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Introduction 
 
Stress has become a prominent topic in the recent years, both in scientific research and 
media talking points. This is no surprise, since more and more surveys underline the fact that it is an 
increasing presence in the life of a growing part of the population and more and more research 
confirms that prolonged stress alters body- and possibly mental-functioning, being a precursor of 
serious disease (McEwen, 2004; McEwen, 2007). While the scientific evidence concerning the 
physiological effects of prolonged stress is continuously blooming, that concerning the effects it 
might have on cognitive mechanisms, higher-order cognition, behavior and decision-making 
processes is very restricted. Yet, considering that stress is a universal response and its chronicity 
potentially impacts a significant part of the population who must take private and professional 
optimal decisions, it is paramount to understand if and how chronic stress impacts individual and 
social decision-making.  
This inquiry is intrinsically important, irrespective of economic cycles, because stress occurs 
indiscriminately and it is now established that decision makers’ rationality is biased and potentially 
subject to psychological and physiological influences (Camerer, 1998; Glimcher and Fehr, 2013). 
However, this interrogation becomes especially relevant in times of economic crisis, when stressors 
multiply (see APA reports below or Faresjö et al., 2013) and, more than ever, optimal decision-
making is necessary to rationally utilize or divide resources and derive the greatest possible benefit 
for both self and society as a whole. 
Throughout the outbreak of the recent economic crisis, the American Psychological 
Association’s yearly report, “Stress in America”, highlighted the fact that stress is on the rise and 
that chronic stress is becoming a public health problem not only for adults, but also for teenagers 
and smaller children (Anderson et al., 2010; Anderson et al., 2012; APA, 2011; APA, 2013; APA, 
2014; APA, 2015). The main stressors individuals identified were money and finances, but, despite 
this burden, emotional support was singled out as a potentially efficient stress buffer. However, 
reports focusing on stress management strategies determined that, most often, individuals will 
accelerate the damaging effects that chronic stress has on health by making poor dietary choices or 
adopting high-risk behaviors like smoking, drinking, or inactivity (for instance in APA, 2007). And, 
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worth noting further, even though the problems created by prolonged stress appear to be universal 
and range so far as to degrade social relationships (APA, 2007), there is a gender difference in 
stress perception, with women reporting higher stress levels and more stress-specific physical and 
psychological symptoms than men.  
In brief, these recent yearly reports underlined the fact that people seem to take poor 
decisions under stress, and the one stress buffer that might function well, social support, is itself 
affected by stress. Further, stress appears to be chiefly caused by one´s financial situation and it 
appears to bear stronger on women than on men. Decisions, therefore, and, pertinent in everyday 
life and mostly during a crisis, financial decisions, are being taken under stress by a growing 
fraction of the population. These survey findings open two main experimental research avenues that 
are up-to-date unexplored: they indicate that stress might impact genders, with different 
magnitudes, by hindering one’s ability to weigh risks and benefits, and that stress could ram the 
way that social relationships are perceived, nourished, and thus valued. It is precisely this the aim of 
the present thesis: to initiate experimental research on chronic stress, higher-order cognition and 
behavior, by deriving a bird´s eye view over gender-specific decision-making and social 
preferences under chronic stress in financially-motivated behaviors. 
The investigation will be initiated by shedding light on decision-making in uncertain 
contexts. The first study presents a standard risk-taking paradigm (for instance, similar to Buckert et 
al., 2014) and investigates if, and to what extent, perceived and biologically measured chronic stress 
affects women´s and men´s risk-taking. This is especially relevant since everyday decisions often 
have uncertain outcomes and are themselves the exit route from problematic physiological and 
psychological states. Furthermore, since money is a source of stress, the object of many decisions, 
and a mean of improving one’s current state, financial risk-taking will be experimentally employed 
as a reliable, relevant model for general, motivation-driven decision-making.  
The second research avenue, concerning if and how social preferences per se are affected by 
chronic stress, will then be approached and examined. In the second study, the biological measure 
of stress is abandoned, since, as revealed in the first study, there is a misalignment between the two 
types of measures and they might therefore reflect different concepts and determine related, yet 
distinctive mechanisms. Until further research clarifies the golden standard for the biological 
assessment of chronic stress, the main aim of this thesis is pursued with a validated, self-reported 
measure: social preferences are evaluated under perceived chronic stress in a well-established social 
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decision-making task, the Dictator Game (Forsythe et al., 1994). Particularly important, social 
preferences are determined in various gender-pairing conditions, since evolutionary psychology 
suggests that not only gender, but also paired gender may determine social behavior under stress. 
Finally, the third study will conclude the dissertation. It builds upon the experimental setting 
used in the second study and derives important methodological remarks regarding gender, gender-
pairing, and framing in social decision-making task design. These contributions are compelling for 
both the study of social decision-making in general, and experimental and behavioral economics, in 
particular. 
The experimental setting of the research that follows belongs to behavioral and experimental 
economics, and integrates methods and presumptions from neuroeconomics. These fields offer the 
opportunity of solid, thorough and reliable experimental practices with high experimental control, 
while integrating measurements of physiological and psychological variables. The next section 
identifies the literature gap that enables the study of economic decision-making under chronic stress 
and outlines the scientific context of the three studies by concisely describing the state-of-the-art of 
the involved fields and shortly defining the concept of stress. 
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Background 
 
 
The investigation of economic decision-making under stress is firstly important because it 
informs research about common choice in a significant part of the population. Secondly, economic 
decision-making, besides the fact that represents a large array of everyday decisions that are 
ultimately motivated by optimal allocations of resources, could also serve as a study platform for 
the category of decisions that are not financially-motivated, but motivated nonetheless. For long, 
decision makers have been thought of as perfectly rational, following a unique goal: the 
maximization of own benefit or payoff (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2002; Edwards, 1954). This entitles 
two associated ideas. For one, thinking and reason are the only determinants of rational choice. 
Second, within an individual’s utility or expected utility function nothing beyond own benefit is 
included, thus accounting for alterity is excluded.  
It is behavioral economics that, through broad experimental evidence, has shifted this homo 
economicus view towards a more factual account of human motivation (for instance, Camerer, 
2004). Investigating decision-making, its motivations, and underlying mechanisms, behavioral 
economics has uncovered and integrated psychological and other internal or contextual variables in 
the rational decision-making models (Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004). As such, individuals are no 
longer defined as perfectly rational, and their decisions are described more accurately, being subject 
to various biases (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). These biases can be reduced if decisions are 
incentivized, and behavior approaches more rational predictions, though it does not turn to perfect 
rationality (Engelmann and Strobel, 2000). This last discovery has entered the realm of 
experimental economics and became a standard experimental feature: financially-motivated 
behaviors reveal true preferences, by excluding interferences form concurrent, confounding 
motivations. Another imperative practice for yielding true preferences, for obvious reasons, is the 
lack of deception. Ergo, behavioral economics has not only helped develop more inclusive, genuine 
models of human decision-making, but has contributed to the settlement of equitable experimental 
practices that are included and, to some extent, challenged in the three studies that follow. 
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Allowing for psychological and contextual variables to add to the rational models explaining 
decision-making has opened up another realm of possibilities. Namely, the recently developed field 
of neuroeconomics has extended the investigation into the biological foundations of behavior and 
decision-making (Glimcher and Fehr, 2013). In neuroeconomics, the brain regions at work are non-
invasively scrutinized and peripheral physiological markers are measured in order to obtain 
objective assessments of the individual’s bodily activation patterns and to connect them to 
behavioral outcomes.  
What is more: economics and, especially, behavioral economics have been preoccupied with 
explaining decisions endorsing trust, competition, risk-taking and delay discounting. While with 
behavioral measures several interesting conclusions have been derived, like the fact that there are 
marked gender differences in some of these behaviors (Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Niederle and 
Vesterlund, 2005; Schwieren and Sutter, 2008), neuroeconomics has further encouraged 
investigations into the psychoneuroendocrinological bases of behavior. For instance, testosterone 
has made its way into experimental economics and has been successfully investigated in relation to 
monetary delay discounting, distrust, social preferences, and risk-taking (Stanton et al., 2011; 
Takahashi et al., 2006; Zak et al., 2005; Zak et al., 2009). A second avenue of 
psychoneuroendocrinological research that has been embraced concerns stress. Thanks to the 
opening towards psychological factors and external influences from behavioral economics, and the 
new toolset of neuroeconomics, stress has begun to capture the attention of numerous researchers. 
Without doubt, the domain of economic decision-making that has been most investigated 
under the influences of stress is risk-taking. While only one pharmacological study explored the 
effects of prolonged exposure to the main stress hormone1 on risk attitudes, measuring some form 
of chronicity (Kandasamy et al., 2014), numerous studies have followed changes in risk-taking 
behavior after acute, momentary stress induction in the laboratory (for a review see Starcke and 
Brand, 2012). The current conclusion is that prolonged exposure to the main stress hormone 
decreases risk-taking, while exposure to acute stress affects risk-taking, but the direction in which it 
does is still subject to debate (for a thorough discussion see Buckert et al., 2014). Some authors 
report that risk-taking increases under acute stress (for instance, Lighthall et al., 2009; Starcke et al., 
2008; van den Bos et al., 2009), while others report different findings (Delaeny et al., 2014; 
Gathmann et al., 2014). Importantly, it seems that, at least under acute stress, the gender differences 
                                                            
1 Cortisol is the main stress hormone; but stress activates two bodily systems, the Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal Axis (HPA), 
quantifiable through cortisol, and the Sympathetic-Adrenal-Medullary Axis (SAM), quantifiable through, for instance, epinephrine or 
salivary alpha amylase (Nater et al., 2006; Whishaw and Kolb, 2005). 
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in economic behavior, e.g., risk-taking, are exacerbated: women choose even less risky options, 
men choose even more (Preston et al., 2007; Lighthall et al., 2009).  
The other two domains of economic decision-making that have been explored under the 
effects of stress are social decision-making2 and delay discounting. If the first route has just been 
opened in von Dawans and colleagues (2012) and increased prosociality is reported in connection to 
acute stress, the second beneficiates already of several explorations, yielding heterogeneous results 
(Fields et al., 2014). Some authors do not find any effect of acute stress on intertemporal choice 
(Haushofer et al., 2013), while others find increased delay discounting rates in cortisol responders 
(Kimura et al., 2013); and still others find increased delay discounting rates with concurrent low 
self-reported perceived stress (Lempert et al., 2012). 
In sum, stress appears to influence economic decision-making and the initial evidence 
encourages further scrutiny. Nonetheless, the studies are limited in number and have focused on 
acute stress. While this offers much needed basic understanding of how neurophysiological 
processes momentarily affect higher-order cognition and behavior, it should not be neglected that, 
as detailed above, stress is often found in its chronic form in a growing part of the population and 
might have more permanent effects on economic decisions, and thus behavior.  Moreover, given the 
difference between acute and chronic stress, knowing the direction of the effects acute stress has on 
economic decision-making might not shed light also on the effects of chronic stress.  
Although the two concepts refer to the metabolic-activation response to an uncontrollable or 
unpredictable demand upon a body’s resources, the difference they code regards exposure periods. 
Acute stress is a momentary response that provides adaptation for survival, while chronic stress 
refers to repeated or prolonged acute stress. It is well known that acute stress can have also 
beneficial effects, while chronic stress triggers mostly damaging effects upon body and, 
importantly, brain structures involved in cognitive processes and decision-making (McEwen, 2004). 
In the light of this evidence, chronic stress is granted a line of research of its own, in connection to, 
but disambiguated from acute stress. Moreover, the limited character of the knowledge about 
chronic stress extends beyond cognitive effects. If acute stress is validly assessed through 
momentary hormonal and arousal markers, chronic stress is mostly assessed through self-reports, 
since there exists no reliable biological measure for it. Against initial hypotheses, perceived chronic 
stress appears not to be connected to existing measures for prolonged stress hormone exposure (for 
                                                            
2 In the form of social preferences (e.g., interpersonal altruism, fairness, reciprocity, inequity aversion), which is why these two 
concepts will be used interchangeably throughout this thesis. 
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instance, Stalder and Kirschbaum, 2012), which further complicates the understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying behavioral changes and changes in decision-making under chronic stress. 
Given this current problem, the first study of this thesis will not only lay the ground for the 
development of a new research line on economic decision-making and chronic stress, but will also 
contribute to the debate concerning biological and self-reported measures of chronic stress. If one of 
the most prevalent economic decision-making domains in behavioral economics is explored in the 
first study, i.e., risk-taking, the second study will expand on the connection between chronic stress 
and a highly important type of decision in everyday life: social decisions, as measured by social 
preferences. Finally, since gender differences have been a staple finding in behavioral economics, 
experimental economics, and stress research, and will also become evident throughout the first two 
studies in this thesis, the third study will comprise methodological aspects regarding the 
experimental scrutiny of gender specific behaviors and gender interactions. Finally, the 
experimental tasks employed throughout this thesis are routinely used and have been widely 
explored in behavioral economics, and became standard references for valid laboratory 
investigations of behavior, assuring that this initial scrutiny of the effects of chronic stress on 
economic decision-making will provide reliable and replicable evidence. 
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Chronic Stress Is Positively Related to Risk-Taking in Young Adults3 
 
 
Abstract 
Chronic stress is a public health problem that affects a significant part of the 
population. While the physiological damage it causes is under ongoing scrutiny, its behavioral 
effects have been overlooked. This is one of the first studies to examine the relation between 
chronic stress and decision-making, using a standard uncertainty paradigm. We measured learning-
independent risk-taking in the gain domain through binary choices between financially incentivized 
lotteries. We then measured self-reported chronic stress with the Trier Inventory for the Assessment 
of Chronic Stress (TICS). We additionally collected hair samples from voluntary participants, in 
order to quantify chronic cortisol exposure. We discovered a significant, positive correlation 
between self-reported chronic stress and risk-taking that is stronger for women than for men. This 
confirms part of the findings in acute stress research: there is a clear connection between high stress 
and increased risk-taking. However, unlike the biologically-based results from acute stress research, 
we did not identify a significant relation between hair cortisol and risk-taking behavior. Yet, in line 
with previous literature, we found a clear gender difference in risk-taking and self-reports: women 
generally take less risk and report slightly higher stress levels than men. We conclude that perceived 
chronic stress might impact behavior in uncertainty conditions and that there might be differences 
in uncertainty and experience processing between men and women. Still, further research is 
necessary in order to unveil the mechanism accounting for these behavioral effects, while 
motivating the divergence between biological and psychological chronic stress measurements.  
Keywords: Chronic Stress · Gender Differences · Risk · Self-reported Measures · Hair Cortisol 
JEL Classification: C91 · D81 · D87 · J16  
PsycINFO Classification: 2340 · 2560 · 3360 
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1 Introduction 
Stress is a domain of research that has increased in popularity in recent years. The reason for 
this heightened interest is the fact that stressors have multiplied proportionally with the amount of 
political and economic uncertainty in the contemporary world, and more and more individuals of all 
ages are affected by it (Anderson et al., 2010). Stress as a physiological phenomenon is double-
sided: it has initially evolved as a useful, acute response to threat or challenge that marshals 
metabolic resources to adapt the body to short-term survival needs. However, when prolonged or 
having multiple sources, stress fosters chronicity, which leads to disease and degradation of bodily 
systems, including those involved in cognition and decision-making (Cacioppo, 1994; Gianaros et 
al., 2007; Juster et al., 2010; Lupien and Lepage, 2001; Lupien and McEwen, 1997; McEwen, 2004; 
McEwen and Sapolsky, 1995). Despite this status quo, the knowledge of how exactly chronic stress 
affects cognitive mechanisms, decisions, and thus behavior remains limited. 
It is especially important, if chronic stress significantly alters cognition and decision-making 
processes, to uncover to which extent and in what manner this happens, because it is through 
optimal and functional decisions that physical and psychological health is re-established and 
behavioral patterns that can further endanger the individual are broken. Moreover, these decisions, 
either individual or social, are taken in uncertainty conditions, and stress might even further distort 
the way options are evaluated or information about alternatives is perceived. We refer here in 
laymen terms to uncertainty as a state of the world in which individuals do not have any guarantee 
that the option they chose out of all possible alternatives will always yield the outcome they 
expect4, independent of any other conditions.  
For instance, given a certain disease, there might be alternative treatments available, but no 
full assurance that one of them is going to provide the cure in each and every situation5. Instead, 
based on scientific studies, observations and health records, there is a certain probability associated 
with each of the treatments’ success rates. The decision then is defined by choosing between these 
treatments or no treatment at all6. This type of situation, where one knows the possible outcomes of 
                                                            
4 We continue using the term “uncertainty” below in the economic sense, and will refer to it as defined by Ellsberg (1961), to include 
both risky and ambiguous situations. 
5 In fact, the existence of multiple alternatives in a decision could already be considered a proof of uncertainty: if only one option 
would exist where the outcome is known and it occurs at all times, in all conditions, then there would be no further need for 
alternative options. 
6 Choosing no treatment at all can bring about several different outcomes, as well, but, for the purpose of categorizing the types of 
uncertain situation, we suppose the outcomes of refusing all treatments are known, as well as their respective probabilities. 
 13 
 
the different options involved in a decision and the probability associated to the occurrence of each 
of the outcomes, is known in the economics literature as a risky situation. In contrast, one could 
face a newly discovered or less understood disease for which treatments have not been fully 
developed yet. In this situation, there might exist an experimental treatment that has just been 
discovered and it could yield several outcomes: curing, ameliorating, aggravating, or not curing the 
disease. However, since the treatment is experimental, no one knows what the probability 
associated with any of these outcomes might be. The decision then is defined by choosing between 
this treatment and no treatment at all7. This type of situation, where one knows the possible 
outcomes of the different options involved in a decision but not the probability associated to the 
occurrence of each of the outcomes, is known in the economics literature as an ambiguous situation. 
Of course, situations in the world are not only risky or ambiguous, but there is an entire continuum 
ranging from full certainty, where an outcome occurs every time, to full uncertainty, where not all 
outcomes and none of their probabilities are known (see, for instance, Starcke and Brand, 2012). 
Nonetheless, given the uncertain character of most situations, modeling decisions in standard 
paradigms as either risk or ambiguity can prove to be a valuable resource in reliable and replicable 
decision-making research.   
In fact, in both experimental economics and stress research decisions have been modeled in 
the laboratory as either risky or ambiguous decisions (see, for instance, Buckert et al., 2014; Starcke 
and Brand, 2012). Stress research has mainly focused on using financial risk-taking paradigms to 
study decision-making under stress. Even though most experimental work in the stress and 
decision-making field concentrated on acute stress and results are heterogeneous in terms of 
direction, the current conclusion is that decision-making under acute stress is altered (Starcke and 
Brand, 2012). This finding is not only relevant for overstressed stock traders that influence entire 
economies, but also for other vulnerable groups as, for instance, public employees dealing with 
emergency situations - like firemen, medical doctors, or policemen (Trautmann, 2014). Moreover, 
under the premises of increasing stress in the contemporary society and the uncertain character of 
most decisions individuals face daily, the fact that stress affects decisions under uncertainty 
becomes relevant for all individuals, especially since it has been shown that cortisol levels8 increase 
with increasing contextual uncertainty (Coates and Herbert, 2008). Finally, a third premise justifies 
our avenue in the present study: with increasing levels of stress, prolonged exposure to stress and 
                                                            
7 Here we suppose the outcomes of not taking the experimental treatment are known, but their occurrence probabilities are unknown. 
8 Cortisol is the main stress hormone; it is employed as a biological marker of the stress response.  
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the multiplication of stressors, not only acute stress, but also stress chronicity might impact 
decisions in uncertain situations. We thus propose one of the first investigations of decision-making 
under chronic stress9 and chronic cortisol exposure and aim to assess if the reported effects of 
momentary stress on decisions maintain, especially those on risk-taking. 
 
2 Literature  
Stress has been defined as the specific physiological response that the body initiates when 
confronted with an unpredictable or uncontrollable demand, i.e., a threat or a challenge10, which 
triggers changes in homeostasis (Koolhaas et al., 2011). This acute, momentary response comprises 
the activation of the Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal (HPA) Axis, assessable through cortisol 
release, and the activation of the Sympathetic-Adrenal-Medullary (SAM) Axis, assessable through 
epinephrine release or salivary alpha amylase (sAA) (Kirschbaum and Hellhammer, 1989; Nater et 
al., 2006; van Stegeren et al., 2008; Whishaw and Kolb, 2005). If this type of acute activation is 
either repeated or prolonged, the stress becomes chronic and the bodily systems become exhausted, 
paving the way for disease (McEwen, 2004). Up to date, there is no measure as robust and valid for 
chronic stress as the salivary or plasma cortisol and salivary alpha amylase for acute stress11, even if 
several biological measures have been explored (Cacioppo et al., 1998; Dickerson and Kemeny, 
2004; McEwen, 2000; Pruessner et al., 1999; Wüst et al., 2000) and some offered very optimistic 
perspectives (Klein et al., 2004; Stalder and Kirschbaum, 2012a). However, for both acute and 
chronic stress, there is another measurable facet: the perceived experience.  
Several self-report measures have been developed for chronic stress (Cohen et al., 1983; 
Fliege et al., 2005; Levenstein et al., 1993; Schulz et al., 2004) and, in acute stress research visual 
analogue scales and momentary emotional assessments are often utilized (for instance, see 
Kirschbaum et al., 1999). Given these different facets of stress, two natural questions arose: the first 
question regards the correlation between physiological measures of stress and the self-reported 
                                                            
9 Throughout this study we refer to chronic stress as the perceived, self-reported facet of stress, while to chronic cortisol exposure as 
to the longer-term exposure to increased cortisol secretion. However, as will be discussed later, because of a limited sample size of 
hair donators, we refrain from advertising, underlining, or advancing concluding statements in connection to chronic cortisol 
exposure and its relation to perceived chronic stress and decision-making. 
10 The way this external or internal demand is perceived, i.e., either as challenge or threat (thus dealing with positive stress, eustress, 
or negative stress, distress), can influence the magnitude of the stress response and the strain it places on the bodily systems (see 
more on appraisal in Lazarus, 1990). 
11 But see important considerations (Hansen et al., 2008a; Hansen et al., 2008b; Jensen et al., 2014). 
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experience, while the second question examines whether potential biological measures of stress 
chronicity assess actual prolonged acute stress, i.e., if they correlate with averaged acute stress. To 
answer the first question, cortisol release fluctuates with induced changes in affect (Buchanan et al., 
1999), but the relation between biologically measured and self-reported acute stress is characterized 
by heterogeneous results (for instance, Buchanan et al. 1999; Hellhammer and Schubert, 2012; 
Hjortskov et al., 2004; Vinkers et al., 2013; von Dawans et al., 2012). This might be motivated by 
the time-lag between endocrine responses and psychological responses to stress, the former 
occurring later (Schlotz et al., 2008). For the relation between self-reported chronic stress and 
biological measures of chronic stress the jury is still out, since there is no golden-standard for 
quantifying chronic stress. However, lately, most research in the field has concentrated on the 
novel, promising measurement of cortisol in hair.  
Hair cortisol concentration (HCC) is a new, intraindividually stable measure of chronic HPA 
axis activity that can provide a monthly calendar of cortisol exposure12 (Meyer and Novak, 2012; 
Russell et al., 2012; Stalder and Kirschbaum, 2012a; Stalder et al., 2012b). While possibly affected 
by hair-washing frequency (Hamel et al., 2011) but robust to hair-coloring, smoking, and oral 
contraceptive use (Dettenborn et al., 2012a), HCC varies across body regions, with diurnal change, 
with reactivity to environmental stressors, with gender (men have higher levels, cf. Dettenborn et 
al., 2012a), and shows localization effects (Sharpley et al., 2012). Nonetheless, research has reliably 
reported increased HCC in athletes, pregnant women, unemployed individuals, stressed neonates, 
individuals suffering from chronic pain, as well as people working in shifts, having been through 
major life events, or having some mental disorders (D’Anna-Hernandez et al., 2011; Gerber et al., 
2012; Kirschbaum et al., 2009; Staufenbiel et al., 2013). 
Despite its potentiality, hair cortisol concentrations are not generally correlated with 
perceived chronic stress13 (Dowlati et al., 2010; Karlen et al., 2011; Stalder et al., 2012c; van 
Holland et al., 2012 ), but with major life events, proneness to psychological disease (Karlen et al., 
2011), depression (Dettenborn et al., 2012b), increased cardiovascular risk and increased risk of 
type 2 diabetes mellitus (Manenschijn et al., 2013), BMI (Stalder et al., 2012c), and with caregiving 
burden and depressiveness in dementia caregivers (Stalder et al., 2014). As an exception, there 
                                                            
12 The average hair growth rate is 1 cm/ month, so in each 1-cm segment of hair there is information about monthly exposure, with 
the closest cm to the scalp encompassing the latest month, the second closest the second latest month, and so on. For a thorough 
state-of-the-art review and detailed explanations see Stalder and Kirschbaum (2012a). 
13 Except for one reported association to the Social Overload Scale of the Trier Inventory for the Assessment of Chronic Stress 
(Stalder et al., 2012c). 
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seems to exist an association between perceived chronic stress and HCC in special subpopulations 
like unemployed individuals (Dettenborn et al., 2010), pregnant women (Kalra et al., 2007), cocaine 
users (Grassi-Oliveira, 2012), or, if detectable in a subsample of the general population, this 
association is mediated by ethnic identity and socioeconomic status (O´Brien et al., 2013).  
The second question surrounding the various measures of stress refers to whether chronic 
cortisol exposure measures like HCC assess stress chronicity, i.e., if they are associated to averaged 
acute stress over a longer period. The answer seems to be positive (van Holland et al., 2012), as 
some report general significant correlations between HCC and average blood cortisol (Xie et al., 
2011), while others confirm it with HCC and salivary cortisol in specific samples like pregnant 
women (D’Anna-Hernandez et al., 2011). Notwithstanding, it appears that this correlation does not 
maintain ad infinitum a positive trend, as an initial high cortisol reactivity (and correlated HCC 
levels), when prolonged, might exhaust the physiological systems and later result in hypoactivation 
(Kudielka et al., 2006). In fact, a recent report on hair cortisol and perceived stress and health 
questionnaires shows that this might be the case. Greek youth, who have been subject to multiple, 
prolonged acute stressors owing to major national economic difficulties, report higher perceived 
stress, more depressive symptoms, more anxiety, and more major life events, while having lower 
cortisol levels in hair than equivalent Swedes (Faresjö et al., 2013). 
It is not only the development of biological markers for chronic stress and the establishment 
of hypocortisolism or hypercortisolism patterns under chronic stress that received less attention than 
acute stress in the field, but also basic research concerning how chronic stress affects cognition, 
decision-making, and thus behavior. In terms of altered cognition, it has been suggested that acute 
stress negatively affects reaction times, feedback learning and learning from negative outcomes, 
working memory and encoding, as well as retrieval and memory for socially important information 
(Buchanan et al., 2006; Buchanan and Tranel, 2008; Kuhlmann et al., 2005; Petzold et al., 2010; 
Preston et al., 2007; Putman et al., 2004; Roelofs et al., 2005; Schoofs et al., 2008; Smeets et al., 
2008; Takahashi et al., 2004; but see also Soravia et al., 2006), while attention tunneling might 
enable beneficial effects, facilitating the disregard of peripheral information (Staal, 2004). Yet, if 
we return to chronic stress, the way it affects cognitive mechanisms is less researched 
experimentally and current conclusions are based on limited evidence.  
Initial proposals assert that chronic stress generally affects performance in individuals with 
high stress sensitivity (Baradell and Klein, 1993) and adversely impacts neurological structures 
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involved in learning, memory and decision-making (Lupien and Lepage, 2001; Lupien and 
McEwen, 1997), disrupting, among others, excitatory working memory networks (Hains et al., 
2009). While it seems to have no effect on reaction times (Schwabe et al., 2008), chronic stress 
appears to affect learning and memory similarly to acute stress (Schwabe et al., 2010), targeting the 
quality of learning: stimulus-response learning strategies, i.e., habit learning, are used instead of 
more flexible strategies (Schwabe et al., 2008). Also, short-term memory processing is slower 
(Brand et al., 2000) and long-term memory is probably affected because of specific decrease of grey 
matter volume in the hippocampus (Gianaros et al., 2007). Finally, a process that might be 
heightened, but not beneficial, is the memory for fear-arousing events. Chronic stress seems to 
improve it and thus lead to a higher sensitivity for negative experiences, a propensity to see risks 
and threats where none exist, and to experience depression and learnt helplessness (Conrad et al., 
1999; Kademian et al. 2004; Korte, 2001; Luethi et al., 2008; Sapolsky, 2000). This last piece of 
evidence is highly relevant for the present study, where we explore decision-making under chronic 
stress in contexts of uncertainty. One could already, based on the above evidence, propose that 
chronic stress would foster risk aversion14.  
However, this hypothesis cannot be settled yet, since it has been both confirmed and 
rejected before. The only existing study on chronic cortisol exposure and decision-making15 showed 
that cortisol administration increased risk aversion (Kandasamy et al., 2014), while a handful of 
studies on decision-making under acute stress report increased risk loving behavior. Kandasamy et 
al. (2014) administered hydrocortisone (pharmaceutical cortisol) in a placebo-controlled, double-
blind study to 36 participants of both genders over 8 days. They then asked participants to complete 
several tasks assessing risk preferences and discovered that while acute cortisol increase has no 
effect on risk aversion, chronic cortisol exposure increases risk aversion independent of gender. 
While we cannot equate chronic cortisol exposure to chronic stress16, this evidence should not be 
ignored.  
On the other hand, it has been shown that biologically assessed acute stress affects decision-
making under uncertainty (Buckert et al., 2014; Starcke and Brand, 2012). Possibly in a time-
dependent manner (Pabst et al., 2013c), risk-taking increases under acute stress (Lighthall et al., 
2009; Pabst et al., 2013a; Preston et al., 2007; Starcke et al., 2008; van den Bos et al., 2009). There 
                                                            
14 Risk aversion translates in behavior by avoiding risk, i.e., choosing less risky options as compared to options offering certainty. 
15 But see also Ceccato et al. (2014) for social decision-making where chronic stress affects women´s transfers in a Dictator Game. 
16 See the results on the association between the two. 
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is also counterevidence (Gathmann et al., 2014), but this heterogeneity in results is, as detailed in 
Buckert et al. (2014), due to the heterogeneity in stressors and design-relevant factors like the 
decision domains or the different ways of varying probabilities and reward values in the tasks. For 
instance, the decision-making domain seems to yield differential effects under stress (for further 
explanations see Buckert et al., 2014). A prominent theory in behavioral economics defines that, 
independent of any emotional state, individuals are generally risk averse for gains, while risk loving 
for losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979)17. Acute stress seems to potentiate this natural 
predisposition, mainly in the gain domain: risk-taking decreases (Buckert et al., 2014; Porcelli and 
Delgado, 2009), but others report no effect (Pabst et al., 2013b).  
Acute stress seems to potentiate yet another natural tendency: gender differences in risk 
attitudes. While most people are generally risk averse and their risk attitudes are unstable 
(Bernoulli, 1954; Coates and Herbert, 2008; Guiso et al., 2013), women are more risk averse than 
men (Eckel and Grosssman, 2008). Under acute stress, these general tendencies are enhanced: risk 
aversion increases in women and risk seeking increases in men (Preston et al., 2007; Lighthall et al., 
2009). However, these differential effects disappear for very high cortisol levels (van den Bos et al., 
2009) or are not sustained by data at all (Starcke et al., 2008; Pabst et al., 2013a, b). Again, these 
mixed results are explainable by design and stressor heterogeneity (see Buckert et al., 2014). 
Considering all this evidence, we implemented our aim of exploring decision-making under 
chronic stress and chronic cortisol exposure in uncertainty conditions in the standard risk-taking 
paradigm employed in stress research and behavioral economics. However, we had to take into 
account more than gender-modulated stress effects on risk aversion and  encompass in the 
hypotheses another important gender difference.  The only reliable way to measure chronic stress 
appears to be the use of self-reports and these further differ between genders, with women reporting 
more psychological distress compared to men, even if these accounts rarely parallel physiological 
processes (Frankenhäuser et al., 1976; Collins and Frankenhäuser, 1978; Matud, 2004; Schlotz et 
al., 2011). We thus defined three testable hypotheses below. 
                                                            
17 Prospect Theory explains that when dealing with possible gains individuals prefer fixed amounts instead of risky gambles, even if 
the risky gamble offers a higher, mathematically expected reward (see the Experimental Design section for an actual example). 
Instead, when dealing with potential losses, individuals prefer to gamble, hoping they will decrease their debt, than having to pay a 
fixed amount. In sum, risk is more attractive when potential losses are involved than when potential gains are in perspective. 
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3 Hypotheses  
Hypothesis 1         Despite mixed results concerning the direction, initial findings seem to indicate 
that acute stress affects risk-taking. Given that chronic stress presupposes prolonged or multiple 
exposures to acute stressors, we expect that also chronic stress is related to risk-taking. And, since 
ambiguity pertains to the domain of uncertainty, we expect, in addition, that chronic stress is 
associated to ambiguity-taking, too. 
Hypothesis 2          A carefully controlled recent study showed that chronic cortisol administration 
decreases risk-taking, i.e., increases risk aversion. We expect that chronic cortisol exposure, as 
measured in hair samples, will also positively relate to risk aversion (and ambiguity aversion). 
Hypothesis 3      When assessing past experience and affect, women report higher levels of 
distress and specific symptoms than men. We expect to replicate this finding in the self-report 
chronic stress measure we use (the Trier Inventory for the Assessment of Chronic Stress, TICS). 
 
4 Experimental Design  
4.1 The task 
We measured financial risk-taking behavior in the gain domain in a pen-and-paper 
incentivized task, which we followed up with a spontaneous, real investment decision (more details 
in the Procedure) and a question exploring self-reported general risk-taking. The risk-taking task 
followed, for comparability, a standard paradigm and consisted of 25 binary choices between a safe 
lottery18 offering 2.25 € and a risky lottery, a supplement of 5 binary choices between the same safe 
lottery and an ambiguous lottery, as well as 3 control trials proposing choices between the safe 
lottery and another safe lottery offering a higher amount. The task follows the design used in 
Buckert et al. (2014) and Hayden et al. (2010). Each of the 33 choices was randomly displayed on a 
separate page. On each of the 33 task pages participants saw two options simultaneously (Figure 1) 
and circled the one they chose. For instance, in the upper leftmost pictogram of Figure 1, 
                                                            
18 We use the term “lottery” interchangeable with the term “gamble” and we refer to situations where outcome success is governed 
by chance; in this case, the payoff is determined by blindly drawing a colored ball out of a container with two differently colored 
balls. In the present case the lottery´s probabilities are graphically depicted by colored segments composing a bar and directly 
presented as mathematical proportions of certain-colored balls out of the constant total of 100 balls (Figure 1). 
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participants would choose between option A yielding 2.50 € with probability 10% (10 out of 100 
balls are yellow) and 0 € with probability 90% (90 out of 100 balls are green), and option B where 
one would get 2.25 € for sure (100 out of 100 balls are blue). In this case, the expected value19 of 
the lottery depicted by option A is much smaller than that of B (0.25 € versus 2.25 €), so the 
rational choice would be option B.  
All three types of trials are depicted in Figure 1 and details regarding the options are 
presented in Table 1. The 25 trials involving risk combined five reward values, from 2.50 € to 22.50 
€, and five wining probability levels, from 10% to 90%, exploring a wide range of risky decisions 
(see Table 1). Given that the alternative option for these risky option was always a safe option 
offering 2.25 €, the combinations of value and probabilities yielded ten lotteries where the expected 
value was smaller than what the safe one offered, five trials with equal expected value to that of the 
safe alternative, and ten trials with a higher expected value than that of the safe one. The 5 
ambiguity trials were meant to pilot the task for higher uncertainty levels.  
All lotteries coded their specific uncertainty level through colored bar segments20 
composing the bar, as in Buckert et al. (2014), Hayden et al. (2010), and Putman et al. (2010), and 
they actually existed in the form of bags containing colored balls in various proportions (photos 
attached in the Appendix). Participants were shown the bags with colored balls and were assured 
that the task is real, even if they used pen-an-paper means to express and record their choices. The 
potential reward of each option was written, in the corresponding color, above and under the bar for 
lotteries containing two types of balls, and either above or under the bar for safe lotteries containing 
one type of balls only. A safe choice was represented by an option where all 100 balls were of the 
same color (Figure 1, choice B in the first pictogram). A random draw would always result in the 
same colored ball, i.e., a blue ball, and would thus always yield 2.25 €. A risky choice, on the other 
hand, was represented by an option where a draw would result in one of two differently colored 
balls (Figure 1, choice A in the first pictogram), i.e., either a yellow ball or a green ball, and would 
yield either 0 € or 2.50 €. An ambiguous choice was represented by an option where a draw could 
                                                            
19 The expected value or expected return is the mathematical value of an uncertain event. It is computed by multiplying the possible 
outcome (a positive reward in our case) by its corresponding probability. For example, in Figure 1, the upper left choice is between a 
risky option with an expected value of (0.10 x 2.50 €) + (0.90 x 0 €) = 0.25 € (see Table 1, first row, third column) and a safe option 
with an expected value of 1.00 x 2.25 € = 2.25 €. 
20 Probabilities for each possible outcome are coded by the color distribution of the bar. The height of the different colored segments 
signals the proportion of balls of a certain color; the proportion is also written on top of every colored segment. For instance, in the 
first pictogram of Figure 1 the 10/ 100 proportion is written on top of the yellow segment, explaining that 10 out of 100 balls are 
yellow. 
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yield one of two differently colored balls, but the proportion of balls was covered by a grey 
occluder signed with a question mark (Figure 1, first pictogram in second row, choice A). A draw 
would result in one of two colored balls, i.e., either a yellow ball or a blue ball, and would yield 
either 0 € or 2.50 €. However, the chance of drawing a certain color was unknown because the exact 
distribution of balls could not be seen. Finally, three control trials were introduced to make sure 
participants understood the task and are not providing automatic or naïve responses by, for instance, 
choosing always option A, indifferent of the reward they could get or the number of balls associated 
with a particular reward. A control trial consisted of a binary choice between two safe alternatives, 
i.e., both containing 100 same-colored balls. A draw from any of these two alternatives would 
always yield the same payoff, since all balls were of the same color in both options (Figure 1, last 
pictogram). However, each of the two options in the control trials offered a different reward: one 
always offered the 2.25 € and it was the same safe alternative from the risk and ambiguity trials, 
while the other offered a higher amount (see Table 1, last row).  
In all three types of trials, risky, ambiguous or control, all factors were randomized: the 
color of the balls yielding the non-zero uncertain amount (blue, green, or yellow), the color of the 
balls yielding the alternative zero amount (blue, green, or yellow), the color of the balls yielding the 
safe amount (blue, green, or yellow), the position of the safe alternative (left or right side of the 
screen), the position of the uncertain or control alternative (left or right side of the screen), the 
position of the safe amount (above or below bar), the position of the zero and non-zero uncertain 
amounts (above or below the bar). Also, there was no feedback for the decisions and no time limit 
for completing the task. 
In order to analyze the data from this task, we quantified risk-taking into a metric variable 
ranging from 0 to 25. This represents the frequency of choosing the risky option in the 25 binary 
choices representing risk-taking (rows 1-5 in Table 1). Ambiguity-taking was quantified into a 
different metric variable ranging from 0 to 5 and it represents the frequency of choosing the 
ambiguous option in the 5 binary choices measuring ambiguity-taking (row 6 in Table 1). Finally, 
task understanding was measured with a metric variable ranging from 0 to 3. It encodes the 
frequency of choosing the safe option with the highest payment. 
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Figure 1: Example of Task Trials 
 
 
 
Note: Six sample pages from the task. First row: Examples of trials involving risky choices. Colored segments indicate the proportion of differently-
colored balls. Winnable amounts are written in the corresponding color and the proportion of balls is written on each related colored segment. It is 
also indicated by the height of the colored segment. Second row: Two examples of ambiguity trials and one example of a control trial (last 
pictogram).  
 
 
Table 1: Description of Task Trials 
Type of trial 
Probability of receiving  
the non-zero amount 
Non-zero amount receivable upon choosing the alternative option 
2.50 € 
(+11.11%) 
3.00 € 
(33.33%) 
4.50 € 
(+100%) 
9.00 € 
(+300%) 
22.50 € 
(+900%) 
Risk 10 % 0.25 € 0.30 € 0.45 € 0.90 € 2.25 € 
Risk 25 % 0.63 € 0.75 € 1.13 € 2.25 € 5.63 € 
Risk 50 % 1.25 € 1.50 € 2.25 € 4.50 € 11.25 € 
Risk 75 % 1.88 € 2.25 € 3.38 € 6.75 € 16.88 € 
Risk 90 % 2.25 € 2.70 € 4.05 € 8.10 € 20.25 € 
Ambiguity ? (50 %) 1.25 € 1.50 € 2.25 € 4.50 € 11.25 € 
Control 100 % 2.50 € 3.00 € 4.50 € - - 
Note: The cells in columns 3-7 display the expected values of the 33 randomly played task trials. Choices are always made between a safe option 
yielding 2.25 € and a risky, ambiguous, or control option. The first five rows (columns 3-7) display the expected values of the 25 risky options, with 
expected values equal to the safe choice on the bottom-left to top-right diagonal. Row six (columns 3-7) shows the expected values of the five 
ambiguous alternatives, where the rationally presumed probability distribution is 50% for each of the two colored ball types. The last row (columns 3-
7) presents the expected value of the three control trials. 
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4.2 Procedure 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Heidelberg, Germany, and participants 
were recruited either during coursework and completed the experiment in class, or through the 
ORSEE pool (Greiner, 2004) and completed the experiment in the laboratory. In class, participants 
were seated in every other seat for privacy reasons, while in the laboratory they were seated in 
private cubicles. All their information, responses and choices remained anonymous. The experiment 
debuted with reading the instructions aloud, so that participants would understand that everybody 
else was accomplishing the same task (instructions are attached in the Appendix). While describing 
the options, the research assistants showed the actual bags containing the colored balls (photos in 
the Appendix) and explained that the payment of each participant will be decided, at the end, by 
herself/ himself, through drawing a ball out of the corresponding bag. Further, participants were 
told that they would also determine, by drawing one code out of the 33 possible, which of the trials 
will be played, i.e., for which specific probability distribution they have to draw a ball from the 
corresponding bag. In this way, both randomness and trust were assured. Finally, participants were 
also introduced to the possibility of donating, at the end of the study, a hair sample. 
After the participants completed the task and the demographic and psychometric 
questionnaires, they went to the payment table, one by one, and their final payoff was determined. 
First, they drew, from a bag containing codes for all the 33 trials they responded to (photo in the 
Appendix), which of the trials they should play. After the trial was chosen, a research assistant 
checked which option the participant chose for that respective trial, i.e., the safe option or the 
alternative one. If the safe option was chosen, the participant was paid the 2.25 € corresponding to 
it, together with the fixed 3 € participation fee. If the participant had chosen the alternative option, 
the research assistant paid the safe amount if it was one of the control trials or selected the 
corresponding bag and gave the participant the opportunity to blindly draw a ball from the 
respective risky or ambiguous container. The color of the drawn ball decided then the final payoff, 
which was paid to the participant along with the fixed 3 € participation fee. 
Finally, after receiving the payment and privately signing the receipt, the participant was 
asked to invest the amount he/ she just gained, partly or in total, in a gamble that offered the chance 
of doubling the investment. This new lottery was constructed as a real-world risk-taking task where 
money one has consumed time and invested effort for is at stake. Compared to the risk-taking task 
above, where one could argue that participants were gambling with potential money, in the 
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investment task participants had to use actually owned money. However, the advantage of the 
measure derived from the experimental task is that it averages over a wide array of winning 
probabilities and values. It is thus a better estimation of real-world behavior where decisions under 
uncertainty occur in various conditions. The outcome of the investment was decided by a coin flip. 
The participant himself/ herself threw the coin and had a 50% chance of doubling the invested 
amount and a 50% chance of losing it entirely. We measured this with a metric variable showing 
the proportion of the payoff that the participant invested (from 0% to 100%). After deciding on the 
investment task, he/ she either left, if the invested amount was null, or threw the coin and either 
received double the gambled amount, or received nothing, if the invested amount was non-null. 
 
4.3 Participants 
The total sample included 205 young adults who participated in the study either in class (N 
= 67) or in the laboratory (N = 128)21. The sample used for analysis included only 195 observations, 
as nine participants were excluded because of taking prescription medication for psychiatric 
conditions and one participant was excluded because of participating for a second time in the 
experiment. Only 51 of the 195 participants donated hair for cortisol analysis, making the self-
reported stress and biological stress samples incomparable. The mean age of our final sample was 
22.74 years and ranged from 18 to 33 years with 56.92% women and 43.07% men.  
 
4.4 Control variables 
We aimed to uncover the relationship between perceived chronic stress, chronic cortisol 
exposure, and risk-taking in the absence of most measurable confounding factors. In order to attain 
this, we collected demographic and psychometric data, controlling for age, income, expertise in 
economics, acute stress, anxiety, depression, stress reactivity, medication for chronic disease and 
oral contraceptives. To measure acute stress we elicited momentary self-reports through a visual 
analogue scale from 0 to 100 (see Kirschbaum et al., 1999). We are aware of the fact that the 
correlation between physiological and self-reported measures of acute stress has yielded 
                                                            
21 There is no significant difference in risk-taking behavior or reported stress levels between class and laboratory participants (p = 
.17; p = .37) 
 25 
 
heterogeneous results (for instance, Vinkers et al., 2013; but also Buchanan et al. 1999; 
Hellhammer and Schubert 2012; von Dawans et al., 2012), but, in the absence of momentary 
biological measures, it encodes some degree of emotional activation. To screen for depression and 
anxiety, both possible consequences of chronic stress and conditions interfering with the cortisol 
mechanism of stress (Dettenborn et al., 2012b; O’Donovan et al., 2010), we used the validated 
German version of the HADS- the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (Herrmann-Lingen et al., 
2011). Finally, we included, as a brief measure of stress reactivity, the short five-item version of the 
PSRS, the Perceived Stress Reactivity Scale (Schlotz et al., 2011). 
 
4.5 The chronic stress measure 
We measured self-reported chronic stress with the validated German TICS questionnaire. 
The Trier Inventory for the Assessment of Chronic Stress (Schulz and Schlotz, 1999; Schulz et al., 
2004) yields subjective reports of the experiences individuals have had in the last three months. 57 
items on a 5-point Likert scale (“never”, “infrequent”, “sometimes”, “frequent”, “and very 
frequent”) evaluate chronic stress through nine subscales: “excessive workload”, “excessive social 
demand”, “pressure to be successful”, “dissatisfaction at work”, “mental overload at work”, “lack of 
social recognition”, “social tensions”, “social isolation” and “chronic anxiety”. The TICS can be 
completed in 10-15 minutes (Schwabe et al., 2008).  
We followed to assess naturally-occurring levels of chronic stress towards the end of the 
winter semester, in November - December 2012 and January - February 2013. This period includes 
handing in final reports and projects, the winter holidays, exam preparation and exam taking and 
should therefore provide us with variance with respect to chronic stress. As the span of the stressful 
period is rather short for each individual student, we modified the original TICS questionnaire and 
assessed experience pertaining to the last month, instead of the last three months. The inter-item 
reliability analysis showed that our modification is valid, as the version we employed is as reliable 
as the original version22. To avoid multiple testing and maintain the standard we used in another 
study (Ceccato et al., 2015), we followed the TICS scoring procedure from Schwabe and colleagues 
(Schwabe et al., 2008): we summed up a total chronic stress score by adding the 57 items into a 
continuous variable. 
                                                            
22 Inter-item reliability analysis for the modified TICS and descriptives are included in Tables 6 and 7 in the Appendix. 
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4.6 The hair cortisol measure 
  We collected hair samples from voluntary participants as described in Kirschbaum et 
al. (2009) and as instructed on the webpage of the Biopsychology Laboratory, Dresden 
University23, where samples were then analyzed. We used fine scissors to cut two hair strands from 
two sites in a posterior vertex position, as close as possible to the scalp. Since we modified the 
perceived chronic stress questionnaire to reflect the participant´s experience in the latest month, we 
collected samples of minimum 1-cm segments closest to the scalp and we ordered analyses for this 
proximal segment. The average weight per hair segment was 7.5 mg ± 0.5 mg. We additionally 
collected relevant data in connection to the hair samples: the number of washes/ week, hair 
treatments and natural hair color. Both the hair data and the task were marked with the same unique 
code that the participant composed according to an algorithm (instructions on code composition are 
in the Appendix). 
 
4.7 Statistical analysis 
We analyzed the data using SPSS version 20 with two-tailed tests for the undirected 
hypotheses and one-tailed tests for the directed hypotheses. The significance threshold was set at p 
< .05. Behavior was analyzed by performing appropriate correlations between variables denoting 
chronic stress or chronic cortisol exposure and risk-taking, ambiguity-taking and risky investment. 
To test the hypotheses that required mean comparisons we used either t-tests or Mann-Whitney U 
tests, in function of data normality. Finally, we assessed the robustness of the results in an OLS 
regression model controlling for all measured confounding variables. 
 
5 Results   
5.1 Chronic stress is positively associated with risk-taking  
We begin by testing Hypothesis 1 and exploring whether chronic stress, measured by the 
TICS, is associated with choices in uncertain contexts. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the 
main variables in our study and, due to previously reported gender differences, the values are 
                                                            
23 http://p113367.typo3server.info/index.php?id=183&L=1 
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calculated for both the overall sample and for each gender separately. Further, Table 3 includes the 
correlational results for the tested associations. To assess behavior under uncertainty we used the 
propensity to choose risky gambles in the task, but we supplement our conclusion with results from 
self-reported risk-taking, ambiguity-taking in the task, and participants’ investment in a real 
gamble. The propensity to choose risky gambles in the task was calculated as the frequency of 
choosing the risky lottery in the 25 risky trials. On average, participants chose 10.07 risky lotteries 
out of 25 possible. Exactly 10 lotteries were offering a higher expected value than the 2.25 € safe 
alternative. We partly accept Hypothesis 1, since there is a significant positive correlation between 
risk-taking in the task and the TICS score (r = .18*; p = .011) (see Table 3). 
Self-reported risk-taking was measured through a visual analogue scale from 0 to 10, where 
participants pinpointed their general willingness to take risks. This measure has been previously 
validated as a good approximation of real-world behavior under risk (Dohmen et al., 2011) and, 
even if hypothetical, it is a convenient and fast alternative to risk-taking tasks. We can confirm the 
validity of this self-report: participants declared that their average risk attitude is situated in-
between extreme risk lovingness and extreme risk aversion (5.17 on the 0 to 10 scale), which 
approximates well their behavior in the task, where they took risks 40% of the time (the correlation 
between the two yields r = .35; p <.001). However, overall, self-reported risk-taking is not 
significantly related to perceived chronic stress, even though the trend shows the same direction as 
that specified in Hypothesis 1. But women’s self-reports correlate positively with perceived stress 
levels (rs = .25; p = .024).  
As a different proxy for behavior under uncertainty, the propensity to choose ambiguous 
gambles was measured in the task24 by the frequency of choosing the ambiguous lottery in the 5 
ambiguity trials. On average, participants chose 1.42 ambiguous lotteries out of 5 possible (28%), 
less than the proportion of risky choices. Again, this measure is not significantly associated with 
stress levels overall. However, the positive association trend set by risky choices is confirmed and 
women´s stress levels are significantly related to choices under ambiguity (rs = .23; p = .039).  
Finally, we asked participants to invest, if wanted, their recent payoff from the experiment 
in a spontaneous gamble where a coin throw would determine if the invested amount would double 
or vanish. The proportion invested correlates significantly with both task-measured risk-taking and 
self-reported risk-taking (rs = .25; p = .001; rs = .22; p = .003), but is not related to chronic stress 
                                                            
24 To pilot a future study, thus the limited number of choices covering a discrete interval of ambiguity. 
 28 
 
levels (rs = .01; p = .905). In sum, we confirm that self-reported chronic stress is significantly and 
positively associated with risk-taking measured by an incentive compatible task, while decisions 
under ambiguity are only significantly associated with stress levels for women.  
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for the Main Variables  
Variable Overall Women Men 
    
N 195 84 111 
    
Age - M (Me; SD) 22.74 (22.00; 2.46) 22.46 (22.00; 2.07) 22.95 (22.00; 2.71) 
    
% Females - fq 43.07% 100% 0% 
    
HCC (pg/mg) 
- M (Me), (SD) N 
7.04 (5.91) 
(3.60) 51 
6.26 (4.41) 
(3.75) 21 
7.59 (7.12) 
(3.45) 30 
    
TICS - M (Me; SD) 83.50 (84.00; 26.03) 87.43 (85.50; 24.71) 80.52 (80.00; 26.71) 
    
Risk-taking frequency (task)     
- M (Me; SD) 
10.07 (10.00; 3.47) 8.80 (9.00; 3.30) 11.04 (10.00; 3.29) 
    
Risk-taking (self-report)            
- M (Me; SD) 
5.17 (5.00; 1.92) 4.79 (5.00; 1.93) 5.45 (6.00; 1.87) 
    
Ambiguity-taking frequency 
(task) - M (Me; SD) 
1.42 (1.00; 1.43) 1.19 (1.00; 1.10) 1.59 (2.00; 1.16) 
    
Investment % - M (Me; SD) 36.34% (30.00; 39.21) 23.92% (10.00; 30.90) 45.77% (45.00; 42.26) 
Note: The table displays descriptive statistics for the main variables. Statistical measures are denoted by symbols: “M” for “mean”, “Me” for 
“median”, “SD” for “standard deviation”, “fq” for “frequency” and “N” for “sample size”. 
 
 
 
 29 
 
Table 3: Correlations  
  Stress 
variable 
Coefficient 
(r or rs) 
Overall 
r/ rs (p) N 
Females 
r/ rs (p) N 
Males 
r/ rs (p) N 
Behavioral 
variable 
      
Risk-taking frequency 
(task) 
 r 
.18*(.011) 
195 
.29** (.007) 
84 
.20* (.035) 
111 
      
Risk-taking  
(self-report) 
TICS rs 
.10 (.188) 
195 
.25* (.024) 
84 
.07 (.499) 
111 
      
Investment % 
 rs 
.01 (.905) 
183 
-.06 (.624) 79 
.09 (.377) 
104 
      
Ambiguity-taking 
frequency (task) 
 rs 
.09 (.238) 
195 
.23* (.039) 
84 
.03 (.778) 
111 
      
Risk-taking frequency 
(task) 
 rs 
.15 (.141) 
51 
.18 (.221) 
21 
-.02 (.461) 
30 
      
Risk-taking  
(self-report) 
HCC 
(pg/mg) 
rs 
.14 (.158) 
51 
.07 (.380) 
21 
.04 (.408) 
30 
      
Investment % 
 rs 
.21 (.081) 
47 
.03 (.452) 
20 
.31+ (.060) 
27 
       
 Ambiguity-taking 
frequency (task) 
 rs 
.10 (.238) 
51 
.04 (.4398) 
21 
.04 (.4097) 
30 
Stress 
variable 
TICS 
HCC 
(pg/mg) 
rs 
-.16 (.260) 
51 
-.18 (.437) 
21 
-.14 (.459) 
30 
Note: The table displays appropriate correlation coefficients for either Pearson (r) or Spearman (rs) tests, as well as the sample size for each 
correlation analysis (second line, under the parentheses, denoted by N). Correlations significant at the .05 level are denoted by “*” and those 
significant at the.01 level by “**”.   
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5.2 Chronic cortisol exposure is not associated with risk-taking or perceived 
chronic stress 
We measured chronic cortisol exposure by analyzing cortisol concentrations in hair samples. 
Unfortunately, just 26% of our participants (N = 51) agreed to donate hair samples, and this low 
rate was similar for both genders: 27% of the male participants (N = 30) and 25% of the female 
participants (N = 21). As such, the predictive power of the analysis considering cortisol exposure is 
much lower than the results we uncovered on self-reported chronic stress and behavior. Further 
information concerning the hair samples and cortisol concentrations is included in the Appendix. 
This biological facet of stress is not significantly related to any of the variables measuring decision-
making under risk in our study (see Table 3), but shows a positive association at trend level with the 
investment in the gamble for men (rs = .31; p = .060). We therefore cannot confirm Hypothesis 2.  
A further analysis that can supplement research in the field is the correlation between 
chronic cortisol exposure and perceived chronic stress. In our data there is no significant association 
between the two, but it should be noted that the relation is negative. We reconfirm this lack of a 
significant correlation with supplementary data from an unrelated experiment. In December 2013 
48 participants gave hair samples for analysis and completed the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS, 
Cohen et al., 1983) at the economics experimental laboratory of Pompeu Fabra University, 
Barcelona, Spain. Data from 21 males and 27 females shows, again, that there is no significant 
association between chronic cortisol exposure and perceived stress (rs = .21; p = .152). However, 
the relation appears positive in this data set.  
 
5.3 At trend levels, women report higher TICS levels than men 
Gender differences in stress self-reports have been often outlined in the literature. We 
replicate this, at trend level, but cannot confirm Hypothesis 3 because of the lack of statistical 
significance (see Table 4). Women report, on average, a score of 87.43 (Me = 85.50) on the TICS, 
while men report almost 10% less, 80.52 (Me = 80.00). Mean levels are presented in Table 2 and 
mean comparisons in Table 4. The difference between these two means is not statistically 
significant at the threshold we established, but is considerable (p = .066; Cohen’s d = -0.27). If we 
look at the biological facet of stress, the opposite trend can be observed: men have higher average 
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hair cortisol concentrations (7.59; Me = 7.12) than women (6.26; Me = 4.41) and this distinction is 
significant at trend level (p = .075; Cohen’s d = 0.370)25. 
However, in what regards self-reports, a significant difference between genders is detectable 
in the self-reported risk-taking variable, where women situate themselves, on average, at 4.79 (Me 
= 5.00) on a scale from 0 to 10, while men at 5.45 (Me = 6.00). This notable difference (p = .025; 
Cohen’s d = 0.347) predicts actual behavior under uncertainty, as we discuss below. 
 
Table 4: Mean Comparisons between Genders  
  Tested variable   
 
TICS 
Risk-taking 
frequency (task) 
Risk-taking 
(self-report) 
Investment % 
Ambiguity-taking 
frequency (task) 
HCC (pg/mg) 
       
p-value .066+ <.001**** .025* .001*** .014* .075+ 
Test t-test t-test MW MW MW MW 
t(df)/z -1.846 (193) 4.695 (193) - 2.239 - 3.314 - 2.455 - 1.780 
N (Nf; Nm) 195 (84; 111) 195 (84; 111) 195 (84; 111) 183 (79; 104) 195 (84; 111) 195 (84; 111) 
Note: The table displays, for each tested variable, p values, the applied test, the t- or z-value, and the sample size for mean comparisons between 
gender subsamples. Trends significant at the .10 level are denoted by “+”, while values significant at the .05 level are denoted by “*”, those significant 
at the .01 level by “**”, those significant at the .001 level by “***”, and those significant at <.001 level by “****”.   
 
5.4 Women take significantly less risk than men 
Women reported to take significantly less risks, in general, compared to men. This 
hypothetical measure is in line with measures of actual behavior. For all three variables assessing 
real-world financial risk-taking the difference between genders is highly significant. In the main 
task men choose the risky option 11.04 (Me = 10.00) times out of 25 times, while women 8.80 (Me 
= 9.00) times (p < .001; Cohen’s d = 0.679). Similarly, men chose the ambiguous option 1.59 (Me = 
2.00) times out of 5 possible, while women 1.19 (Me = 1.00) times (p = .014; Cohen’s d = 0.356). 
Finally, men invest 45.77% (Me = 45.00%) of their payoff in a gamble, while women only almost 
                                                            
25 We do not replicate this in the Spanish data (p = .324), where women have higher hair cortisol concentrations than men. 
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half of that, 23.92% (Me = 10.00%), and this difference is highly significant (p = .001; Cohen’s d = 
0.590).  
The marked difference in behavior under uncertainty, along with the trend difference in the 
chronic stress measure drive overall gender differences in the correlation between risk-taking and 
stress. Figure 2 shows, in parallel, the associations between risk-taking in the task and TICS scores 
for each gender. While chronic stress is positively and significantly associated overall with risk-
taking in the task (r = .18; p = .011, Table 3), this association is higher and more significant for 
women (r = .29; p = .007, Table 3) than for men (r = .20; p = .035, Table 3). For presentation 
purposes only, we divided the TICS scores at the median and plotted the resulting trends in Figure 
2. It is there clearly noticeable how both associations display an increasing trend and how risk-
taking levels differ between genders: men take more risk, independent of stress levels. Interestingly, 
this gender contrast renders associations that were insignificant for the overall sample significant 
for women. Specifically, self-reported stress levels positively relate also to self-reported risk-taking 
(rs = .25; p = .024, Table 3) and ambiguity-taking (rs = .23; p = .039) for women. For men, neither 
correlation is significant. 
 
Figure 2: Gender Differences in the Association between Risk-taking (task) and Self-reported Chronic Stress 
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Result 1 Self-reported chronic stress is positively associated with risk-taking. 
Result 2 Chronic cortisol exposure is not associated with risk-taking or perceived chronic 
stress. 
Result 3 At trend levels, women report higher chronic stress levels than men. The gender 
difference persists also in what concerns risk-taking. 
In what follows, we test the robustness of our main contribution in a regression adjusting for 
possible confounding factors.  
 
5.5 Chronic stress is positively related to risk-taking in young adults 
The results of the analyses presented above indicate that, independent of gender, self-
reported chronic stress is significantly correlated with financial risk-taking measured in actual 
behavior with real stakes. We put this association to further test in seven OLS regression models 
(Table 5), explaining risk-taking frequency in the task by self-reported chronic stress, task 
understanding, demographic variables and psychometric variables that might interfere with chronic 
stress.  
Inspection of the first line of all seven regression models already shows that, independent of 
all controls, self-reported chronic stress explains risk-taking significantly and constantly. The 
coefficients of the TICS variables (both unstandardized and standardized, of course) and the robust 
standard errors do not change dramatically and maintain stable levels. However, further effects 
from other variables, e.g., gender, grant a more detailed discussion of these models. 
The first model motivates risk-taking by perceived chronic stress (TICS) for both genders. 
The second model details the first one with gender (0= Male, 1= Female), while the third includes 
the interaction between chronic stress x gender, and the fourth controls for the effect of task 
mis/understanding. Model five adds demographic controls: age, income, and economics major (0= 
No, 1= Yes), and model six looks in detail at the effect of income in the gender x income 
interaction. Finally, acute stress (VAS), a screening for anxiety (HADS-A), a screening for 
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depression (HADS-D), medication for chronic disease (0= No, 1= Yes), and a brief measure of 
stress reactivity (PSRS-5) are controlled for in the seventh model.  
Based on the regression models, we can confirm the robustness of the main result we 
presented in the previous subsection: chronic stress is related to risk-taking. Perceived chronic 
stress, in the first model, has a positive and significant effect on risk-taking. The effect slightly 
strengthens when gender is introduced in the second model, and the gender’s coefficient shows the 
gender difference in risk-taking we replicated. The third model encompasses an insignificant 
interaction between chronic stress and gender and thus shows that the difference in the effects 
between genders is not noteworthy. 
 Further, the fourth and fifth models reconfirm the robustness of the effect of chronic stress 
and gender on risk-taking, while flagging a trend-level effect of income, which might positively 
influence decision-making under risk. To clarify this marginally significant effect, the sixth model 
includes the interaction between gender and income, which washes out the partial effect of income 
that arose in the previous model and shows that women are risk-cautious at all income levels. 
Finally, the last model reaffirms the robust effect of perceived chronic stress on risk-taking, 
independent of stress reactivity, and excludes confounding effects from related psychological states 
and conditions.  
In brief, the regression models confirm that self-reported chronic stress as measured by the 
TICS robustly explains risk-taking for both genders, accounting for, but independent of, specific 
gender differences: chronic stress promotes risk loving behavior in young adults. 
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Table 5: Regression Analysis  
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) Model (7) 
Chronic Stress (TICS) 
0.026* 
0.188* 
(0.010) 
0.031** 
0.222** 
(0.009) 
0.026* 
0.187* 
(0.012) 
0.026* 
0.187* 
(0.012) 
0.026* 
0.190* 
(0.012) 
0.025* 
0.183* 
(0.012) 
0.029* 
0.212* 
(0.015) 
Gender  
(0= Male, 1=Female) 
 
- 2.492*** 
- 0.350*** 
(0.485) 
- 3.569* 
-0.501* 
(1.695) 
- 3.562* 
-0.500* 
(1.702) 
- 3.225+ 
-0.453+ 
(1.712) 
- 5.338* 
-0.749* 
(2.336) 
- 4.624+ 
-0.649+ 
(2.405) 
Chronic Stress   
x Gender  
  
0.013 
0.165 
(0.019) 
0.013 
0.164 
(0.019) 
0.012 
0.155 
(0.020) 
0.014 
0.178 
(0.020) 
0.010 
0.127 
(0.020) 
Control Task Trials 
   
0.066 
0.005 
(0.878) 
0.039 
0.003 
(0.882) 
- 0.132 
- 0.010 
(0.890) 
- 0.184 
- 0.014 
(0.895) 
Age 
    
0.047 
0.033 
(0.102) 
0.033 
0.023 
(0.102) 
0.015 
0.011 
(0.104) 
Income 
    
0.759+ 
0.124+ 
(0.429) 
0.234 
0.038 
(0.583) 
0.240
0.039 
(0.595) 
Economics Major  
(0 = No, 1 = Yes) 
    
0.580 
0.080 
(0.511) 
0.505 
0.070 
(0.513) 
0.445 
0.061 
(0.518) 
Gender x Income 
     
1.148 
0.283 
(0.866) 
1.176
0.290 
(0.884) 
Acute Stress (VAS) 
      
0.016 
0.115 
(0.010) 
Anxiety (HADS) 
      
- 0.052 
-0.053 
(0.097) 
Depression (HADS) 
      
- 0.050 
-0.043 
(0.105) 
Medication for 
Chronic Disease    
(0 = No, 1 = Yes)       
- 1.009 
- 0.130 
(0.717) 
Stress Reactivity 
(PSRS5) 
      
0.119 
0.067 
(0.144) 
Constant 
7.931*** 
(0.863) 
8.607*** 
(0.820) 
8.998*** 
(1.011) 
8.800** 
(2.836) 
5.997 
(3.868) 
7.904+ 
(4.120) 
7.782+ 
(4.185) 
N 187 187 187 187 187 187 187 
Note: The independent variable is risk-taking frequency in the task. Unstandardized, standardized coefficients (β) and robust standard errors 
(parentheses) are shown. Significant results have a (+) for trends where p < .10, (*) for p < .05, (**) for p < .01, and (***) for p < .001. 
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6 Discussion  
We proposed one of the first studies of decision-making under chronic stress and chronic 
cortisol exposure, seeking to evaluate if the effects of acute stress on decisions involving 
uncertainty perpetuate. We employed the Trier Inventory for the Assessment of Chronic Stress 
(TICS) to measure perceived chronic stress, hair samples to assess chronic cortisol levels, and a 
standard risk- and ambiguity-taking task, followed by self-reported risk-taking and a gamble with 
owned money, to evaluate decision-making under uncertainty. While we did not manage to obtain 
comparable sample sizes for the biological and self-reported facets of stress, hindering the power of 
our conclusions, we found that perceived chronic stress relates robustly and significantly to 
financial risk-taking, an appropriate model for real-world risk-taking. Based on our data, out of the 
four defined hypotheses we can only partially confirm the first and third hypotheses, and reject the 
second hypothesis. 
We first expected, based on the research scrutinizing acute stress effects on decision-making 
under uncertainty (see Buckert et al., 2014; Starcke and Brand, 2012), that chronic stress will be 
related to risk- and ambiguity-taking behavior. The most often used model for decision-making 
under uncertainty in acute stress research is risk-taking, but design details are heterogeneous for 
different authors and thus yielded mixed results. While most reports delineate an increase in risk-
taking under acute stress (for instance, Lighthall et al.; 2009, Pabst et al., 2013a; Starcke et al., 
2008), there are some others that report the opposite trend (Gathmann et al., 2014). For this reason, 
we did not direct the first hypothesis and speculated only on the existence of a significant 
relationship between the two variables. Further, as most research on acute stress settled on the gain 
domain, we have only constructed trials in this domain, but we underline the fact that changing the 
domain, e.g., having participants make choices in the loss domain, might dramatically shift 
results26.  
We uncovered the fact that perceived chronic stress is significantly and positively related to 
risk-taking for both genders, but stronger for women than for men. Ambiguity-taking, in contrast, is 
not related to perceived chronic stress for both genders, but only for women. This gender 
differences and specificity for ambiguity-taking warrants further discussion. First, it might be 
partially driven by the underlying gender differences in risk-taking, independent of stress and other 
                                                            
26 For instance, see the discrepancy between risk aversion for gains and risk lovingness for losses in Kahneman and Tversky (1979).  
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psychometric and demographic controls (further discussed below). However, the fact that chronic 
stress is associated stronger to risk-taking for women than for men might indicate that, despite 
initial higher risk aversion, women are more sensitive to uncertainty cues when under stress. While 
we do not discuss the rationality or optimality of the decisions, nor we pretend to define the key 
motivation or mechanism, we advance the idea that, under perceived chronic stress, risk aversion is 
reduced and this is stronger for women, probably due to increased stress sensitivity. The overall 
result, however, is in line with the STARS model proposed by Mather and Lighthall (2012), where 
decision-making is thought to be reward-biased under stress, as stress triggers additional reward 
salience (STARS). In this sense, it might be that the riskiness of the lottery, i.e., the fact that there is 
a chance to gain nothing, is underestimated, while the probability to get the higher reward is 
overestimated. 
A last mention that has to be made in discussing the first hypothesis is the fact that 
ambiguity, in contrast to risk-taking, was measured briefly, in an attempt to offer a general proxy 
for behavior under higher levels of uncertainty. On one hand, the fact that already with such a crude 
measure a positive association with chronic stress for women appeared, and in terms of power it 
almost parallels the association between risky decisions and stress, strengthens the speculation 
about increased behavioral sensitivity to stress in women. Moreover, this is further confirmed by 
the significant correlation between self-reported risk and stress, in women only27. On the other 
hand, the limited content of the ambiguity trials might disqualify them as a proper measure of 
behavior under high uncertainty, and, while this indication that we present warrants further 
research, the discussion concerning gender differences should occur in the context of an extended 
task under ambiguity conditions. Moreover, in this respect, one should also note that individuals are 
generally less likely to gamble under ambiguity than under risk (Camerer and Weber 1992), and 
risk and ambiguity attitudes might stem from different physiological and psychological processes 
(Huettel et al., 2006; Levy et al., 2010; Trautmann, 2014). 
It is not only self-reported chronic stress that relates to behavior, but its biological 
counterpart, chronic cortisol exposure, might have discernible effects, too. We have hypothesized 
this because of the fact that glucocorticoids28 are known to regulate various cognitive functions 
                                                            
27 While it remains questionable if the way participants responded to this item, that requested their general willingness to take risks, 
relates to their “natural” attitude towards risk instead of the temporary change chronic stress might have induced, we expect that their 
self-reports are influenced by their current state, i.e., if chronically stressed, and that, responding after the task, participants have 
included the auto-evaluation of their recent behavior under risk in their self-assessment. 
28 Hormonal group where cortisol belongs. 
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(Cahill and McGaugh, 1996) and because a recent study brings evidence that hydrocortisone 
administration increases risk aversion, i.e., decrease risk-taking (Kandasamy et al., 2014). The only 
pharmaceutical study of chronic cortisol exposure and decision-making, the study of Kandasamy et 
al. (2014) measured financial risk-taking after a 8-day administration of hydrocortisone to voluntary 
participants. This placebo-controlled, double-blind experiment unveiled that prolonged cortisol 
exposure increases risk aversion independent of gender. We thus hypothesized that we would see 
similar associations between hair sampled cortisol and risk-taking. However, we did not find any 
correlation between chronic cortisol exposure measured in hair samples and financial risk-taking, 
though a trend-level, positive association between HCC and investment in the gamble surfaced for 
men. There are two main points worth conferring about when considering our result. 
First, chronicity differs between studying an 8-day hydrocortisone administration and 
analyzing cortisol measured in hair samples. While the first is limited to 8 days, the second 
evaluates average cortisol release over one month. Second, ad-hoc HCC measurements incorporate 
all sorts of heterogeneous factors that a standardized hydrocortisone administration might deter 
from: the individual’s “normal” cortisol levels, his/her reactivity to stressors, his/her sensitivity or 
resistance to the effects of glucocorticoids, and one’s own maximal reactivity in conditions of 
stress. While, when considering all these interindividual factors, also HCC measures might yield 
standard thresholds for very different persons, its averaging character might yield a different 
standardization than hydrocortisone dosage. In contrast, if one could possibly account for 
interindividual variety, pharmaceutical studies would have a better chance of determining precise 
effects and thresholds than post-hoc measurements like HCC. 
There is a further unsettled matter in the literature that we can contribute to with our data. 
Hair cortisol concentrations have not been reliably correlated with perceived chronic stress (Dowlati 
et al., 2010; Karlen et al., 2011; Stalder et al., 2012c; van Holland et al., 2012 ), but with major life 
events and other conditions and experiences of special populations (e.g., Dettenborn et al., 2010; 
Dettenborn et al., 2012b; Grassi-Oliveira et al., 2012; Stalder et al., 2014). We also did not find any 
significant association between the two in any of the data sets we hold, and we discovered a 
negative relation in this study’s data29. This last, somewhat surprising finding has been also 
reported in a recent study showing that chronic stress caused by the economic environment might 
                                                            
29 Please note that the sample sizes differ between measures and we could only test the association in the 51 participants who both 
donated hair and completed the TICS. A higher sample size would undoubtfully clarify the relation between HCC and perceived 
stress, as well as that between HCC and behavior. 
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cause hypocortisolims (Faresjö et al., 2013). It has also been suggested before and motivated by 
HPA axis exhaustion (Kudielka et al., 2006). 
In what concerns the lack of correlation between HCC and perceived chronic stress, Stalder 
and Kirschbaum (2012a) highlight the puzzling association of HCC and cortisol with stress-related 
conditions, but not perceived acute or chronic stress. The authors suggest retrospective bias as a 
potential cause. Of course, an ambulatory assessment over a long period or a well-thought, ethical 
intervention study might clarify this phenomenon. Another described cause that might motivate the 
lack of correlation is the fact that in normal populations stress exposure is insufficiently high in 
order to produce a physiological response that would further render differences in HCC. We agree 
that exam stress, on average in a student population, might not be high enough to stimulate a 
marked chronic cortisol response.  
We additionally propose that stress resilience, personal characteristics as trait anxiety or 
neuroticism, and a potential mismatch in the hair collection procedure might contribute to the lack 
of correlation between HCC and subjective measures of chronic stress. The hair collection 
procedure presupposes hair cutting as close as possible to the scalp and is based on the assumption 
that the closest 1-cm segment to the scalp encloses, on average, cortisol exposure from the most 
recent month, despite heterogeneity in hair growth rates. While a few millimeters are lost because 
of cutting instead of, for instance, shaving or plucking, terminal hair, as that on the scalp, extends a 
few millimeters inside the hypodermis (Wosicka and Cal, 2010). Thus, recently produced hair is 
uncuttable at the surface and this accounts for an outgrowing lag time of 1-2 weeks (Russell et al., 
2012). In sum, the cuttable hair segment at the scalp’s surface might account for stress dating more 
than one month old, even if HCC levels correlate well intraindividually (Stalder et al., 2012b). 
However, we restate that despite potential problems with using HCC as a biological measure for 
chronic stress and its lack of connection to subjective stress, behavior in decision-making under 
uncertainty, especially under risk, is still connected to self-reported stress, but not HCC. It might be 
that, in lack of actual biological effects, stress changes perception and perspectives, like the general 
view upon the world and upon uncertainty. 
The third hypothesis returned our endeavor to gender differences in behavior and 
perception. Women are known to report higher psychological distress then men (e.g., Matud, 2004; 
Schlotz et al., 2011) and, given that we measured chronic stress through self-reports, we expected to 
replicate this finding. While we did find the direction of these findings to be reliable, we could not 
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replicate it significantly, but only at trend levels. The fact that women see themselves as subject to 
higher distress might be explained in several ways. First, given their overlapping social roles, it 
might indeed be the case that they are exposed to more stressors. Another plausible explanation is 
the fact that women might have a higher responsivity to stress (Kudielka et al., 2004a), especially 
young women (Kudielka et al., 2004b), as is the case in our sample. Also, it could well be that 
women tend to exaggerate their symptoms, resulting in over-reporting distress experience. Finally, 
it might also be possible that women observe more, analyze more, and thus are more aware of their 
bodily and mental states, and, in this sense, their reports are closer to objective occurrences around 
them and inside their bodies. 
We can also contribute to the behavioral economics literature: we replicate the general 
notion that women are more risk averse than men (reviewed in Eckel and Grosssman, 2008) with all 
four variables that measured behavior under uncertainty in our study: self-reported risk-taking, 
actual risk-taking in the main task, ambiguity-taking in the main task, and investing in a gamble 
recently gained money in the experiment. Interestingly, in relation to perceived chronic stress, risk 
lovingness appears for both genders, instead of risk aversion or gender-specific risk aversion. In 
what concerns the underlying motivation of this (maybe) evolutionarily-derived difference, we 
refrain from defining post-hoc explanations. Instead, we direct the reader to Eckel and Grosssman 
(2008) where experimental conditions are objectively and thoroughly analyzed. 
Finally, the present study has several limitations. First, the measures we employed are based 
on ad-hoc stress levels, without any chronic stress treatment or controlled chronic stress induction, 
in the experimental sense. Given the naturally occurring stress levels we are basing our analysis on, 
our results are purely correlational and do not speak of any causal relation between chronic stress 
and risk-taking. The same limitation applies to our results regarding the relation between perceived 
stress and cortisol exposure. Furthermore, our results stem from a very peculiar sample and have 
thus limited generalizability: young, highly educated adults studying or having studied at 
Heidelberg University or neighboring universities took part in the study. We were suggesting above 
that personal characteristics could mediate stress reactivity and even the relationship between 
biological stress levels and perceived stress. This is another group of possible confounding 
variables we did not control for.  
We further lack, as suggested in Trautmann (2014), thorough measures regarding 
heterogeneity in stress reactivity and sensitivity to stress. As Trautmann (2014) explains, 
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predictions about behavior under stress become externally valid if they account for susceptibility to 
stress, which may, in the real world, affect economic preferences and drive self-selection into 
certain professions, environments and activities. Finally, a justified critique could also target the 
stakes we propose in the study. While the payoff of the risky/ ambiguous lottery varies to some 
extent, that of the safe alternative is a constant modest amount. And, even if we used payment 
levels in agreement to general experimental practices with students and aligned the payoffs to the 
average student income, it may still not be enough to motivate the revealing of true preferences, and 
it may even encourage risk seeking behavior.  
Nonetheless, we have opened an important avenue in investigating the effects of perceived 
chronic stress and chronic cortisol exposure on decision-making and future experiments could shed 
more light on the matter and help derive better measures for the phenomena under discussion. 
 
7 Conclusion  
We explored the relation between decision-making under uncertainty and self-reported 
chronic stress as measured by the Trier Inventory for the Assessment of Chronic Stress. We 
additionally collected hair samples to integrate chronic cortisol exposure as the biological facet of 
prolonged stress. Decision-making under uncertainty was primarily assessed through binary choices 
between safe and risky lotteries, and supplemented with self-reported risk-taking, and an investment 
of own money in a real gamble. We discovered that there is a significant correlation between 
chronic stress and actual risk-taking for both genders and this positive relation is robust to multiple 
demographic and psychometric controls. However, we observed a slight gender difference in this 
correlation, in that it is stronger for women than for men. Moreover, gender differences persist also 
in risk-taking, independent of stress, and, at trend level, in self-reported stress and risk-taking 
measures. In what regards physiological parameters, we found no relation between cortisol 
exposure and general risk-taking, as well as self-reported chronic stress. However, an interesting 
trend-level connection arose between HCC and men’s investments in the final gamble.  
Our study directly contributes to the scarce research on chronic stress and decision-making, 
and follows up the line of research regarding chronic cortisol exposure and perceived stress levels. 
Two avenues would greatly improve the state of the knowledge in this field. First, a study 
performing an ecological assessment of daily stress and chronic cortisol markers would be very 
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helpful in understanding the relation between the two main stress responses. Second, a higher 
account for interindividual variability in stress experience and reactivity, together with the 
mediating effect of personal characteristics, could clarify the heterogeneity of existing reports.  
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Appendix 
 
Inter-item reliability analysis and descriptives of TICS scores 
 
Table 6: Inter-item Reliability Analysis for the Original and Modified Versions of the TICS 
Scale 
Label 
Number of 
Items 
Cronbach´s Alpha Original Version 
(Experience in the Last 3 Months) 
Cronbach´s Alpha Modified Version 
(Experience in the Last Month) 
ERDR 9 .90 .78 
MANG 4 .84 .79 
SORG 4 .88 .87 
SOUE 6 .84 .78 
SOZI 6 .88 .90 
SOZS 6 .87 .85 
SSCS 12 .91 .87 
UEBE 8 .90 .87 
UEFO 6 .87 .86 
UNZU 8 .85 .81 
Average 10 .87 .84 
TICS 57 - .94 
Note: Cronbach´s Alpha values for the Original version are taken from the TICS manual (Schulz et al., 2004). The table rows display descriptives and 
analysis coefficients for the nine facets of stress comprised in nine scales (ERDR, MANG, SORG, SOUE, SOZI, SOZS, UEBE, UEFO, UNZU), a 
screening scale for chronic stress (SSCS), the average value of inter-item variability and the total TICS score (not existent in the original version). 
The nine facets of stress code the following content: pressure to be successful (ERDR), lack of social recognition (MANG), chronic anxiety (SORG), 
excessive social demand (SOUE), social isolation (SOZI), social tensions (SOZS), excessive workload (UEBE), mental overload at work (UEFO), 
and dissatisfaction at work (UNZU). 
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Table 7: TICS Descriptives  
Sample N Mean Minimum Maximum Median Standard Deviation 25th Percentile 75th Percentile 
Pooled 195 83.50 34 171 84.00 29.03 63.00 100.00 
         
Females 84 87.43 37 142 85.50 24.71 70.00 105.50 
         
Males 111 80.52 34 171 80.00 26.71 58.00 100.00 
Note: The descriptives are given for the entire sample (second row), for females only (third row), and for males only (fourth row). 
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Further details on hair samples and hair cortisol concentrations 
 
Table 8: Hair Cortisol Variables  
 Mean Median                  SD N (%) 
Hair Cortisol Concentration 
(HCC) – pg/mg 
7.04 5.91 3.60 51 
Hair treatment - - - 6 (11.76%) 
Washes per week 5.12 5.00 1.68 51 
Blond Hair - - - 20 (39.21%) 
Brown Hair - - - 26 (50.98%) 
Red Hair - - - 1 (1.96%) 
Black Hair - - - 3 (5.88%) 
Note: The table displays main statistics for hair cortisol- related variables.   
 
  
 
 56 
 
Instructions 
 
(Please do not open the folder in front of you until you are prompted to do so!) 
Dear Participant, 
Thank you for being part of this study.  
Before we begin the study and read the instructions, we would like to draw your attention to 
something you could do to further support our research. Upon completion of this experiment, you 
can donate a small hair sample. The amount of hair we need is more or less equal to what you 
naturally lose in one day and we will be paying 3 euros for your time. We will examine the hair 
sample for hormone concentrations. Of course, the hair donation is anonymous. If you want to 
support us, please find us, once the study is finished, in Room 00.012, at the ground floor, in 
Bergheim campus. At the very end of the task folder in front of you, there is more information 
concerning the hair donation. You do not have to decide about this now, you can read the info sheet 
and ask more questions after the study today has finished.  
Now we can begin the study and you are allowed to open the folder in front of you. Please do 
not start to look through the pages. 
In front of you there is a folder containing three piles of papers. The top pile contains the task 
instructions that we will read together, and the instructions to create your personal identification 
code. The study today is completely anonymous, so from now on you will be identifying yourself 
only through the identification code you will create. Please, do not write your name on any of the 
paper sheets in the folder. 
The middle pile contains the task that you will have to complete today. Please do not try to look at it 
before we instruct you to do so. After reading the task instructions and generating your 
identification code, we will continue with the task. 
The last pile contains questionnaires. We ask you to fill these in after you have finished completing 
the task. While you are completing the questionnaires, one of the research assistants will come to 
you and determine your payoff from the task. 
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Creation of personal identification code 
Prior to the beginning of the experiment, we kindly ask you to read this page carefully and follow the 
instructions below in order to create your personal identification code. You will be asked today, at various 
times points, to enter your personal identification code in order to personalize the task you are 
accomplishing. It is only with this identification code that we can differentiate between participants, while 
handling your data anonymously. 
Instructions 
Please answer the following questions:     
             Identification Code 
The second letter of your mother's first name: 
……………………………………..    ____  
The day of your birthdate (for example: 03) 
……………………………………..         __ __  
The third letter of the street on which you currently live: 
……………………………………..    ____ 
The second and third letters of your eye color: 
……………………………………..    __ __  
Your height in centimeters (for example: 174): 
……………………………………..    __ __ __  
Example of personal identification code creation: If your mother would be called Petra, you would have 
been born on the 3rd of July 1954, you would now live on the Boulevard Street, your eye color would be blue 
and your height would be 174 cm tall; then your personal identification code would be E 03 U LU 174. 
The data collected from you today is, of course, subject to confidentiality. It cannot be disclosed to 
any third party. 
Thank you for your help! 
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Task Instructions 
Thank you for participating in our study today. The duration of this study is approximately 40 
minutes. You will receive 3 € for your participation, and will additionally receive a variable amount 
from the task. Details will follow. However, it is important for you to already know that you have to 
fill in a receipt for your payoff at the end of the study, so that we can justify proper fund usage. 
We guarantee complete anonymity of your data at all times; that is, the researchers cannot connect 
your identity to your choices in the task or your responses to the questionnaires. You will create 
your own code, which serves as your identification in this study. However, for signing the payment 
receipt, we need your real name. Therefore, a second researcher who does not supervise your task 
and questionnaire completion will take care of the payment at the end of the study. 
The task that you will complete today consists of 33 choices. Each choice is presented on a separate 
page. There are a total of 33 pages. Once you have made the decision on a certain page, please pass 
to the next page. You can NOT turn back the pages. If we observe that you turn back the pages, we 
must ask you to leave and you forgo your payment.  
In each decision, you have to choose between two urns, graphically presented as bars. An urn 
always contains 100 balls of the same color (see Figure A). In the other urn there are also 100 balls, 
but of two different colors (see Figure B). It may happen that you cannot see how many balls of a 
certain color or of another color are in the urn (see Figure C). 
 
                 A                                   B 
 59 
 
 
     
                 C                                 D 
 
On each colored segment of the urn you can read the ratio of balls of that color. For example, the 
50/100 ratio written over a green segment means that 50 of the 100 balls in the urn are green (see 
Figure D). Above and below the bar is written the amount you get when a ball of that color is drawn 
from the urn you selected (the amount is written in the same color as the ball it refers to). 
The number and proportion of differently colored balls in the urn changes from choice to choice, as 
well as the amount you can gain if a certain colored ball is drawn. If you opt for the leftmost urn, 
circle the letter A under the leftmost urn. If you opt for the rightmost urn, circle the letter B under 
the rightmost urn. You need to decide on each page for one of the two urns. 
You should decide on each page for the urn you truly prefer, as one of these choices you make will 
be played for real and paid to you at the end of the study. To decide which of the 33 choices will be 
selected for payment, you will draw yourself one of the 33 trial codes form a bag. You will then 
also determine the outcome of the lottery you chose in the respective trial by drawing a colored ball 
from the appropriate urn. We have prepared 33 different urns containing two types of colored balls 
in the same proportions as those presented in the 33 choices. As each choice contains two urns and 
at least one of the urns has 100 balls of the same color, we prepared bags with colored balls only for 
the urns that have two types of colored balls. So, these urns exist in reality and you will draw a ball 
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from one of these urns (urns are shown to participants). The colors of the balls have no special 
meaning. 
If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The research assistant will come to you and 
answer all your questions quietly. Of course, these instructions will remain on your desk and you 
can re-read them anytime you want during the study. 
We now ask you not to talk to the other participants; if you try to communicate, we have to exclude 
you from the study. 
 
Please start by creating your personal identification code and then completing the task. 
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Real urns that enabled real randomness 
 
1. 33 trial codes are put in a bag; the participant blindly draws one trial code showing what urn 
will be chosen further. 
  
2. If the risky/ ambiguous urn was chosen in the respective trial, the participant blindly draws a 
ball from the appropriate urn and his/ her final payment is thus established. 
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Real and Hypothetical Social Decision-Making under Chronic Stress: 
 Women Talk the Talk, but Don’t Walk the Walk; Men Walk the Talk30 
 
 
Abstract 
Although chronic stress is a pervasive problem in contemporary societies, its effects on 
decision-making and cognition have not been systematically investigated. We are the first to 
explore the interplay between self-reported chronic stress and social preferences. We measured 
chronic stress with the Trier Inventory for the Assessment of Chronic Stress (TICS), a nationally 
validated German inventory. We measured social preferences with a dictator game decision, i.e., 
sharing a given amount with an anonymous counterpart. Controlling for social preferences 
robustness, experimenter demand effects, and the impact of method dissimilarity of economics and 
psychology, we implemented a 2x2x2x2 factorial design, manipulating: the framing of the decision 
(Give to Recipient vs. Take from Recipient), the decision maker’s gender (Female vs. Male), the 
decision recipient’s gender (Female vs. Male) and the nature of the payoff (Real € vs. Hypothetical 
€)31. We uncovered that perceived chronic stress is not related to social preferences over real 
payoffs for either gender, and is generally unrelated to men´s transfers. However, women’s 
decisions over hypothetical payoffs are negatively correlated to chronic stress. This entails that 
perceived chronic stress does not affect social preferences as measured by real money transfers, but 
fosters, for women, what could be interpreted as higher self-interest, “fight-or-flight” competitive 
behavior, or a decrease in projected self-image positiveness.  
Keywords: Chronic Stress · Social Decision-Making · Dictator Game · Framing · Hypothetical 
versus Real Decisions · Gender Pairing  
JEL Classification: C72 · C91 · D64 · D87 · J16 · Z13  
PsycINFO Classification: 2560 · 2970 · 3020 · 3040 · 3360 
                                                            
30 Co-authored by Brigitte M. Kudielka and Sara E. Kettner. We would like to thank the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) 
under research grant number SCHW1537/1-1 for providing financial support for our research.  
31 For detailed behavioral and methodological aspects of gender pairing see Kettner and Ceccato (2014). 
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1 Introduction 
Chronic stress is a growing concern in the modern world. Caused mainly by family or work 
conditions, own financial situation, or the global economy, stress affects more and more adults, 
their life quality, their sleeping and eating patterns, and it even translates onto the behavior of their 
children (APA, 2013). While some amount of stress might have motivational effects by promoting 
adaptation and mobilizing short-term resources necessary for survival, long-term stress, i.e., chronic 
stress, is known to bear only damaging effects. It gives rise to allostatic load, the ”wear-and-tear” of 
the body, and this often precedes chronic physiological and psychological conditions (Cacioppo, 
1994; Chrousos, 2009; Juster et al., 2010; McEwen, 2004).  
Despite its “pandemic” character and the fact that it alters neurological structures involved 
in cognition and decision-making (Gianaros et al., 2007; Lupien and Lepage, 2001; Lupien and 
McEwen, 1997; McEwen and Sapolsky, 1995), the direct effects of chronic stress on cognitive 
mechanisms and decision-making have not been consistently researched in humans. What is more, 
chronic stress potentially affects not only the health and solitary decisions of individuals, but might 
also be affecting, by eroding physical and mental health, their interpersonal relationships and the 
social decisions they take. However, since positive social interaction is actually a stress buffer 
(APA, 2015) and the vast majority of decisions are often made in social contexts (Fehr and 
Fischbacher, 2003), it is important to scrutinize not only disruptions over isolated cognitive 
processes, but also the way that stress alters well-being, relationships and interactions. We herein 
propose the first investigation of the effects of chronic stress on social decision-making. 
We refer to chronic stress as the sum of consequences of prolonged exposure to one, single 
and repetitive, or multiple acute stressors. Acute stressors, in turn, are either unpredictable stimuli, 
or predictable stimuli, but the physiological activation they cause is uncontrollable (Koolhaas et al., 
2011), i.e., one cannot simply decide to stop the specific reactions in the bodily systems. Acute 
stress, essentially a reaction to unpredictability or uncontrollability, is the evolution´s response 
which mobilizes metabolic resources to ready the body for action, i.e., to fight against danger or 
flight away from it. The notion is often used to denote both eustress and distress32, because both 
forms of stress cause the same specific reaction in the body (Koolhaas et al., 2011)33. If proving 
                                                            
32 The former refers to good, motivating stress, while the latter to disruptive stress, with potential negative effects. 
33 The activation of the Hypothalamic-Pituitary-Adrenal Axis (HPA), measurable through cortisol, and the activation of the 
Sympathetic-Adrenal-Medullary Axis (SAM), measurable through epinephrine or salivary alpha amylase (sAA) (Kirschbaum and 
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acute stress biologically is rather straightforward, for chronic stress there is yet no robust, directly 
validated measure34 (see, for instance Cacioppo et al., 1998, McEwen, 2004; but see also Stalder 
and Kirschbaum, 2012). However, there exist several self-reported measures that have been 
successfully validated and employed in behavioral chronic stress research (for instance, Cohen et 
al., 1983; Fliege et al., 2005; Levenstein et al., 1993; Schulz et al., 2004). We are thus employing 
one of these measures, which has been nationally validated for our target population: the Trier 
Inventory for the Assessment of Chronic Stress, acronymed as TICS (Schulz and Schlotz, 1999; 
Schulz et al., 2004). 
Returning to social interactions and the necessity to explore social decision-making under 
stress, there are two phenomena that grant the necessity for further research into the matter. First, 
under severe pressure or during natural disasters, both highly stressful situations, some individuals 
behave in manners that could be labeled as pure altruistic: they endanger themselves in order to 
save others or provide for others. This entails that, at least for some people, stress might be 
modifying social preferences or might be activating specific evolutionary care mechanisms.  
The second phenomenon is less dramatic, but widely spread. Despite the predictions of the 
rational choice theory35, individuals are not always only self-interested when their selfishness 
doesn´t bear costs, but are kind to others, to which they are not related by genes36. For instance, in 
the dictator game, money is transferred to strangers, even if the design of this task allows one to 
anonymously keep the entire endowment for himself/ herself without anyone ever knowing and 
without suffering any consequences (Camerer, 2003). Another example is blood donation, which is 
also anonymous to the recipient and does not involve reciprocity or mutualism, but might involve 
“feel-good” consequences, as this behavior is observable by others. A recent review further 
suggests that acute stress might be one factor triggering such acts of kindness, in immediate need 
situations (Buchanan and Preston, 2014). Finally, the prosociality under stress has been approached 
also from evolutionary psychology and biobehavioral standpoints. Taylor and colleagues (2000) 
speak of a “tend-and-befriend” behavior under stress, instead of the classical “fight-or-flight” 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Hellhammer, 1989; Nater et al., 2006; van Stegeren et al., 2006; Whishaw and Kolb, 2005). However, this biological measure does 
not reliably associate with self-reported stress (see, for instance, Hjortskov et al., 2004). 
34 Hair cortisol and the cortisol awakening response (CAR) are two measures under scrutiny; for instance, the latter reliably showed 
that individuals exposed to bullying have lower cortisol secretion (Hansen et al., 2006; Hansen et al., 2011). 
35 This theory states that individuals behave in a selfish manner, following only to maximize their own benefit, happiness or gain. It 
also encompasses the idea that “more is always better”, implying that in any (monetary) decision where selfishness cannot bare a 
cost, individuals will always take for themselves the maximum available. 
36 Gene ties motivate sharing, giving or helping, in order to promote genome survival. 
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response. This demeanor is theorized as being more specific to women, although the oxytocin-based 
mechanism that might underlie it motivates its existence in both genders (Taylor, 2006). 
Accounting for these phenomena and the theoretical gender-specificity of prosociality under stress, 
we propose to lay the foundation for researching chronic stress and social decision-making with a 
gender-paired task that measures social preferences in the absence of most exogenous demands and 
motivations: the dictator game, a widely-employed task in experimental economics. 
However, there is a methodological issue that might have a major role in bridging 
psychological and experimental economics traditions in a reliable and externally valid experiment, 
when researching the impact of psychological factors in an economic task: incentives. While 
psychology has built immense replicable knowledge based on data stemming from self-reports and 
unincentivised studies, experimental economics is very strict in what concerns having a clear, 
monetary payment for the performance in experimental tasks. Below we give details on if and how 
the existence or lack of incentives can change behavior in experiments, but, for methodological 
soundness and disentangling motivations, we employ both procedures in two different experimental 
treatments: one where the sharing task in the dictator game is accomplished for real monetary 
payoffs, the other where the task is accomplished “as if” there were money involved, in a 
hypothetical fashion. 
To conclude, our study is a first attempt at analyzing the effects of chronic stress on social 
preferences in a gender-paired design with real and hypothetical payoffs. It is important to identify 
eventual relations between chronic stress and social preferences because more and more individuals 
suffer the physiological and psychological effects of chronic stress and, under those effects, take 
economic decisions, interact, negotiate and share with others. In what follows we summarize the 
relevant literature that motivates our experimental design. 
 
2 Literature  
Research on the effects of stress on cognitive processes and decision-making has focused so 
far only on acute stressors. In nuce, in what regards cognitive processes under acute stress, the 
literature proposes that some are altered, while others are facilitated: attention narrows so that 
peripheral cues are ignored (Staal, 2004), reaction times decrease (Roelofs et al., 2005), feedback 
learning and learning from negative outcomes are reduced (Petzold et al., 2010; Preston et al., 
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2007), working memory is reversibly impaired in demanding tasks (Schoofs et al., 2008), memory 
encoding for emotional material is disrupted, memory consolidation is generally improved (Putman 
et al., 2004; Smeets et al., 2008), retrieval from memory is impaired (Buchanan et al., 2006; 
Buchanan and Tranel, 2008; Kuhlmann et al., 2005; Smeets et al., 2008), and memory for socially 
relevant information as face-name association is affected in high cortisol responders (Takahashi et 
al., 2004).   
In what concerns decision-making under acute stress, most studies explored decisions taken 
in uncertainty contexts, as this type of environment characterizes everyday decision-making outside 
the laboratory37. Here, the effects of acute stress are again heterogeneous, as they depend on the 
nature of the task (Buckert et al., 2014), but, the general conclusion so far is that the underlying 
decision mechanisms like dynamic strategy choice, switching from automatic to deliberative 
processes, feedback integration and reward and punishment sensitivity are negatively affected 
(Starcke and Brand, 2012). Decision-making becomes less flexible under stress (Bröder, 2000, 
2003; Dougherty and Hunter, 2003; Janis et al., 1983; Janis and Mann, 1977; Keinan, 1987; 
Streufert and Streufert, 1981), rewards become more salient while punishments less important 
(Mather and Lighthall, 2012), and decisions rely heavily on intuitive, automatic processes (Evans, 
2003; Reyna, 2004; Starcke and Brand, 2012).  However, the way acute stress affects behavior 
seems to follow a time-dependent pattern. Immediately after stress exposure, decisions and behavior 
tend to be mostly instrumental or habitual (Schwabe et al., 2010). Later on, behavior becomes more 
flexible and long-term goals can be followed (Diamond et al, 2007; Williams and Gordon, 2007). 
This interval-dependent effect of stress raises an interesting question regarding how stress 
chronicity may affect decisions and behavior: does the system adapt to repeated, prolonged 
stressors and behavior becomes more goal-directed or is the system overridden and cannot move 
anymore beyond habitual reactions? 
If research on the effects of acute stress on cognitive process and individual decision-
making under uncertainty has laid the ground and continues to grow, two other important, related 
domains benefit from very limited scientific evidence. The first domain is social decision-making 
under acute stress, and the second concerns the effects of chronic stress on cognitive processes, 
                                                            
37 We refer to uncertainty as a continuum comprising situations for which the exact final outcome is not known. They comprise both 
risky situations, where one knows the possible outcomes and the probabilities with which these outcomes occur, and ambiguous 
situations, where one knows the possible outcomes, but knows nothing about the occurrence probabilities of these outcomes. Most 
real-life decisions have a character of uncertainty, like those where one might be able to define the possible outcomes, but rarely 
compute their precise occurrence probabilities. 
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individual and social decision-making. The effects of chronic stress, to our knowledge, have been 
scrutinized only in a short-term pharmacological study that showed changes in financial risk 
attitudes with increased cortisol secretion (Kandasamy et al., 2013).  
The initial evidence coming from the first domain we mentioned, social decision-making 
under acute stress, encourages the endeavor we take on in the present paper. One solid finding about 
the relationship between stress and social interaction is that positive social interactions before stress 
exposure set off increased control over stress reactivity (Christenfeld et al., 1997; Ditzen et al., 
2007; Gerin et al., 1992; Heinrichs et al., 2003; Kirschbaum et al., 1995; Lepore et al., 1993; 
Uchino and Garvey, 1997). Also, recent evidence shows that acute stress increases prosocial38 
behavior in men (von Dawans et al., 2012) and temporarily increases altruistic punishment and 
decreases donations in men (Vinkers et al., 2013). Von Dawans and colleagues (2012) gave male 
participants in an acute stress paradigm binary choices measuring trust, trustworthiness, sharing, 
punishment towards an anonymous male recipient, and financial risk-taking. They then found that 
exposure to psychosocial stress increases non-strategic sharing39, trust and trustworthiness, but not 
punishment or financial risk-taking. Vinkers and colleagues (2013) test both strategic40 and non-
strategic sharing, either immediately after or late after the induction of psychosocial stress. They 
find that strategic sharing is affected by acute stress only immediately after stressor onset, while 
non-strategic sharing is always lower under stress, independent of time. These two experiments, 
displaying somewhat opposing results, do have a major limitation: because the various female 
menstrual cycle phases and oral contraceptive consumption mediate biological stress reactivity and 
make control and conclusion deriving more difficult (Kirschbaum et al., 1999; Meulenberg et al., 
1987), they were carried on only with male participants. However, as described in the next section, 
our design can and will consider both sexes, since we do not measure chronic-cortisol-mediated 
decisions, but self-reported chronic stress and its relation to social preferences.  
A contributing review, considering also the experiments of von Dawans and colleagues 
(2012) and Vinkers and colleagues (2013) concludes that stress might lead to prosocial behavior, 
but only in specific situations (Buchanan and Preston, 2014). Based on the assessed evidence, 
Buchanan and Preston (2014) suggest that prosociality arises under stress only if there is saliency of 
                                                            
38 We employ the term following the definition adopted by Buchanan and Preston (2014) from Eisenberg and Miller (1987): a 
voluntary and intentional serving of another while incurring own personal cost. 
39 The dictator game, details follow in the experimental design section. 
40 The ultimatum game, extended details are offered in the discussion section. 
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the recipient’s need and the possibility of direct interaction between benefactor and recipient. The 
authors also propose two mechanisms explaining this triggered behavior. The first viable 
explanation is the extended activation of peculiar neural mechanisms for offspring care to strangers, 
i.e., taking a risky decision to help another person in need, as one would often do in order to help 
his/ her own children. The second mechanism is a contagion of feelings that motivates intervention, 
based on the mirroring of observed emotions: the benefactor intervenes or acts as a result of self-
projecting in the situation. Indeed, the authors also showed experimentally on another occasion that 
observers of stressed participants have a proportional stress response (Buchanan et al., 2012).  
Departing from the suggestions of Buchanan and Preston, we extend the realm of the 
investigation to social, but non-strategic situations, and to chronic, instead of acute stress. Given the 
extensive physiological effects of chronic stress and the strongly embedded cooperation in threating 
times in humans, it is also important to investigate whether chronic stress has evolved to modify 
social preferences per se, independent of direct interaction with the recipient, the salience and 
urgency of the recipient’s need, the kinship, or the degree of danger the recipient is in. The best 
setting for this endeavor is a non-cooperative, socially distant context. We thus chose a double 
anonymous dictator game, where participants should reveal true preferences, have less reputational 
concerns and be subject to reduced experimenter demand effects (Hoffman et al., 1994; Koch and 
Normann, 2008).  
Next, we preferred to implement this socially distant design with both genders, not only to 
get a more complete description of human behavior, but also because there is strong evidence that 
there might exist gender specificity: sexes’ stress systems and responses differ (Kudielka and 
Kirschbaum, 2005; Matud, 2004), their behaviors in bargaining tasks differ (Sutter et al., 2003), 
their decisions in economic tasks differ (Croson and Gneezy, 2009), their behavior under acute 
stress varies robustly (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Lighthall et al., 2009; Mather et al., 2009; Mather 
and Lighthall, 2012; Porcelli and Delgado, 2009; Preston et al., 2007) and within-gender interactive 
decisions are more competitive (Sutter et al., 2009).  
Last but not least, following an evolutionary psychology perspective, it is also important to 
consider both genders, not in isolation, but in paired interaction. According to mainstream theories, 
interaction mechanisms appear to have evolved somewhat differential for sexes, in function of their 
social roles. If men, resource gatherers, might display more competitive, “fight-or-flight” responses 
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to stress, women, nurturers and caregivers, are more cooperative, displaying “tend-and-befriend”41 
behaviors (Taylor et al., 2000). In detail, Taylor and colleagues (2000) propose that the theoretical 
“fight-or-flight” response that has been used to characterize stress (Canon, 1932) is not adequate for 
both sexes. While physiologically the body does prepare for high energy necessities, behaviorally, 
females’ responses appear to have developed more towards “tend-and-befriend” patterns in order to 
assure simultaneous self and offspring survival (Taylor et al., 2000). In later work (Taylor, 2006), 
Shelley Taylor proposes a model of affiliation under stress where tending and befriending behaviors 
are motivated by oxytocin42, opioids and dopaminergic pathways. This affiliative behavior, while a 
possibility for men, who have similar neurochemical embodiment to women, is expected to appear 
more often in women (Taylor, 2006; Taylor et al., 2000). The reason for this is the fact that 
oxytocin is mediated by the nature of social contacts: if they are supportive, stress effects are 
attenuated, if they are hostile, stress effects may be exacerbated. And, given evolutionary social 
roles, the social contacts of women are often more supportive, while those of men more hostile. 
Finally, in exploring the effects of perceived stress chronicity on gender-paired social 
decision-making, we further aim to bring together two research traditions, i.e., psychology and 
economics, and thus unveil reliable and externally valid behavioral patterns. We attained this 
experimentally by varying two factors: decisions are both incentivized and unincentivized 
(hypothetical)43, and endowment ownership is varied44. Endowment ownership is framed as either a 
“Give” (from own endowment) or a “Take” (from the endowment of another participant) treatment 
and it was shown to potentiate opposite-sex preferences in the dictator game (Kettner and Ceccato, 
2014).  
The experimental variation of the reward nature (hypothetical versus real choices) helps to 
detect a potential hypothetical bias, i.e., when the values elicited in hypothetical choices are 
overestimated as compared to those in choices involving real monetary outcomes. There is 
sufficient evidence regarding the existence of the hypothetical bias (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; 
Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004; Kang et al., 2011; Morgenstern et al., 2013), even though some 
authors do not find it behaviorally (Dixon et al., 2013; Kettner and Waischman, 2014; Taylor, 2013) 
                                                            
41 Tending refers to self- and offspring protection, befriending to the creation of social networks that function as a stress buffer. 
42 A hormone with a stress protective role. 
43 Most research in psychology is based on self-reports and unpaid performance; a flat fee is paid for participating in the study. This 
implies trust in the fact that participants are able to report their thoughts, feelings and behavior in an unbiased, accurate manner. 
Experimental economics, on the other hand, maintains that the only way to reveal one’s true preferences and behavior is through 
financially motivated performance.  
44 This is a robustness check and we refer to the way that the initial sum to be divided in the task is allocated; the task remains the 
same, it is just the framing that changes. 
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or at neural activation level (Gospic et al., 2013). Relevant for our design, the hypothetical bias 
appears to be gender specific and frame change shifts it into a “real” bias, reversing it45 (Kang and 
Camerer, 2013). Some authors even report that the positive hypothetical bias46 appears only for 
women (Carlsson and Martinsson, 2001; Gospic et al., 2013), while others report it only for men 
(Brown and Taylor, 2000). In the light of this evidence, it is important to scrutinize whether results, 
if gender specific, are so because of true gender differences or, if gender specificity is triggered by 
framing or incentive schemes, making transdisciplinary generalizations short-handed.  
 
3 Hypotheses  
In what follows we build on the literature summarized above and define three testable 
hypotheses to be evaluated in the results section. 
Hypothesis 1      Initial findings indicate that acute stress exposure promotes prosocial economic 
behavior between men. Since the underlying mechanism for acute and chronic stress is identical, we 
expect also chronic stress to affect economic behavior in a social context.  
Hypothesis 2   According to evolutionary psychology, interactions have evolved towards 
cooperation instead of competition, and more so for women. We thus expect that chronic stress is 
positively related to real money transfers, but more strongly for women than for men. 
Hypothesis 3        Hypothetical decisions follow, according to the literature, the same direction as 
decisions with real stakes, only that the declared values are higher. If chronic stress positively 
affects real money transfers, we expect it to positively affect also hypothetical money transfers; 
further, following some authors, we expect that the hypothetical bias is stronger for women. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
45 Values elicited in real choices are higher compared to those in hypothetical choices.  
46 When the value elicited in a hypothetical decision is higher than that elicited in a decision involving real monetary outcomes. 
 72 
 
4 Experimental Design  
4.1 Procedure 
We investigated the link between chronic stress and social preferences by asking 
participants to complete a non-strategic money sharing47 task, i.e., a task where the sender decides 
over the sharing ratio of a given amount and the recipient has to accept whatever he/ she is given, as 
he/ she cannot change the sharing ratio or punish an unfair offer by, for instance, refusing it. This 
task has been widely used in experimental economics to investigate if people do share something 
when they have no constraints to do so and it is called the “dictator game”48 (Forsythe et al., 1994). 
We implemented the task in a 2x2x2x2 design and assured it is double anonymous49. The four 
variables we manipulated in the classic dictator game are: the gender of the sender (Female or 
Male), the gender of the recipient (Female or Male), the frame (Give to Recipient or Take from 
Recipient) and the nature of the reward (Real € or Hypothetical €). Below we briefly describe the 
procedure, but other details can be found in Kettner and Ceccato (2014) for the gender-paired 
design and Kettner and Waischman (2014) for the reward nature and frame manipulation. 
Upon arrival at the experimental laboratory, participants received their show-up fee in a 
common room. They then privately drew numbers and letters that randomly assigned decision 
pairing and role distribution. We used two similar experimental rooms. The participants who drew 
numbers pertained to the first experimental room, where the task was to decide upon transfers 
containing real money. Those who drew letters pertained to the second room, where their task was 
to decide upon hypothetical, non-monetary transfers. In the sessions where both counterparts were 
of the same sex, participants drew, from a common container, either a letter or a number that 
randomly assigned them to a designated seat in one of two experimental rooms. In the sessions 
where the counterparts were of opposite sex, each of the genders was directed to one of two 
experimental rooms and randomly drew their seat at the entrance. Both a female and a male 
                                                            
47 We use “sharing” in the sense of splitting an amount of money with equal costs and benefits for giver and receiver, and not in the 
evolutionary psychology sense like, e.g., Trivers (1985, p.386), where sharing incurs a low cost to the giver, but a large benefit to the 
receiver. 
48 The name suggests the fact that the decision is non-strategic and all the decision power in this task belongs to the sender; he/ she 
decides how to share the proposed amount, while the receiver has no option but accepting whatever he/ she is sent (including null 
offers). 
49 Neither the experimenters nor the other participants could know the identity of the decision maker or link any particular decision to 
an identity (before, during or after the experiment). 
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experimenter supervised each of the two experimental rooms, since experimenter gender has the 
potential to bias decisions (Innocenti and Pazienza, 2008).  
In the first room we elicited dictator game decisions involving real money. At the same 
time, in a second room, we elicited hypothetical dictator game decisions. The dictators taking 
hypothetical decisions were then the recipients of the transfers from dictators taking real decisions 
and the dictators taking real decisions were then the recipients of the transfers from the dictators 
taking hypothetical decisions. Importantly, none of the groups was informed about the task of their 
counterparts, i.e., the dictators taking real decisions found out that their receivers took hypothetical 
decisions and had sent them hypothetical transfers only after they took their own decision. 
Similarly, the dictators taking hypothetical decisions found out that their receivers took decisions 
involving real money and had sent them actual money only after they took their own decision.  
The general procedure, in both rooms, was as follows. Once all the participants were seated, 
the experiment started50. In the private cubicle of each participant two envelopes were arranged on 
the table. The leftmost envelope contained the endowment: either five euros (ten fifty cent coins) 
and ten metal washers51 - for the real money treatments - or a slip of paper declaring they have five 
hypothetical euros - for the hypothetical treatments -. In the Give (to Recipient) treatments, the 
leftmost envelope was labeled “Your Personal Envelope”, while in the Take (from Recipient) 
treatments it was the rightmost envelope the one carrying this label. The rightmost envelope was the 
empty envelope, i.e., the one in which dictators had to put whatever they decided to be sent to the 
recipients in the other room. For the real money treatments dictators had to put in the envelopes 
precisely ten metal pieces (either fifty cent coins or metal washers), while for the hypothetical 
treatments dictators had to put in the envelopes a slip of paper containing their hypothetical transfer 
(from zero to five euros in increments of fifty cents). In the Give treatments, the rightmost envelope 
was labeled “Other [Female/Male] Participant’s Envelope52”, while in the Take treatments this was 
the leftmost envelope. That is, in the Give treatments the money obviously belonged to the sender, 
while in the Take treatments it belonged to the recipient.  
                                                            
50 Instructions for the main treatments (Give Real, Give Hypothetical, Take Real, Take Hypothetical) are included in the Appendix. 
51 Washers were used to preserve decision anonymity, as they mimic the fifty-cent coins. If a dictator playing with real money 
decided to keep all the euro coins for himself/ herself, he/ she could place the metal washers in the envelope of the receiver and no 
one could know that inside the respective envelope coins are missing. Photos are included at the end of the Appendix. 
52 We ran the experiment in German; gender is embedded in the inflection and thus is automatically specified- on envelopes 
involving a male sender or recipient we used the form “Teilnehmer”, which means “male participant”, and on envelopes referring to 
a female sender or recipient we used the form “Teilnehmerin”, which means “female participant”. 
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After both types of dictators took their decisions in the two rooms, the envelopes entitled 
“Other [Female/Male] Participant’s Envelope” were sealed by them and deposited in a common 
collection box. The boxes were then carried in the opposite room and envelopes were given to the 
recipients, who opened them and counted the contents. The hypothetical dictators received the 
envelopes containing the transfer of the dictators playing with real money and the dictators playing 
with real money received the non-monetary, declared transfers (a paper slip with hypothetically 
transferred amount written on it, see Appendix) of the dictators playing the hypothetical dictator 
game. Research assistants registered the contents of the envelopes in both rooms, privately. 
Finally, participants received demographics and psychometric questionnaires, after taking 
their decisions, since, considering the content of the questionnaires, distributing them before the 
task could have primed participants or could have suggested a certain type of behavior53.  
 
4.2 The chronic stress measure 
We measured chronic stress with the Trier Inventory for the Assessment of Chronic Stress 
(Schulz and Schlotz, 1999; Schulz et al., 2004), a validated German questionnaire that requires a 
10-15 minutes completion time (Schwabe et al., 2008). The TICS comprises 57 items answerable 
on a 5-point Likert scale (“never”, “infrequent”, “sometimes”, “frequent”, “and very frequent”) and 
reflects the participant’s experiences within the last three months. It assesses chronic stress through 
nine subscales: “excessive workload”, “excessive social demand”, “pressure to be successful”, 
“dissatisfaction at work”, “mental overload at work”, “lack of social recognition”, “social tensions”, 
“social isolation” and “chronic anxiety”.  
We ran our experiment in thirty-three sessions as close as possible after university exam 
periods in February, April and June 2013. We therefore counted on exam preparation and exam 
taking as a “natural” chronic stressor. Since this stress “treatment” is more limited in time compared 
to the period reflected originally in the TICS (three months), we slightly modified the questionnaire 
and asked participants to report frequency of specific experiences within the last month only. 
Reliability analysis shows that this modified version is as reliable as the original version54. To 
                                                            
53 We are aware that it might be argued that it is equally possible that participants responded in a specific way to the questionnaires as 
to “justify” their behaviour in the task; we believe the double anonymous setting should have washed out this sort of effects; second, 
our results are specific to a certain gender and treatment, despite the random setting, which goes against the justification idea. 
54 Inter-item reliability analysis and modified TICS descriptives are included in Tables 5 and 6 in the Appendix. 
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determine the effect of chronic stress on social preferences while avoiding multiple testing in an 
already complicated study design, we followed the scoring procedure from Schwabe and colleagues 
(Schwabe et al., 2008): we computed a total chronic stress score by adding the 57 items and either 
used it as a continuous variable in correlational and regression analyses, or performed a median cut 
to obtain high chronic stress and low chronic stress subsamples. 
 
4.3 Control variables 
We collected additional demographic and psychometric data to control for confounds. 
Demographic controls covered age, economic expertise, marital status, and income. Psychometrics 
included factors that can interfere with chronic stress: medication for chronic conditions and 
contraceptives, acute stress, depression and anxiety. A Visual Analogue Scale from 0 to 100 
measured perceived acute stress, and the validated German version of the HADS, the Hospital 
Anxiety and Depression Scale, screened for depression and anxiety (Herrmann-Lingen et al., 2011). 
 
4.4 Participants 
The experiment was conducted at the AWI Laboratory, University of Heidelberg, Germany. 
The initial study sample comprised 376 inexperienced participants. They were recruited from the 
ORSEE pool (Greiner, 2004). Our final analysis sample includes 348 of the participants. Sixteen 
participants were excluded because of taking prescription medication for psychiatric conditions55, 
six participants for incomplete chronic stress questionnaires56, two participants did not perform the 
task as instructed and five participants were of senior age. The mean age of our final sample was 
22.74 years and ranged from 18 to 33 years with 50.29% women and 49.71% men. Further age 
means and the number of independent observations for specific reward conditions can be found in 
Table 1. 
 
                                                            
55 Mainly antidepressants and sleeping pills; this might interfere with the cortisol mechanism of stress (for instance, Bhagwagar et al., 
2005, Burke et al., 2005). 
56 Participant exclusion for incomplete questionnaires was performed according to the instructions delineated in the TICS manual 
(Schulz et al., 2004). 
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4.5 Statistical analysis 
The data was analyzed using SPSS version 20. Tests are two-sided and the significance 
threshold is set at p < .05. Behavior was analyzed by comparing the mean amount transferred for 
the two independent groups (low and high stress levels) using Mann-Whitney U tests. Associations 
between continuous variables denoting chronic stress and transferred amounts were calculated using 
Spearman’s rank correlations (Spearman’s ρ). Finally, the robustness of the results is assessed in an 
OLS regression model controlling for possible confounds. 
 
5 Results 
Below, we explore the relation between chronic stress and social preferences. In (5.1.) we 
present mean transfers, correlations between chronic stress and transfers in the dictator game, 
transfer trends, and pairwise tests. We then evaluate the hypotheses defined in section (3). In (5.2.) 
we check the robustness of our conclusions in a regression analysis, assuring they hold 
independently of any potentially confounding demographic or psychological factors we measured. 
 
5.1 Chronic stress is only related to women’s hypothetical transfers  
Before testing our hypotheses, we present the average transfers as percentage from the initial 
endowment. Subsample sizes, demographic information and transfer values are provided in Table 1, 
contrasting high and low stress groups. We divide the presentation into real money transfers (Real) 
and hypothetical money transfers (Hypothetical), as these two conditions are fundamentally 
different and should not be pooled. To display general trends, we first report average transfers 
pooled across genders (“mixed”). Gender-specific transfers in conjunction with stress levels follow. 
Table 2 includes Mann-Whitney U Tests comparing transfers of high stress and low stress groups 
for both genders and frames in the Real, Hypothetical and Real vs. Hypothetical conditions.  
Table 1 shows that the hypothetical bias exists, since the transfers were significantly higher 
with hypothetical rewards than with real money (p < .001, see Table 2). On average, highly stressed 
participants transferred 19.88 % of the initial real endowment, and 26.36 % of the initial 
hypothetical endowment. This significant difference (p = .04) holds also for low stressed 
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participants: they transferred 21.49 % of the initial real endowment and 34.00 % of the initial 
hypothetical endowment (p < .002, see Table 2). However, this result was driven by females (p < 
.001, see Table 2), especially the low stressed ones (p < .001, see Table 2). They claimed to transfer 
almost double and close to “fair-share”- 43.33 % of the initial endowment - compared to what 
women dealing with real money actually transferred, 22.86 % of the initial endowment. 
Importantly, what women claimed to transfer in the hypothetical condition does not discriminate 
between recipient’s genders: claimed transfers towards other women are, on average, the same as 
claimed transfers towards other men, so pairing has no effect over claims in interaction with stress. 
Finally, as hinted by transfer percentages in Table 1, women’s behavior is significantly different 
from that of men (not displayed in Table 2), marginally for decisions involving actual money (p = 
.09) and highly for decisions involving pretended transfers (p < .001). 
 
 
 
Table 1: Average Transfers of Highly Stressed (HS) and Low Stressed (LS) Participants in the Real and 
Hypothetical Conditions 
Real Hypothetical 
 
Mixed 
HS 
Mixed 
LS 
Female 
HS 
Female 
LS 
Male 
HS 
Male 
LS 
 
Mixed 
HS 
Mixed 
LS 
Female 
HS 
Female 
LS 
Male 
HS 
Male 
LS 
Percentage 
transferred 
19.88 
(24.17) 
21.49 
(21.74) 
24.29 
(25.90) 
22.86 
(21.33) 
13.71 
(20.30) 
20.51 
(22.16) 
 
26.36 
(23.45) 
34.00 
(26.56) 
31.67 
(22.63) 
43.33 
(25.30) 
20.00 
(23.09) 
25.38 
(25.01) 
N 84 101 49 42 35 59  88 75 48 36 40 39 
Age 
22.66 
(2.96) 
22.83 
(2.25) 
22.58 
(3.17) 
22.67 
(2.22) 
22.77 
(2.70) 
22.95 
(2.29) 
22.68 
(2.71) 
22.75 
(2.35) 
22.46 
(2.60) 
23.17 
(2.57) 
22.95 
(2.86) 
22.36 
(2.08) 
Note: The table displays mean values (standard deviations in parentheses). The percentage transferred is calculated from the initial endowment of 5 €. 
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Table 2: Mann-Whitney U Tests Comparing Transfers Between Low Stress and High Stress Observations in 
the Real, Hypothetical and Real vs. Hypothetical Conditions 
Real Hypothetical Real vs. Hypothetical 
R--LS- vs. R--HS- p = .41 H--LS- vs. H--HS- p = .08 (+) R----- vs. H----- p < .001 (***) 
R-FLS- vs. R-FHS- p = .88 H-FLS- vs. H-FHS- p = .02 (*) R--LS- vs. H--LS- p = .002 (**) 
R-MLS- vs. R-MHS- p = .17 H-MLS- vs. H-MHS- p = .36 R--HS- vs. H--HS- p = .04 (*) 
RG-LS- vs. RG-HS- p = .82 HG-LS- vs. HG-HS- p = .21 R-F--- vs. H-F--- p < .001 (***) 
RT-LS- vs. RT-HS- p = .16 HT-LS- vs. HT-HS- p = .54 R-M--- vs. H-M--- p = .18 
RGFLS- vs. RGFHS- p = .24 HGFLS- vs. HGFHS- p = .07 (+) R-FLS- vs. H-FLS- p < .001 (***) 
RGMLS- vs. GMHS- p = .33 HGMLS- vs. HGMHS- p = .44 R-FHS- vs. H-FHS- p = .08 (+) 
RTFLS- vs. RTFHS- p = .23 HTFLS- vs. HTFHS- p = .72 R-MLS- vs. H-MLS- p = .33 
RTMLS- vs. RTMHS- p = .31 HTMLS- vs. HTMHS- p = .62 R-MHS- vs. H-MHS- p = .23 
Note: p-values are rounded to two decimals and significant results are flagged with (+) for trends where p < .10, with (*) for p < .05, with (**) for p < 
.01 and with (***) for p < .001. The first letter in the label of the treatment indicates the nature of the reward (R for Real or H for Hypothetical); the 
second letter, if existent, indicates the framing (G for Give and T for Take); the third letter, if existent, indicates the gender of the sender (F for 
Female and M for Male); the fourth and fifth letters constitute a syntagm and indicate the reported chronic stress level (LS for Low Stress and HS for 
High Stress); and the sixth letter indicates the gender of the recipient (F for Female and M for Male). A missing letter is replaced by the “-“sign and 
indicates that, on that particular variable, the sample has been pooled, i.e., the result is independent of the manipulation of the denoted variable. 
 
If we look at different transfers within the same reward nature condition, we discover that it 
was only in the Hypothetical condition that highly stressed participants claimed to behave 
marginally different in the dictator game compared to low stressed participants (p = .08). Again, 
this difference in claims was strongly driven by women (p = .02), mainly those who faced the 
decision of how much to take from their counterpart in the Take framing sessions (p = .07). Again, 
women’s claims did not differ between recipient genders. To summarize, we observe that real 
transfers did not significantly differ between participants reporting low versus high stress levels, 
while hypothetical transfers did; and this effect is driven by women’s claims. Also, hypothetical 
transfers overall are significantly higher than those involving actual money.  
We follow up these conclusions with the results in Table 3 in order to evaluate our 
hypotheses. Table 3 displays correlations between continuous chronic stress scores and dictator 
game transfers. As shown also by the average transfer analysis above, there was no significant 
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correlation between chronic stress, as measured by the continuous TICS score, and real money 
transfers (p = .49). With this, the data does not support Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2.  
 
Table 3: Correlations Between Chronic Stress (TICS score) and Dictator Game Transfers 
Reward Nature Sample N Spearman´s rho p-value 
Real 
Females and Males 185 -.05 .49 
Females 91 .002 .98 
Males 94 -.13 .22 
     
Hypothetical 
Females and Males 163 -.16 (*) .04 
Females 84 -.28 (*) .01 
Males 79 -.13 .27 
Note: (*) - correlation significant at the .05 level. 
 
In order to evaluate Hypothesis 3 we refer to the results displayed in the lower half of Table 
3. The correlation between self-reported chronic stress and declared transfers was negative and 
significant (p = .04), although weak (ݎ௦ = - .16). This correspondence is presented graphically in the 
upper left panel of Figure 1: both real and hypothetical money transfers decreased with increased 
chronic stress, but the decrease was significant only when decisions did not involve real money. 
Men have put their money where their mouth was (p = .18, see Table 2), meaning that what men in 
the hypothetical condition declared they would transfer is not significantly different to what men in 
the real condition actually transferred. Figure 1 (upper right panel) also shows that, for men, 
correlational trends between stress and transfers evolve in the same negative direction for both 
reward conditions. For women, the nature of the reward shifts the correlation signs: if in the Real 
condition the coefficient is null, but positive (ݎ௦ = .002, n.s.), lower transferred amounts correlate 
negatively with stress in the Hypothetical condition (ݎ௦ = - .28, p = .01). This is also visually 
displayed in Figure 1 (upper right panel). Given these, we have to reject also Hypothesis 3, as the 
relation between chronic stress and claimed transfers is not significant overall, but only for women. 
However, even if just gender specific, it is not positive as expected, but negative: the higher the 
perceived stress, the lower women’s declared transfers.  
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Result 1 Chronic stress is not significantly related to real money transfers for either gender. 
Result 2 Chronic stress is, generally, not positively, but negatively related to transfers in the 
dictator game, against the “tend-and-befriend” hypothesis.  
Result 3 The negative correlation is driven by women’s hypothetical decisions: that is, chronic 
stress is significantly related to the hypothetical decisions of women. 
 
Figure 1: Mean Transfers (in Percentage) for Real and Hypothetical Reward Natures, Pooled Sample (left 
panels) and Each Gender (right panels) 
  
    
Note: The first row of images displays bar charts with mean transfers in percentage for the low and high stress groups in the two different reward 
conditions. The first image displays mean transfers for the entire sample, whilst the second mean transfers for each gender. The second row of images 
displays trends for mean transfers in percentage from low to high stress groups in the two different reward conditions. The first image displays the 
mean transfers for the entire (pooled) sample, whilst the second image illustrates mean transfers for each gender. Error Bars represent +/- 1 standard 
deviation of the mean (SEM). 
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5.2 Women talk the talk, but don’t walk the walk; men walk the talk 
The pairwise comparisons and correlational analyses show clearly that chronic stress is not 
significantly related to real money transfers in the dictator game for either gender, but is associated 
with differences in hypothetical transfers between low stressed and highly stressed women. In order 
to put this result to further test, we ran eight regression models57 (Table 4) where we explain 
transfers in percentage from the initial endowment through stress, experimental treatment 
conditions, and demographic and psychometric controls. Throughout these models we employ the 
continuous TICS score, as opposed to the median cut, in order to capture the entire variation of the 
data.  
The first model explains pooled transfers through chronic stress (TICS) for both genders. 
The second model expands by the reward nature (0= Hypothetical, 1= Real) and the interaction of 
reward nature x chronic stress, while the third model adds the experimentally varied conditions: the 
sender’s gender (0 = Male, 1 = Female), the recipient’s gender (0 = Male, 1 = Female) and the 
framing (0 = Take, 1 = Give). Model (4) further tests Model (3) with demographic and 
psychometric controls: age, income, relationship status (0= Single, 1= Relationship), economics 
major (0= No, 1= Yes), medication for chronic disease or contraceptives (0= No, 1= Yes), acute 
stress (VAS), a screening for anxiety (HADS-A), and a screening for depression (HADS-D). The last 
four models re-estimate models (3) and (4) for women (models (5) and (6)), and men (models (7) 
and (8)), respectively. We have chosen to retest the influence of stress on transfers, separately, for 
each gender, since the pairwise comparisons indicated they follow different trends: men’s transfers 
do not differ between reward conditions and stress levels, while women’s transfers are higher in the 
hypothetical condition and lower for the high stress group. 
The regression results confirm the conclusions we drew in the previous subsection. Chronic 
stress explains hypothetical transfers in the dictator game, for women. The TICS score in the first 
model indicates the overall trend: stress has a negative effect on pooled transfers (real and 
hypothetical). The source of the marginal significance of this trend is revealed in the second model, 
where the trend is evident for hypothetical transfers, but insignificant for the real ones. If we 
separate the transfers by reward nature in model two, we see that the trend is highly significant and 
driven by the hypothetical treatment (the coefficient of the stress score is negative and significant), 
                                                            
57 We ran OLS models for easiness of interpretability, but a Tobit estimation with robust standard errors (Engel, 2011), the 
appropriate analysis for censored data, yields the same results. 
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while the interaction coefficient, representing the real transfers, is positive and insignificant. Model 
three reconfirms the significant negative effect of stress on hypothetical transfers, but indicates a 
strong, positive gender effect, i.e., that females might be the ones driving the result. It also indicates 
that hypothetical transfers decrease with increasing stress independent of the gender of the recipient, 
but that transfers decrease further in the give framing. We discuss this extensively in Kettner and 
Ceccato (2014). Finally, the last model ran for both genders together shows that our result is robust 
to demographic and psychometric controls. The only significant coefficient of the control variables 
is that of the economics major, showing that domain-specific knowledge affects transfers 
negatively. This is in agreement with some existing literature, where a more rational behavior 
(decreased transfers) is expected for those having expertise (Marwell and Ames, 1981), but in 
disagreement with other results (Yezer et al., 1996). 
The fifth and sixth models test whether stress has a different effect on the real and 
hypothetical behavior of women. Model five retests the variables manipulated in the design (reward 
nature, framing, and the gender of the recipient) and uncovers the fact that, for women, 
hypothetical transfers significantly decrease with increasing stress, while real transfers marginally 
increase with increasing stress. Model six confirms the robustness of these trends, although 
significance weakens. Finally, models seven and eight retest the design variables for men and, upon 
robustness check, show that while their transfers follow the same trends as those of women, they 
are not significantly explained by stress in either of the reward nature conditions. Men´s transfers 
are explained by the gender of the recipient and the framing (for a detailed discussion see Kettner 
and Ceccato, 2014). 
To summarize, we find that self-reported stress as measured by the TICS robustly explains 
hypothetical money transfers for women in a gender-paired dictator game. It, however, does not 
explain transfers for men or real-money transfers for either gender. For women, decreasing stress 
significantly increases hypothetical transfers, but this does no longer hold when they have to share 
real money: women talk the talk, but don’t walk the walk. Men’s transfers are independent of stress 
and do not differ much between reward conditions: they walk the talk. 
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Table 4: Regression Analysis  
 
Model 
(1) 
Model 
(2) 
Model 
(3) 
Model 
(4) 
Model 
(5) 
Model 
(6) 
Model 
(7) 
Model 
(8) 
Chronic Stress (TICS) 
-0.0820+ 
(0.0425) 
-0.139* 
(0.0660) 
-0.137* 
(0.0647) 
-0.161* 
(0.0763) 
-0.174* 
(0.0819) 
-0.187+ 
(0.104) 
-0.0987 
(0.107) 
-0.137 
(0.127) 
Reward Nature 
(0= Hypothetical, 1=Real) 
 -17.08* 
(7.331) 
-17.09* 
(7.057) 
-20.06** 
(7.401) 
-33.45** 
(10.65) 
-38.52*** 
(10.86) 
-8.360 
(10.26) 
-10.37 
(10.78) 
Reward Nature x  
Chronic Stress  
 0.0978 
(0.0845) 
0.0987 
(0.0812) 
0.144+
(0.0845) 
0.243+
(0.126) 
0.314* 
(0.126) 
0.0407 
(0.120) 
0.0757 
(0.125) 
Gender Sender  
(0= Male, 1= Female) 
  10.09*** 
(2.486) 
13.17*** 
(3.436) 
    
Gender Recipient  
(0= Male, 1= Female) 
  1.905 
(2.513) 
2.344 
(2.591) 
-4.206 
(3.583) 
-1.751 
(3.776) 
7.621* 
(3.462) 
6.785+
(3.593) 
Framing  
(0= Take, 1= Give) 
  -5.447* 
(2.570) 
-5.325* 
(2.589) 
-3.493 
(3.807) 
-2.322 
(4.050) 
-7.403* 
(3.453) 
-8.290* 
(3.644) 
Age 
   0.469 
(0.519) 
 0.0468 
(0.692) 
 1.071 
(0.732) 
Income 
   1.314 
(2.509) 
 2.250 
(4.008) 
 1.653 
(3.256) 
Relationship Status 
(0= Single,  
1= Relationship) 
   -4.114 
(2.934) 
 -3.812 
(4.608) 
 -5.376 
(4.106) 
 
 
Economics Major  
(0=No, 1=Yes) 
   -6.657* 
(2.723) 
 -8.252+ 
(4.227) 
 -3.168 
(3.742) 
Medication  
(0 = No, 1 = Yes) 
   -5.910 
(3.681) 
 -5.422 
(4.108) 
 -3.371 
(10.60) 
Acute Stress (VAS) 
   -0.0324 
(0.0548) 
 -0.108 
(0.0796) 
 0.0749 
(0.0793) 
Anxiety (HADS) 
   -0.120 
(0.507) 
 -0.195 
(0.683) 
 0.205 
(0.784) 
Depression (HADS) 
   0.372 
(0.578) 
 0.295 
(0.948) 
 -0.128 
(0.741) 
Constant 
31.66*** 
(3.710) 
41.17*** 
(5.770) 
37.73*** 
(5.728) 
30.28*
(14.73) 
55.14*** 
(7.070) 
59.30** 
(20.09) 
30.74*** 
(8.940) 
7.302 
(20.09) 
N 348 348 348 337 175 170 173 167 
Note: The independent variable is the amount transferred (in percentage). Significant results are flagged with (+) for trends where p < .10, with (*) for 
p < .05, with (**) for p < .01 and with (***) for p < .001. Robust standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
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6 Discussion 
We find that self-reported chronic stress as measured by the TICS is not related to social 
preferences in an incentive compatible task, but is related to social preferences in a hypothetical 
task, especially for women. We could not confirm any of the defined hypotheses. 
We first expected, following initial results from acute stress research, that chronic stress 
would also be connected to prosocial behavior as measured by real transfers in the dictator game. 
Buchanan and Preston (2014) concluded in a recent review that “stress leads to prosocial action in 
immediate need situations”, as long as the need of the target is salient and interaction between 
benefactor and target took place. This conclusion is based on reviewed evidence, and explains the 
findings of the two existing studies on acute stress and social preferences. In an acute social stress 
paradigm, von Dawans and colleagues (2012) show that men are more prosocial under stress. After 
inducing acute social stress through socioevaluative threat (the TSST-G protocol, von Dawans et 
al., 2011), 34 non-economist males made binary choices. The choices measured trust, 
trustworthiness, sharing, and punishment towards an anonymous male recipient they might have 
interacted with before the task, as well as financial risk-taking. The sharing task they used is very 
similar to ours, i.e., the dictator game, except, being a binary choice, it only offered one of two 
possibilities to the decision maker: either send nothing (0 Swiss Francs) or the fair-share, i.e., half 
of the initial endowment. We, in contrast, measured social preferences in a somewhat more 
continuous manner, offering eleven sharing options, which allows for participants to express 
prosocial attitudes, other than sharing half of their endowment. Von Dawans and colleagues (2012) 
found that exposure to psychosocial stress increased sharing (higher proportion of non-zero 
transfers), as well as trust and trustworthiness, but did not have any effect on punishment or 
financial risk-taking. They motivate their findings by the theories of Taylor et al. (2000) and Taylor 
(2006), accounting for a “tend-and-befriend” tendency also among interacting men. In contrast to 
this finding, but in a different setting and dealing with another type of stress, i.e., self-reported 
chronic stress in our case, we find no evidence of increased prosociality with increasing stress, but 
the contrary. Our result is more in line with the conclusions of Vinkers and colleagues (2013).  
They tested social decision-making under acute psychosocial stress with two different tasks. 
A sample of 80 male participants completed both a strategic sharing task (the ultimatum game) and 
a non-strategic sharing task (the dictator game) either immediately after stress exposure or later, 75 
minutes after stress exposure. The ultimatum game is a sharing endeavor where one proposer, 
 85 
 
exactly like in the dictator game, sends a portion of his/ her initial endowment to a receiver. 
However, the receiver can either accept or reject (hence called altruistic punishment58) the offer that 
he/ she was made by the proposer. If the offer is accepted, the endowment is shared as proposed. If 
the offer is rejected, both counterparts get nothing. Male participants in the experiment 
accomplished both roles in the ultimatum game: they first proposed a sharing proportion for several 
different endowment values and then decided on rejecting or accepting several offers from credible, 
but non-existent counterparts, playing the role of the receiver. After this, they played a donation 
dictator game, deciding how much, if anything, of 10 endowed euros to donate to Unicef. Being a 
dictator game, Unicef could not accept or reject the offer, and the sharing decision pertained only to 
the participant. The results show that the effects of acute stress on strategic sharing are time-
dependent, while those on non-strategic donation are not time dependent. In detail, altruistic 
punishment is higher immediately following a psychosocial stressor than later, after stress exposure, 
since more offers are rejected in the early aftermath than in the late aftermath of stress exposure. 
Instead, donations in the dictator game are always reduced for stressed participants, both in the 
early and late aftermath of stress exposure. The authors suggest that this proves that acute 
psychosocial stress exposure does not modify reward sensitivity, but might decrease self-control. 
After the effects of stress exposure had decayed, self-control is reestablished and participants 
regulate and start to follow their own material interest, which overrides the necessity of punishing 
others59. Starcke et al. (2011) also find that decisions under acute stress are more self-interested in 
emotional moral dilemmas. The design we implemented is more similar to the one described in the 
second experiment (Vinkers et al., 2013) and the general trends in our results point in the same 
direction, towards a higher self-interest (rationality) under increased stress. Both designs 
presuppose no interaction with the recipient and offer a larger sharing choice set, but do not 
replicate increased prosociality, probably due to the lack of interaction between sender and recipient 
and the lack of prominence of the recipients’ need. It is true that, in the case of Vinkers and 
colleagues acute stress, and not chronic stress is induced, and the recipient is a rather well-defined 
non-anonymous charity, which could exert further emotional demands. Despite that, increased 
stress is linked to decreased donations.  
                                                            
58 Punishing what is considered to be an unfair offer received from the proposer, but at a personal cost; i.e., rejecting the offer means 
not only canceling the payoff of the “unfair” proposer, but also own payoff, as none of the participants receives a payoff. 
59 They start accepting less advantageous offers, as some money is always better than none. 
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The second hypothesis we defined follows the theory of Taylor et al. (2000) and the 
evidence from von Dawans et al. (2012). It advocated that, while stress should increase prosocial 
behaviors for both genders, this relation must be stronger for women than for men. Women are 
supposed to affiliate in threatening times and display a “tend-and-befriend” behavior, since they 
were not as independent as men in providing and surviving (Taylor et al., 2000). Instead, they acted 
as caregivers and child raisers, and their social context enforced them to build social support 
networks, i.e., collaborate with other women for creating increased security, reinforcement, and 
stress buffers. Men, on the other hand, as resource gatherers, while not lacking collaboration, had 
less of a supportive social network and were more exposed to situations specific to “fight-or flight” 
response, i.e., where fighting or fleeing were actual necessities. In sum, these two differential social 
roles and functions of sexes enabled evolution to digress between genders’ behavioral stress 
responses, although the stress-specific physiological activation remains universal: women “tend-
and-befriend”, men “fight-or-flight”. Shelley Taylor later defined an oxytocin-based biobehavioral 
model underlying affiliation under stress, proposing that the nature of social contacts mediates the 
effects of stress. Positive contacts diminish stress effects, negative contacts worsen them. And, 
given that women are theorized to beneficiate more from supportive social contacts, their stress 
responses should be minimized and their behavioral reactions thus more prone to collaboration. 
While we did find a slight but highly insignificant positive correlation between women’s real 
money transfers and stress levels, their decisions are not relevantly different from those of men, 
which are negatively related to stress. Our results thus offer no posthoc support for the “tend-and-
befriend” behavior of women or men under stress, but this might be motivated, beyond the lack of 
interaction and saliency of the recipient’s need, with the type of stressor we measured60. As we will 
argue below, chronic stress, despite being based on the same underlying mechanism, might be very 
different from acute stress. In what concerns the interaction between benefactor and target, we 
purposefully tried to avoid low social distance by setting up a double anonymous context in order to 
investigate if chronic stress affects preferences per se, if it modulates the view of the social world or 
self-image. 
Finally, we presumed that hypothetical transfers would also increase with increasing stress, 
and the hypothetical bias will be stronger for women. We thus incorporated a hypothetical setting, 
following methodological soundness, but also to discover if chronic stress, even if not powerful 
                                                            
60 Taylor’s theories refer rather to immediate responses to stress, i.e., acute stress. Generalizing to chronic stress might not be 
sufficiently motivated by the fact that the underlying biological mechanism is the same. 
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enough as to change social behavior, might change the way people reflect upon themselves or their 
relations. We indeed found that this is the case, but it is specific to women. We uncovered that 
under high perceived chronic stress women report themselves as displaying a “fight-or-flight” 
behavior, hypothetically transferring fewer resources to their counterpart. In economic terms, they 
think they are more rational and play closer to equilibrium. Rational theory states that individuals 
follow exclusively self-interest and the optimal behavior encompasses maximizing one’s own 
payoff or utility to the point where no other higher payoff or utility can be attained. This point is 
defined as the equilibrium. In the dictator game we implemented, the equilibrium is situated at the 
point of giving nothing to the anonymous counterpart, i.e., keeping the maximum possible for the 
self, the entire five euro amount61. Importantly, participants could easily adopt this strategy, since 
the double-blindness of the experiment assures that there are no consequences for this, or any other 
behavior. In reality, despite all premises, participants “irrationally” send something to the recipient, 
and this is actually the case in most reported dictator games (see, for instance, Camerer, 2003).  
The hypothetical behavior is expected to be an accurate description of what one would 
actually do in the given situation, and, thus, should mimic the trend of the behavior in the incentive 
compatible condition. Of course, it is reasonable to assume that, in lack of actual costs, the image 
that participants project through their answers might be more positive than their actual actions 
suggest. We should also mention an important limitation of our study: the lack of an experimental 
treatment where the gender of the recipient is undefined. While this would make conclusions more 
relevant, we still have reasons to trust our results from the current design, as we did not find 
anything connected to stress to be driven by gender pairing as such, but by the gender of the sender, 
irrespective of the recipient’s gender. 
Returning to the behavior of stressed women in the hypothetical condition, they seem to 
report a more rational behavior, proposing to transfer lower amounts than unstressed women. We 
link, in the context discussed above, rational behavior to the “fight-or-flight” behavioral pattern, 
where resources and own survival matter most. In this way, highly stressed women display more of 
a competitive pattern, while low stressed women, more of a tending-and-befriending pattern. 
However, these self-reports are rather far from the truth. When dealing with actual money and 
incurring costs for sharing, stressed women offer slightly higher transfers to their anonymous 
recipients than unstressed women, although this difference is insignificant. As such, at trend level, 
                                                            
61 The equilibrium is the same for both the Give and the Take conditions, as, indifferent of whom the endowment is said to belong to, 
the entire decision is in the hands of the sender (dictator), while the recipient has no say over the sharing proportion. 
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in real behavior stress might trigger tending-and-befriending, and not fighting-or-fleeing. 
Interestingly, for men, although not yielding any significant difference, stress enables a decreasing 
trend of actual transfer that is perfectly mirrored in the hypothetical condition. Living up to the 
expectations of the “fight-or-flight” pattern, they declare to offer less when highly stressed, and they 
do offer less when highly stressed and deciding over real money. 
We already mentioned that our study is a premiere in the field of chronic stress and social 
decision-making. As such, the only literature we can connect it to is the research on acute stress and 
social decision-making. Our results do not expose increased prosociality under stress and we expect 
that the lack of direct interaction between sender and recipient, the lack of saliency of the 
recipient’s need (but, see Vinkers et al., 2013) and, mostly, the fact that we did not scrutinize 
biological acute stress, might motivate the patterns we report. Both acute and chronic stress are 
related to the same specific physiological activation, but they differ in exposure periods. Acute 
stress refers to one, momentary activation, while chronic stress entails a long-term, repeated 
activation. It is reasonable to expect that chronic stress, despite mediating physiological damage, 
might also mediate psychological habituation or adaptation to stressors and external demands. We 
propose, therefore, that the effects of chronic stress might have different, if not opposite results to 
those of acute stress, even if the bodily mechanism underlying both is the same and considerable 
degradation of biological systems can occur under chronic stress.  
Next, another reasonable assumption is that chronic stress onset, development and 
perception is more strongly dependent on personal characteristics than acute stress. We did not 
measure, for instance, neuroticism or trait anxiety, and these kind of factors could be mediating not 
only stress perception, but also the way stressful experience is over- or under- reported. Finally, the 
existing literature on acute stress and social decision-making is based on a biological measure of 
stress, while we only rely on a self-report. This could further make results incomparable, as we 
might be measuring very different constructs. The relation between perceived and reported stress 
and the biological activation of the stress system is not as conveniently straightforward as one 
would expect: while acute stress markers do sometimes correlate with acute stress self-reports (for 
instance, Vinkers et al., 2013), several studies have reported opposite results (see, for instance, von 
Dawans et al., 2012, Hjortskov et al., 2004). In what concerns chronic stress, we are not aware of 
any biological measure that reliably correlates with self-reported long-term stress. However, while 
we do not report on biological measures on this occasion, we bring upfront the first experimental 
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investigation on the effects of experienced stress on economic social behavioral. In integrating our 
results to the field, we advance an idea for future research: not only might chronic stress be having 
different cognitive and behavioral effects than acute stress, but it might be that biological stress and 
perceived or reported stress are two different constructs, yielding different cognitive and behavioral 
effects.  
 
7 Conclusion 
We investigated the relation between self-reported chronic stress as measured by TICS and 
social preferences in a double anonymous dictator game. In order to control for experimenter 
demand effects, self-perception and robustness we manipulated the frame, the gender pairing and 
the nature of the reward. We showed that there is no significant correlation between chronic stress 
and social preferences dependent on real rewards for either gender. We also showed that this lack of 
correlation is robust to all experimental conditions and further controls. However, women’s 
hypothetical social preferences are negatively and significantly correlated to self-reported chronic 
stress levels: the higher their stress, the less they declare to be willing to send to an anonymous 
recipient.   
This strengthened rational behavior is independent of various possible controls and almost 
all experimental manipulations, except framing. Apparently, stressed women are even more willing 
to take a large proportion of the endowment when they are told the money actually belongs to the 
recipient then when they could make an offer from an endowment belonging to themselves. This 
straightforwardly goes against the hypothesized “tend-and-befriend” nature of women, but goes 
perfectly along with expectations of rational behavior. In terms of economic rationality62, while 
men prove to be uninfluenced by perceived stress, women are less rational under low stress: they 
declare they would transfer a larger portion of the endowment, minimizing their gain. However, 
when dealing with real money, women are manly: stress has little influence on transfers and, while 
still sending something to their counterpart, they keep most for themselves.  
 
 
                                                            
62 Having more is always better and one should maximize own payoff, irrespective of other factors. 
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Appendix 
 
Inter-item reliability analysis and descriptives of TICS scores 
 
Table 5: Inter-item Reliability Analysis for the Original and Modified Versions of the TICS 
Scale 
Label 
Number of 
Items 
Cronbach´s Alpha Original Version 
(Experience in the Last 3 Months) 
Cronbach´s Alpha Modified Version 
(Experience in the Last Month) 
ERDR 9 .90 .83 
MANG 4 .84 .83 
SORG 4 .88 .87 
SOUE 6 .84 .85 
SOZI 6 .88 .90 
SOZS 6 .87 .86 
SSCS 12 .91 .91 
UEBE 8 .90 .92 
UEFO 6 .87 .87 
UNZU 8 .85 .83 
Average 10 .87 .87 
TICS 57 - .95 
Note: Cronbach´s Alpha values for the Original version are taken from the TICS manual (Schulz et al., 2004). The table rows display descriptives and 
analysis coefficients for the nine facets of stress comprised in nine scales (ERDR, MANG, SORG, SOUE, SOZI, SOZS, UEBE, UEFO, UNZU), a 
screening scale for chronic stress (SSCS), the average value of inter-item variability and the total TICS score (not existent in the original version). 
The nine facets of stress code the following content: pressure to be successful (ERDR), lack of social recognition (MANG), chronic anxiety (SORG), 
excessive social demand (SOUE), social isolation (SOZI), social tensions (SOZS), excessive workload (UEBE), mental overload at work (UEFO), 
and dissatisfaction at work (UNZU). 
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Table 6: TICS Descriptives  
Sample N Mean Minimum Maximum Median 
Standard 
Deviation 
25th 
Percentile 
75th 
Percentile 
Pooled 348 80.84 1 196 80.00 29.98 59.00 100.00 
         
Females 175 83.32 1 154 85.00 28.18 65.00 101.00 
         
Males 173 78.34 15 196 75.00 31.59 56.00 97.00 
         
Real- 
Pooled 
185 80.56 15 196 78.00 31.07 59.00 99.00 
         
Hypothetical-
Pooled 
163 81.16 1 144 83.00 28.80 59.00 100.00 
         
Real- 
Females 
91 83.47 20 154 82.00 26.77 65.00 101.00 
         
Real- 
Males 
94 77.75 15 196 73.00 34.64 54.00 96.00 
         
Hypothetical-
Females 
84 83.15 1 142 85.00 29.79 64.50 103.00 
         
Hypothetical- 
Males 
79 79.05 26 144 81.00 27.73 57.00 100.00 
Note: The descriptives are given for the entire sample (second row), the entire sample divided by reward nature conditions (fifth and sixth row), 
followed by gender specific scores for each of the Real (seventh and eighth row), Hypothetical (ninth and tenth row), and Pooled Conditions (third 
and fourth row). 
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Instructions  
Give Real 
General Information 
Dear {male} participant, 
Thank you for participating in this study on decision-making. In the following you will be informed 
about the rules and procedures. Every {male} participant has received the same printed instructions 
as you did. Please take your time and read the instructions carefully.  
 
No communication with other {male} participants 
All decisions in this study are private. Please do not communicate with the other {male} 
participants. Otherwise, we are forced to exclude you from the experiment and you will have to 
forgo your payment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The {female/ male} 
experimenter will answer your question quietly.  
 
Anonymous matching 
In this study, you will be randomly matched with another {male} participant from the other room. 
The randomization is carried out according to the number you drew during registration at the 
beginning of this study. The matching will not be made public and no {male} participant can 
reconstruct which other {male} participant {he} is matched to. 
This experiment is completely anonymous. Your identity will not be made public and you will 
not receive information about the identity of the other {male} participants in this room and 
the other {male} participants in the other room. 
In order to simplify readability we forgo the gender matching. We would like to note that the use of the male 
(to male) form should be understood as gender-independent. For each possible gender match (female-
female, male-male, female-male, male-female), instructions have been written as to clearly reflect the gender 
of both counterparts. As there were both a female and a male experimenter in each room, their genders are 
also always specified. 
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General information about the decision task 
Both you and the matched {male} participant received 5 € for your participation at the beginning. In 
addition to this, you have another 5 € which is in your personal envelope, on the table in front of 
you. The other matched {male} participant has nothing (0 €). 
You can now leave the amount you just received unchanged or reduce it, and increase the 
amount of the {male} participant you have been matched with. 
 
How to make your decision 
On the table in front of you, you see two envelopes: one is your personal envelope and the other 
envelope belongs to the other {male} participant. In order to distinguish between the envelopes, 
they are marked: your personal envelope is marked ''YOUR PERSONAL ENVELOPE''; the 
envelope of the other {male} participant is marked ''ENVELOPE OF OTHER {MALE} 
PARTICIPANT''.  
 
Content of the two envelopes 
Your personal envelope contains a total of 20 coins, out of which ten are 50 cents coins (5 €) and 
ten are worthless coins (metal washers). The washers have the purpose of keeping your decision 
completely anonymous with respect to other persons including the {female/ male} experimenters.  
The envelope of the other {male} participant is empty. 
Please make sure, that your personal envelope contains ten 50 cents coins and ten worthless 
washers by emptying the contents onto the table in front of you.  
Receipt 2: This receipt is only for accounting purposes. After you signed the receipt, we ask you to 
place it in the sealed collection box and continue with your decision. The sealed box is used so that 
the {female/ male} experimenters cannot see the name written on the receipt. All {male} 
participants in this room sign the second receipt. The {male} participants in the other room will not 
sign such a receipt. 
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The Decision 
After you have emptied the contents of your personal envelope on the table in front of you and 
signed the receipt, please put exactly ten coins/washers back in your personal envelope. Similarly, 
put exactly ten coins/washers into the envelope of the other {male} participant. In the appendix, we 
present all possible decisions.  
Completing the decision and sealing the envelopes 
As soon as you have made your decision, put your personal envelope into your pocket (coat etc.). 
Please seal the envelope of the other {male} participant (i.e., use the flap-tape to seal the envelope) 
and place it in the box located behind you, on the floor. (Important: Please do not hand the 
envelope to another person or to the {female/ male} experimenter, but place it directly in the 
collection box.) 
After all {male} participants in this room have made their decision, a {female/ male} experimenter 
will carry the box to the other room in which a second {female/ male} experimenter will take over 
the box and distribute the envelopes to the assigned {male} participants. Nobody in the other room 
is informed about your identity.  
 
Anonymity 
We have planned the experiment in a way that guarantees your anonymity at all times. 
1.  Your identity is never revealed to another person. 
2.  The {female/ male} experimenter who distributes the envelopes to the {male} participants 
in the other room was not present at the time you made your personal decision. He or She 
and the other {male} participants do not know from whom they received the envelope. 
3. After the decision we will ask you to fill in an anonymous questionnaire. The questions are 
used for the evaluation of the study and none of your answers can be linked to your identity. 
 
Thank you very much for your support! 
 
 103 
 
 
Last Page of the Instructions- Give Real Treatment 
You Other {male} participant Return to your personal envelope Place in the envelope of other {male} participant 
    
5 € 0 € 10 x 50 cents coins and 0 x washers 0 x 50 cents coins and 10 x washers 
    
4.5 € 0.5 € 9 x 50 cents coins and 1 x washers 1 x 50 cents coins and 9 x washers 
    
4 € 1 € 8 x 50 cents coins and 2 x washers 2 x 50 cents coins and 8 x washers 
    
3.5 € 1.5 € 7 x 50 cents coins and 3 x washers 3 x 50 cents coins and 7 x washers 
    
3 € 2 € 6 x 50 cents coins and 4 x washers 4 x 50 cents coins and 6 x washers 
    
2.5 € 2.5 € 5 x 50 cents coins and 5 x washers 5 x 50 cents coins and 5 x washers 
    
2 € 3 € 4 x 50 cents coins and 6 x washers 6 x 50 cents coins and 4 x washers 
    
1.5 € 3.5 € 3 x 50 cents coins and 7 x washers 7 x 50 cents coins and 3 x washers 
    
1 € 4 € 2 x 50 cents coins and 8 x washers 8 x 50 cents coins and 2 x washers 
    
0.5 € 4.5 € 1 x 50 cents coins and 9 x washers 9 x 50 cents coins and 1 x washers 
    
0 € 5 € 0 x 50 cents coins and 10 x washers 10 x 50 cents coins and 0 x washers 
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Take Real 
General Information 
Dear {male} participant, 
Thank you for participating in this study on decision-making. In the following you will be informed 
about the rules and procedures. Every {male} participant has received the same printed instructions 
as you did. Please take your time and read the instructions carefully.  
 
No communication with other {male} participants 
All decisions in this study are private. Please do not communicate with the other {male} 
participants. Otherwise, we are forced to exclude you from the experiment and you will have to 
forgo your payment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The {female/ male} 
experimenter will answer your question quietly.  
 
Anonymous matching 
In this study, you will be randomly matched with another {male} participant from the other room. 
The randomization is carried out according to the number you drew during registration at the 
beginning of this study. The matching will not be made public and no {male} participant can 
reconstruct which other {male} participant {he} is matched to. 
This experiment is completely anonymous. Your identity will not be made public and you will 
not receive information about the identity of the other {male} participants in this room and 
the other {male} participants in the other room. 
In order to simplify readability we forgo the gender matching. We would like to note that the use of the male 
(to male) form should be understood as gender-independent. For each possible gender match (female-
female, male-male, female-male, male-female), instructions have been written as to clearly reflect the gender 
of both counterparts. As there were both a female and a male experimenter in each room, their genders are 
also always specified. 
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General information about the decision task 
Both you and the matched {male} participant received 5 € your participation at the beginning. In 
addition to this, the other {male} participant you are matched with has another 5 € in the envelope 
labeled envelope other {male} participant. It is found on the table in front of you. You have nothing 
(0 €). 
You can now leave the amount he just received unchanged or reduce it, and increase your 
amount. 
 
How to make your decision 
On the table in front of you, you see two envelopes: one belongs to the other {male} participant and 
the other is your personal envelope. In order to distinguish between the envelopes, they are marked: 
the envelope of the other {male} participant is marked ''ENVELOPE OF OTHER {MALE} 
PARTICIPANT''; your personal envelope is marked ''YOUR PERSONAL ENVELOPE''.  
 
Content of the two envelopes 
The envelope of the other {male} participant contains a total of 20 coins, out of which ten are 50 
cents coins (5 €) and ten are worthless coins (metal washers). The washers have the purpose of 
keeping your decision completely anonymous with respect to other persons including the {female/ 
male} experimenters.  
Your personal envelope is empty. 
Please make sure, that the envelope of the other {male} participant contains ten 50 cents coins and 
ten worthless washers by emptying the contents onto the table in front of you.  
Receipt 2: This receipt is only for accounting purposes. After you signed the receipt, we ask you to 
place it in the sealed collection box and continue with your decision. The sealed box is used so that 
the {female/ male} experimenters cannot see the name written on the receipt. All {male} 
participants in this room sign the second receipt. The {male} participants in the other room will not 
sign such a receipt.  
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The Decision 
After you have emptied the contents of the envelope of the other {male} participant on the table in 
front of you and signed the receipt, please put exactly ten coins/washers back in the envelope of the 
other {male} participant. Similarly, put exactly ten coins/washers into your personal envelope. In 
the appendix, we present all possible decisions.  
 
Completing the decision and sealing the envelopes 
As soon as you have made your decision, put your personal envelope into your pocket (coat etc.). 
Please seal the envelope of the other {male} participant (i.e., use the flap-tape to seal the envelope) 
and place it in the box located behind you, on the floor. (Important: Please do not hand the 
envelope to another person or to the {female/ male} experimenter, but place it directly in the 
collection box.) 
After all {male} participants in this room have made their decision, a {female/ male} experimenter 
will carry the box to the other room in which a second {female/ male} experimenter will take over 
the box and distribute the envelopes to the assigned {male} participants. Nobody in the other room 
is informed about your identity. 
 
Anonymity 
We have planned the experiment in a way that guarantees your anonymity at all times. 
1. Your identity is never revealed to another person. 
2. The {female/ male} experimenter who distributes the envelopes to the {male} participants 
in the other room was not present at the time you made your personal decision. He or She 
and the other {male} participants do not know from whom they received the envelope. 
3. After the decision we will ask you to fill in an anonymous questionnaire. The questions are 
used for the evaluation of the study and none of your answers can be linked to your identity. 
 
Thank you very much for your support! 
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Last Page of the Instructions- Take Real Treatment 
Other {male} participant You 
Return to the envelope of the other 
{male} participant 
Place in your personal envelope  
    
5 € 0 € 10 x 50 cents coins and 0 x washers 0 x 50 cents coins and 10 x washers 
    
4.5 € 0.5 € 9 x 50 cents coins and 1 x washers 1 x 50 cents coins and 9 x washers 
    
4 € 1 € 8 x 50 cents coins and 2 x washers 2 x 50 cents coins and 8 x washers 
    
3.5 € 1.5 € 7 x 50 cents coins and 3 x washers 3 x 50 cents coins and 7 x washers 
    
3 € 2 € 6 x 50 cents coins and 4 x washers 4 x 50 cents coins and 6 x washers 
    
2.5 € 2.5 € 5 x 50 cents coins and 5 x washers 5 x 50 cents coins and 5 x washers 
    
2 € 3 € 4 x 50 cents coins and 6 x washers 6 x 50 cents coins and 4 x washers 
    
1.5 € 3.5 € 3 x 50 cents coins and 7 x washers 7 x 50 cents coins and 3 x washers 
    
1 € 4 € 2 x 50 cents coins and 8 x washers 8 x 50 cents coins and 2 x washers 
    
0.5 € 4.5 € 1 x 50 cents coins and 9 x washers 9 x 50 cents coins and 1 x washers 
    
0 € 5 € 0 x 50 cents coins and 10 x washers 10 x 50 cents coins and 0 x washers 
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Give Hypothetical 
General Information 
Dear {male} participant, 
Thank you for participating in this study on decision-making. In the following you will be informed 
about the rules and procedures. Every {male} participant has received the same printed instructions 
as you did. Please take your time and read the instructions carefully.  
 
No communication with other {male} participants 
All decisions in this study are private. Please do not communicate with the other {male} 
participants. Otherwise, we are forced to exclude you from the experiment and you will have to 
forgo your payment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The {female/ male} 
experimenter will answer your question quietly.  
 
Anonymous matching 
In this study, you will be randomly matched with another {male} participant from the other room. 
The randomization is carried out according to the number you drew during registration at the 
beginning of this study. The matching will not be made public and no {male} participant can 
reconstruct which other {male} participant {he} is matched to. 
This experiment is completely anonymous. Your identity will not be made public and you will 
not receive information about the identity of the other {male} participants in this room and 
the other {male} participants in the other room. 
In order to simplify readability we forgo the gender matching. We would like to note that the use of the male 
(to male) form should be understood as gender-independent. For each possible gender match (female-
female, male-male, female-male, male-female), instructions have been written as to clearly reflect the gender 
of both counterparts. As there were both a female and a male experimenter in each room, their genders are 
also always specified. 
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General information about the decision task 
Both you and the matched {male} participant received 5 € for your participation at the beginning. 
Now imagine that in addition to this you received a second payment of 5 € and it is contained in 
your personal envelope on the table in front of you. The other matched {male} participant has 
nothing (0 €). 
You can now leave your second, hypothetical amount of 5 € unchanged or reduce it, and 
increase the amount of the {male} participant you have been matched with. 
 
How to make your decision 
On the table in front of you, you see two envelopes: one is your personal envelope and the other 
envelope belongs to the other {male} participant. In order to distinguish between the envelopes, 
they are marked: your personal envelope is marked ''YOUR PERSONAL ENVELOPE''; the 
envelope of the other {male} participant is marked ''ENVELOPE OF OTHER {MALE} 
PARTICIPANT''.  
 
Content of the two envelopes 
Your personal envelope contains a paper-slip with 5 € written on it. 
The envelope of the other {male} participant contains a paper-slip with 0 € written on it. 
 
The Decision 
Now, please imagine the 5 € were real and not hypothetical. 
If you wish to reduce your payment and increase the one of the other {male} participant, denote the 
amount (in increments of 50 cent) on the paper-slips; i.e., you denote the amount by which you 
wish to increase the other {male} participant’s payment on the paper-slip contained in the other 
{male} participant's envelope. On your personal paper-slip you change the amount as well.  
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Example: 
You wish to decrease your amount of 5 € by X € (i.e., either by 0 €, 0.50 €,... or 5 €) by which you 
increase the other {male} participant’s amount by X € (i.e., either 0 €, 0.5 €,... or 5 €): 
Then you write on the empty paper-slip contained in the other {male} participant’s envelope: X € 
(i.e., you write either 0 €, 0.50 €, ... or 5 €). 
Additionally you write on the paper-slip contained in your personal envelope: the rest that you wish 
to leave in your envelope (i.e., you either write 5 €, 4.50 €, ... or 0 €). 
Please make sure that the amounts on both paper-slips sum up to 5 €.  
 
Completing the decision and sealing the envelopes 
As soon as you have made your decision, put your personal envelope into your pocket (coat etc.). 
Please seal the envelope of the other {male} participant (i.e., use the flap-tape to seal the envelope) 
and place it in the box located behind you, on the floor. (Important: Please do not hand the 
envelope to another person or to the {female/ male} experimenter, but place it directly in the 
collection box.) 
After all {male} participants in this room have made their decision, an {female/ male} experimenter 
will carry the box to the other room in which a second {female/ male} experimenter will take over 
the box and distribute the envelopes to the assigned {male} participants. Nobody in the other room 
is informed about your identity.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 111 
 
Anonymity 
We have planned the experiment in a way that guarantees your anonymity at all times. 
1. Your identity is never revealed to another person. 
2. The {female/ male} experimenter who distributes the envelopes to the {male} participants in 
the other room was not present at the time you made your personal decision. He or She and the 
other {male} participants do not know from whom they received the envelope. 
3. After the decision we will ask you to fill in an anonymous questionnaire. The questions are 
used for the evaluation of the study and none of your answers can be linked to your identity. 
 
Thank you very much for your support! 
 
 
Paper Slips in the Two Envelopes- Give Hypothetical Treatment 
Your Personal Envelope 
5 € 
Please denote here which amount you would like to leave in this envelope: ______ 
(i.e., you either write 5 €, 4.50 €,... 0 €) 
Other {Male} Participant’s Envelope 
0 € 
Please denote here which amount you would like to leave in this envelope: ______ 
(i.e., you either write 5 €, 4.50 €,... 0 €) 
 
 
 
 112 
 
Take Hypothetical 
General Information 
Dear {male} participant, 
Thank you for participating in this study on decision-making. In the following you will be informed 
about the rules and procedures. Every {male} participant has received the same printed instructions 
as you did. Please take your time and read the instructions carefully.  
 
No communication with other {male} participants 
All decisions in this study are private. Please do not communicate with the other {male} 
participants. Otherwise, we are forced to exclude you from the experiment and you will have to 
forgo your payment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The {female/ male} 
experimenter will answer your question quietly.  
 
Anonymous matching 
In this study, you will be randomly matched with another {male} participant from the other room. 
The randomization is carried out according to the number you drew during registration at the 
beginning of this study. The matching will not be made public and no {male} participant can 
reconstruct which other {male} participant he is matched to. 
This experiment is completely anonymous. Your identity will not be made public and you will 
not receive information about the identity of the other {male} participants in this room and 
the other {male} participants in the other room. 
In order to simplify readability we forgo the gender matching. We would like to note that the use of the male 
(to male) form should be understood as gender-independent. For each possible gender match (female-
female, male-male, female-male, male-female), instructions have been written as to clearly reflect the gender 
of both counterparts. As there were both a female and a male experimenter in each room, their genders are 
also always specified. 
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General information about the decision task 
Both you and the matched {male} participant received 5 € for your participation at the beginning. 
Now imagine that in addition to this the other {male} participant received a second payment of 5 € 
and it is contained in the envelope other {male} participant on the table in front of you. You have 
nothing (0 €). 
You can now leave the hypothetical 5 € amount of the other {male} participant unchanged or 
reduce it, and increase your amount. 
 
How to make your decision 
On the table in front of you, you see two envelopes: one belongs to the other {male} participant and 
the other is your personal envelope. In order to distinguish between the envelopes, they are marked: 
the envelope of the other {male} participant is marked ''ENVELOPE OF OTHER {MALE} 
PARTICIPANT''; your personal envelope is marked ''YOUR PERSONAL ENVELOPE''.  
 
Content of the two envelopes 
The envelope of the other {male} participant contains a paper-slip with 5 € written on it. 
Your personal envelope contains a paper-slip with 0 € written on it.  
 
The Decision 
Now, please imagine the 5 € were real and not hypothetical.  
If you wish to reduce the payment of the other {male} participant and increase yours, denote the 
amount (in increments of 50 cent) on the paper-slips; i.e., you denote the amount by which you 
wish to increase your payment on the paper-slip contained in your personal envelope. On the other 
{male} participant's paper-slip you change the amount as well.  
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Example: 
You wish to decrease the amount of the other {male} participant of 5 € by X € (i.e., either by 0 €, 
0.50 €,.. or 5 €) by which you increase your personal amount by X € (i.e., either 0 €, 0.5 €,... or 5 €): 
Then you write on the empty paper-slip contained in your personal envelope: X€ (i.e., you write 
either 0 €, 0.50 €, ... or 5 €). 
Additionally you write on the paper-slip contained in the other {male} participant's envelope: the 
rest that you wish to leave in the other {male} participants’ envelope (i.e., you either write 5 €, 4.50 
€, ... or 0 €). 
Please make sure that the amounts on both paper-slips sum up to 5 €.  
 
Completing the decision and sealing the envelopes 
As soon as you have made your decision, put your personal envelope into your pocket (coat etc.). 
Please seal the envelope of the other {male} participant (i.e., use the flap-tape to seal the envelope) 
and place it in the box located behind you, on the floor. (Important: Please do not hand the 
envelope to another person or to the {female/ male} experimenter, but place it directly in the 
collection box.) 
After all {male} participants in this room have made their decision, an {female/ male} experimenter 
will carry the box to the other room in which a second {female/ male} experimenter will take over 
the box and distribute the envelopes to the assigned {male} participants. Nobody in the other room 
is informed about your identity.  
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Anonymity 
We have planned the experiment in a way that guarantees your anonymity at all times. 
1. Your identity is never revealed to another person.  
2. The {female/ male} experimenter who distributes the envelopes to the {male} participants in 
the other room was not present at the time you made your personal decision. He or She and the 
other {male} participants do not know from whom they received the envelope.  
3. After the decision we will ask you to fill in an anonymous questionnaire. The questions are 
used for the evaluation of the study and none of your answers can be linked to your identity. 
 
Thank you very much for your support! 
 
 
Paper Slips in the Two Envelopes- Take Hypothetical Treatment 
Other {Male} Participant’s Envelope 
5 € 
Please denote here which amount you would like to leave in this envelope: ______ 
(i.e., you either write 5 €, 4.50 €,... 0 €) 
Your Personal Envelope 
0 € 
Please denote here which amount you would like to leave in this envelope: ______ 
(i.e., you either write 5 €, 4.50 €,... 0 €) 
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Metal Washers Used to Preserve Anonymity 
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Gender-Pairing and Framing Matter in Social Decision-Making63 
 
 
Abstract 
We show that the way decision-making tasks are framed matters in a gender-paired dictator game, 
i.e., a money sharing task where one sender solely decides on dividing a given amount with an 
anonymous recipient. Our methodological experiment explores the influence of gender pairing and 
framing on monetary transfers in a 2x2x2 design where the sender’s gender, the recipient’s gender, 
and the frame, i.e., give from own endowment or take from the endowment of another, are varied. 
We are the first to combine all three variables and uncover that giving information about the gender 
of the recipient accommodates framing effects. If each of the three variables were to be analyzed 
independently, our data would confirm previous literature findings where females generally transfer 
more money than males to a counterpart and framing has no effect (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; 
Dreber et al., 2013). However, we investigate the variables in interaction and find that framing does 
matter when information about the recipient’s gender is salient. For both genders, transfers in 
opposite-sex pairs are always higher than in same-sex pairs, but significantly higher in the take 
frame. We thus suggest that the gender composition of the sample or (beliefs about) gender pairing 
should be controlled for in experiments testing framing and gender differences in social interaction. 
 
Keywords: Framing · Gender Differences · Gender Pairing · Experiment · Dictator Game · 
Experiment 
JEL Classification: C72 · C91 · J16  
PsycINFO Classification: 2970 · 3020 · 3040  
                                                            
63 Co-authored by Sara E. Kettner. We would like to thank the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) under research grant 
number SCHW1537/1-1 for providing financial support for our research. We are also grateful to Jonathan Alevy, Anna Dreber, Peter 
Duersch, Christiane Schwieren, Kathleen Vohs, and Israel Waichman for insightful comments. Hannah Ferner, Frank Illing and 
Christian König provided excellent research assistance. 
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1 Introduction 
Differences in decision-making between genders have been widely explored in experimental 
economics64, but gender-paired interaction has been rarely considered. However, most real-life 
interactions do not occur with an androgynous match, because individuals have information, 
expectations, or, at least, beliefs about their counterpart’s characteristics. It is thus conceivable that 
these characteristics mediate decisions. For instance, counterpart gender has been shown to mediate 
outcomes in strategic and non-strategic settings where the payoffs depend on the courtesy of others. 
In restaurants it is frequently observed that males on dates and groups of males are more generous 
towards waitresses than groups of females (Miller, 2000). To motivate this type of selectivity, 
research in evolutionary psychology argues that preferential behavior towards the opposite sex has a 
signaling role and can be explained by the sexual selection hypothesis (Farrelly et al., 2007). 
Farrelly et al. (2007) show that, in interaction, partners tend to behave more cooperatively, probably 
following to increase their attractiveness. This courtship behavior must have a purpose, since it is 
costly and non-reciprocated: it is meant to appear as being altruistically motivated and portray the 
person as more desirable. 
Evidence also suggests that sharing is lower within same-sex pairs (Buunk and Massar, 
2012). With mate competition for reproduction and survival being the norm, aggression within 
genders is higher (Trivers, 1972, ch. 7) and this is especially prominent for men (Buunk and 
Massar, 2012). However, intra-gender aggression for women also exists, probably to the same 
extent, but is manifested in a less overt manner: gossip, rumors and enlisting cooperation to 
undermine the target person (Holmström, 1992). On this line, research has shown that also women 
see other women as competitors when gender is salient (Buss, 1999; Campbell, 1999; Kanazawa, 
2005) and they become more competitive in single-sex environments (Gneezy et al., 2003). The 
study by Holm (2000) similarly identifies discrimination of females in a battle of the sexes game 
where the better outcome is selected for oneself and the worse outcome is selected for the matched 
female. Lastly, Houser and Schunk (2009) show that even school-age girls are already sensitive to 
gender-paired interactions. 
Given that gender considerations appear to be embodied in social interaction, we maintain 
that the gender composition of the experimental sample, gender pairing, or beliefs about it are an 
important factor for economic decision-making and experimental methodology. Additionally, 
                                                            
64 For a summary see Croson and Gneezy (2009). 
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behavior in social games is often context dependent (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) and context further 
interacts with gender (Croson and Gneezy, 2009), which is why the interplay of social context and 
gender pairing must be scrutinized. 
Our study is the first to focus on the interaction of the decision maker's gender, his/ her 
counterpart's gender, and framing. The most promising setting for this investigation is a non-
strategic, anonymous environment, as it elicits prosocial behavior in the absence of most exogenous 
demands. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we summarize existing 
literature. Section 3 presents the experimental design, and Section 4 the hypotheses. The results are 
discussed in Section 5 and we conclude in Section 6. 
 
2 Literature 
Over and over again, experiments have shown that individuals exhibit other-regarding 
preferences, despite rational theory predicting the contrary (Camerer, 2003). In detail, rational 
theory predicts that maximizing own payoff and benefit, independent of any other concerns, is the 
main and only motivation for humans. However, experimental work has robustly disproved this 
theory and has shown that other-regarding preferences, i.e., taking also into account the welfare of 
other people, do exist. This is observed even under conditions of experimental double-blindness 
(Hoffman et al., 1996), where one has nothing to gain in terms of reputation, and in contexts where 
reciprocity cannot be a motivational concern (Johannesson and Persson, 2000). Once established, 
other-regarding preferences have proven to be cross-cultural and have been motivated by constructs 
like inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999), (impure) altruism (Andreoni, 1989), Rawlsian 
“social welfare” preferences (Charness and Rabin, 2002), or non-monetary benefits (Aknin et al., 
2013). Lastly, this less-egoistic-than-portrayed nature of humans is displayed by both genders, with 
some authors showing that there are gender differences per se in the magnitude of this behavior, 
while others showing that it is context that enables the gender differences. 
In analyzing giving behavior in dictator games, female gender has been positively correlated 
with the amount transferred (Eckel and Grossman, 1998; Engel, 2011). That is, women transfer 
more money to their anonymous counterpart. However, the gender effect seems to be context 
dependent (Andreoni and Vesterlund, 2001; Bolton and Katok, 1995), since females' preferences 
appear to be more sensitive to social cues (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). One factor clearly 
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influencing social interaction is gender pairing: offers are affected by information regarding the 
responder gender. In an ultimatum game65 by Solnick (2001) amounts proposed to men are larger, 
especially those by women. Sutter et al. (2009) expand on this finding in a power-to-take game66, 
reporting that in same-sex pairs the amounts proposed are lower than those in opposite-sex pairs. 
Also, in a gender-paired dictator game, females transfer less to females than to males (Ben-Ner et 
al., 2004). However, others find that there is no effect of gender-paired transfers, i.e., women 
propose higher amounts regardless of the responders' gender (Eckel and Grossman, 2001). We think 
that these mixed results are due to different design approaches, such as the social distance between 
the participants and the decision elicitation method. In this paper we propose examining non-
strategic gender interaction67 in a double-anonymous setting. 
Another important aspect regarding interaction is framing. Bardsley (2008) and List (2007) 
propose that giving in the dictator game, i.e., transferring something rather than nothing to the 
responder, might be just an artefact of the experimental design and dependent on the way that the 
decision is framed and the choice set constructed. In this matter, some authors report that framing 
matters in public goods and bargaining research (Andreoni, 1995; Park, 2000; Leliveld et al., 2008). 
However, others find no framing effects in dictator games (Dreber et al., 2013), in public goods 
contexts (Brandts and Schwieren, 2007), or donation games (Grossman and Eckel, 2012). Thus, the 
effect of framing remains unclear. But this seems to hold only until the decision maker's gender is 
considered and interacted with framing. A recent study by Alevy et al. (2014) demonstrates that 
men and women do react differently to dictator game framing when anonymity is manipulated. In 
contrast, Dreber et al. (2013) report that framing in interaction with gender does not matter, but that 
there is an overall, pure gender effect, regardless of frame, where females are more generous than 
males. Finally, Fujimoto and Park (2010) bring counterevidence, reporting that there are no gender 
differences in contributions under a positive public goods frame, but women are more generous 
                                                            
65 Similar to the dictator game, but the recipient can accept or reject the sharing that the dictator (sender) proposed. If rejection 
occurs, both counterparts get nothing. If acceptance occurs, they get the amounts according to the sharing proposed by the sender. 
66 Similar to the ultimatum game in a take frame. Both players actually gained the amounts they hold at the beginning of the game in 
a real effort task. In the first stage, the decision maker (called “take authority”) decides how much of the responder’s money will be 
transferred to him in the second stage of the game. However, the responder can use his/ her own money to punish the take authority 
for the decision he/ she took, and the final transfer to the take authority will be based on whatever is left of the responder’s 
endowment once punishment was deducted. 
67 Where the recipient has no role during or after the decision, and thus cannot influence the decision in any way. The sender has total 
freedom to express his true sharing preferences, especially under double blind anonymity (neither experimenters, nor other 
participants can ever know what he/ she decided). 
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under a negative one. We contribute to the explorations of gender-context interactions with the 
experiment that follows. 
So far, studies only considered interactions of gender and framing where the decision’s 
recipient was an androgynous match. Likewise, gender pairing in the dictator game has only been 
investigated in the give frame, i.e., where the amount to be shared is initially endowed to the sender, 
pointing at preferential behavior towards the opposite sex. But the question remains whether gender 
pairing effects are further influenced by framing, i.e., defining the endowed amount as initially 
belonging to the recipient. Hence, we investigate the additional influence of framing decisions on 
information about the recipient’s gender. To our knowledge, we are the first to use the interaction of 
the three aspects: gender, gender pairing, and framing. 
 
3 Experimental Design  
3.1 Design 
We scrutinized gender pairing and framing in a double-anonymous dictator game68 
(Hoffman et al., 1996). In a 2x2x2 between-subjects design a) the decision is framed as either give 
or take69, b) the dictator gender is varied, and c) the recipient gender is varied. The basic 
experimental procedure, except gender pairing, is a replication of Kettner and Waichman (2014)70. 
The experiment was organized as follows: all participants were invited to the same room, 
signed up and received a 5 € show-up fee. They thus became aware that everybody had received the 
same show-up fee. Further, on this occasion they might have gotten a sense of the gender 
composition of the sample, but we did not rely on this, and instructions clearly delineated it later. 
Next, the way the experiment unfolded depended on the gender pairing of the sessions' samples. For 
same-sex sessions, the participants drew a number or letter indicating the room and seat to which 
they were randomly assigned (numbers to senders {dictators} and letters to recipients). For 
opposite-sex sessions, each gender was directed towards a different room and, at the entrance, 
                                                            
68 Neither the experimenters nor the other participants can ever know who made what decision. 
69 Give means the amount to be shared has been defined as initially belonging to the sender; take means that the amount to be shared 
has been defined as initially belonging to the recipient. In both frames the sender is the only one that gets to decide how and if the 
amount is to be divided between himself/ herself and the recipient. 
70 Instructions are provided in the appendix. 
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participants drew the seat number71. It is possible that separating participants by gender into 
different rooms might create additional distance but it was the method we chose to maintain full 
anonymity towards experimenters and other participants. 
After everyone had been assigned to a room and seated in a cubicle, the experiment began. 
In both rooms there were always two experimenters present - a male and a female- as experimenter 
gender might influence decisions (Innocenti and Pazienza, 2006). The first page of the instructions, 
including explanations on random matching and anonymity, was read aloud by an experimenter. 
The remainder was read privately by the participants. Dictators (senders) found two envelopes in 
their cubicles, one labeled “Your Personal Envelope” and the other labeled “Other [male/female]72 
Participant's Envelope”. In the give framing, 5 € (ten 0.50 € coins) together with ten metal washers 
were in the “Your Personal Envelope” and the “Other Participant's Envelope” was empty. In the 
take framing, the 5 € (ten 0.50 € coins) together with ten metal washers were in the “Other 
Participant's Envelope” and the “Your Personal Envelope” was empty. The metal washers ensured 
anonymity, as they mimic 0.50 € coins in weight, diameter, and the noise they make. After being 
asked to count the contents of the envelopes and check that both ten 0.50 € pieces and ten metal 
washers were in the correct envelope (dependent on the framing), participants made their decision. 
They were instructed to place ten metal pieces, either coins or washers, in the “Other Participant's 
Envelope” and keep the remainder for themselves. In this way, they could transfer from 0 € to 5 € in 
increments of 0.50 €. Neither the experimenters nor other participants could observe decisions or 
connect a particular identity to a decision. Once a dictator had made a decision, he/she placed the 
sealed envelope labeled “Other Participant's Envelope” in a collection box and filled in 
demographic and psychometric questionnaires. The questionnaires were matched to the decisions 
by means of seat numbering, i.e., each questionnaire and both envelopes a participant got were pre-
labeled according to the seat number and were already laid on the table before the participants drew 
their seat number. After filling in the questionnaires, the participants placed them back on the table 
and left the room. 
                                                            
71 We are aware that this might be viewed as creating additional social distance. When participants who had signed up did not arrive 
on time and the group was uneven in number or in terms of gender, we proceeded as follows: if the missing participant belonged to 
the recipient group, the participant without a partner was assigned a dictator role and his/ her decision was carried out and paired up 
by means of a lottery. If the missing participant belonged to the dictator group, the participant without a partner could not join the 
experiment. 
72 Gender is embedded in the inflection in the German language. It was therefore not required to further emphasize the recipient's 
gender, as one has to use the word “Teilnehmer” to define a “male participant”, and the word “Teilnehmerin” to define a “female 
participant”. 
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When all dictators had placed their sealed envelopes in the box, it was carried into the 
recipient room73. The experimenters in the recipient room, different from the experimenters in the 
sender’s room and thus who were at no point present while the dictators made their decisions, 
randomly distributed the envelopes to the recipients. The recipients opened the envelopes and 
counted the contents. The experimenters in the recipient room recorded the amounts transferred by 
senders according to their seat number, while the recipients filled in pre-allocated demographic and 
psychometric questionnaires. 
 
3.2 Implementation 
The experiment took place at the AWI Lab of the University of Heidelberg in February, 
April, and June 2013. Data was collected in thirty-three sessions74 with an average duration of thirty 
minutes. 376 participants were recruited through the ORSEE-student-pool (Greiner, 2004) after 
filtering for experience in similar experiments. Five participants were excluded owing to their 
advanced age, and other two because they had misunderstood the instructions. After exclusion, the 
sender sample contained a total of 195 independent observations75. The mean age of this sample 
was 22.89 and ranged from 18 to 33 years. 50.14% of the participants were women and 37.95% 
were majoring in economics. The metal washers’ market price is between 2 and 4 cents per piece, 
and the majority of the participants (89.23%) attributed them a value below 50 cents with a mean of 
12.01 cents (median = 4 cents). Further demographic details and the number of observations per 
treatment are displayed in Table 1. 
 
 
 
                                                            
73 The ten coins/ washers that were not transferred by the dictator were placed in the personal envelope and taken home. Therefore, 
dictators could not reveal their decision to the experimenter by returning the metal washers. 
74 Despite the fact that we strived for a sample of 20 participants in each session, they turned out having variable number of 
participants because of frequent no-shows. Because of the difficulty of obtaining gender-paired samples, we preferred to collect all 
available observations (as long as pairing was met and conditions were always kept similar), instead of cancelling the session and 
having an even lengthier data collection period. Treatments were not run in any pre-determined order. 
75 A simple calculation reveals the fact that the receiver subsample is slightly smaller. Again, because of frequent no-shows, we 
decided to run the sessions where the number of dictators was excedentary and implement the decision as instructed, to one of the 
other matched receivers, by means of a lottery. Nothing changes in the experimental set up and there is no deception involved- the 
decision is implemented as stated in the instructions. 
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Table 1: Number of Independent Observations and Demographic Details per Treatment 
Give Framing 
Treatment76 Male to Male (MM) 
Male to Female 
(MF) 
Female to male 
(FM) 
Female to Female 
(FF) 
Observations N = 24 N = 23 N = 26 N = 24 
Age 23.52 (24) 22.48 (22) 22.27 (22) 23.17 (23) 
Individual Income 
(€) 
678.26 (750) 691.30 (750) 601.92 (750) 650.00 (750) 
Single 73.91 % 82.61 % 69.23 % 50.00 % 
Household Size (N) 3.61 (3) 2.96 (3) 2.69 (2) 2.54 (2) 
Game Theory 56.52 % 60.87 % 23.08 % 29.17 % 
Washer Value 4.96 (2) 5.26 (2) 15.29 (5) 15.85 (2.5) 
     
Take Framing 
Treatment Male to Male (MM) 
Male to Female 
(MF) 
Female to male 
(FM) 
Female to Female 
(FF) 
Observations N = 26 N = 25 N = 23 N = 24 
Age 23.54 (22.5) 22.52 (23) 22.59 (22.5) 22.96 (22.5) 
Individual Income 
(€) 
628.85 (750) 682.00 (750) 622.73 (750) 664.58 (750) 
Single 80.77 % 72.00 % 72.73 % 70.83 % 
Household Size (N) 3.54 (3) 3.48 (3) 2.64 (2) 2.42 (2) 
Game Theory 69.23 % 64.00 % 27.27 % 41.67 % 
Washer Value 9.33 (4) 5.16 (5) 17.49 (5) 22.88 (5) 
Note: The table includes mean values (where applicable, median values) and percentage frequencies. 
                                                            
76 The notation used to abbreviate the eight treatments applied to the 195 observations is as follows: where relevant, framing is either 
G (Give) or T (Take); gender pairing is denoted with a combination of the sender’s gender symbol first and the recipient’s gender 
symbol second, i.e., M (Male) and/or F (Female) as in MM (a Male is paired with another Male). 
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4 Hypotheses 
In the analysis that follows, we first test the robustness of the results previously reported in 
the literature. Namely, in (5.1) we check whether females generally transfer more than males and if 
they receive more than males. We also check whether framing does not matter. In a second step, in 
(5.2) we uncover the interaction of the three manipulated variables and test the following 
hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1a       The Give framing does not influence the fact that females transfer more than 
males and females receive higher transfers than males.  
Hypothesis 1ab      The Take framing does not influence the fact that females transfer more than 
males and females receive higher transfers than males. 
Hypothesis 2         Transfers in opposite-sex pairs are different from transfers in same-sex pairs; 
this holds independent of framing. 
 
5 Results 
5.1 Average amount transferred and frequency of non-zero transfers 
The average amount transferred in the pooled decisions, i.e., in the overall sample 
disregarding particular treatments, is 20.92% of the initial endowment. For pairwise comparisons 
we use Mann-Whitney-U tests and report significance levels. Dictator gender plays a significant 
role in the distribution of overall transfers, while framing does not. Female dictators transfer 
24.12% of the endowment, while male dictators transfer 17.76% (p = .06). The recipient's gender 
does not influence transfers significantly, as females receive 21.04% of the initial endowment and 
males 20.81% (p = .65). Finally, the framing of the decision does not play a role (p = .68). In the 
give frame 19.69% of the endowment is transferred; in the take frame 22.14% of the endowment is 
sent to the recipient. 
For the extensive margin, we analyze the percentage of participants transferring a non-zero 
amount to their counterpart and compare it between genders and frames through χ²-tests. 54.87% of 
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all the senders choose to transfer some money to the recipient. However, a split by dictator gender 
underlines the fact that females transfer more frequently than males: 61.86% of the females transfer 
at least 50 cents, while 54.08% do the same (p = .05). When we compare transfer frequencies 
between recipient genders and frames, no difference is found. Females receive a non-zero amount in 
58.33% of the cases, while males receive a non-zero amount in 51.52% of the cases (p = .34). Give 
and take transfer frequencies are not significantly different either (55.67% versus 54.08%; p = .82). 
In summary, looking at the pooled observations, females are more likely to transfer non-zero 
amounts and, on average, transfer higher amounts than males. In what concerns the recipient, males 
and females receive similar average amounts and do not differ at the extensive margin. Finally, 
average transfers and transfer frequencies do not differ between frames. In the following, we put 
our design to test and analyze the interaction of the three manipulated variables. 
 
5.2 Treatment comparisons and interaction effects 
Figure 1 displays the average transfers in percent for each of the eight experimental 
treatments. As shown on the left side (give framing), females transfer higher amounts than males to 
both recipient genders (on average 24.60% versus 14.47%; p = .02). The difference is mainly due to 
higher transfers to the opposite sex in the case of females and lower transfers towards the same sex 
in the case of males (26.54% versus 11.67%; p = .05). We employ “opposite sex befriending” to 
term this selectivity towards the opposite sex. The disparity between average transfers in the give 
frame, i.e., higher transfers made on average by women, disappears in the take frame (right side of 
Figure 1). Here, females and males transfer similar average amounts (23.62% versus 20.78%; p = 
.59). This seems to stem from a heightened opposite-sex “befriending” behavior, driven by the fact 
that the endowment was framed as initially belonging to the recipient: females transfer significantly 
more to males than to females when the endowment is defined as belonging the recipient (31.30% 
versus 16.25%; p = .05), and males transfer significantly more to females than to males when the 
endowment is defined as belonging to the recipient (27.60% versus 14.23%; p = .03). Rephrased, 
females take more from other females than from other males, while males take more from other 
males than from other females. Non-parametric tests comparing contributions between all 
experimental treatments are displayed in Table 2. 
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Figure 2 presents non-zero transfer frequencies for the eight experimental treatments. In the 
give frame females are on average more likely to transfer non-zero amounts (66.00% of females 
transfer non-zero amounts versus 44.68% of males; p = .04) and none of the genders discriminates 
one of the two recipient genders. In the take frame, a transfer frequency analysis reveals the same 
pattern as the analysis at the intensive margin. On average, females and males are equally likely to 
transfer non-zero amounts (57.45% versus 50.98%; p = .52). However, when we consider gender 
pairing, we find, again, that in opposite-sex pairs the frequency of non-zero transfers is significantly 
higher than in same-sex pairs. This result is robust across dictator genders and shows, again, a 
substantial difference in opposite-sex “befriending” behavior: females transfer non-zero amounts 
more frequently to males than to females (69.57% versus 45.83%; p = .10) and males transfer non-
zero amounts more frequently to females than to males (68.00% versus 34.62%; p = .02). 
 
Result 1a In the Give frame, females are generally more likely to transfer non-zero amounts and, 
on average, transfer higher amounts than males. 
Result 1b In the Take frame, transfer frequencies and average transfers are not different between 
dictator genders. 
Result 2  Framing matters in gender-paired decisions: opposite-sex preferences are stronger 
when the endowment belongs to the recipient77. Average transfers are higher in opposite-sex pairs, 
but only significantly higher in the take frame. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
77 We are claiming that the endowment belonged to the recipient, but we are aware of the fact that the dictator, having to physically 
manipulate the money, might have developed ownership over it. 
 128 
 
Figure 1: Average Amount Transferred in Percent by Treatment 
 
 
Figure 2: Non-zero Transfers: Frequencies by Treatment 
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Table 2: Treatment Comparison 
Gender Pairing within Give and Take Framings 
                Give Framing                                                                               Take Framing 
MM vs. MF           p = .43  MM vs. MF      p = .03 (*) 
MM vs. FM      p = .05 (*)  MM vs. FM       p = .02 (*) 
MM vs. FF      p = .03 (*)  MM vs. FF p = .60 
MF vs. FM p = .22  MF vs. FM p = .66 
MF vs. FF p = .29  MF vs. FF       p = .07 (+) 
FM vs. FF p = .76  FM vs. FF       p = .05 (*) 
Gender Pairing and Framing Interaction 
 TMM TMF TFM TFF 
GMM p = .93     p = .02 (*)      p = .01 (**) p = .56 
GMF p = .48 p = .12      p = .08 (+) p = .83 
GFM       p = .06 (+) p = .76 p = .50 p = .15 
GFF       p = .07 (+)  p = .50  p = .39 p = .18 
Note: Results from Mann-Whitney U Tests; values rounded to the second decimal; in parentheses (+) for trends where p < .10, and (*) for p < .05 or p 
= .05. Notation of the treatments: the first letter indicates the framing (i.e., either G for Give or T for Take), the second letter indicates the gender of 
the dictator (i.e., either F for Female or M for Male), and the third letter shows the recipient’s gender (i.e., either F for Female or M for Male). 
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5.3 Regression Analysis 
In Table 3 we specify five regression models to explain the amounts transferred in our 
experiment and confirm the results of the pairwise testing. Since our data is censored, a Tobit 
estimation with robust standard errors is the most applicable way of testing our models (Engel, 
2011)78. 
The first model solely includes the framing (0 = Take, 1 = Give), a dummy for the sender's 
gender (0 = Male, 1 = Female), and a dummy for the recipient's gender (0 = Male, 1 = Female). 
Model (2) expands with the interactions of the three dummies, and Model (3) adds the triple 
interaction. Further, to test the robustness of our results, Model (4) includes the following 
demographic controls: age in years, income category, relationship status (0 = Relationship, 1 = 
Single), and household size. Lastly, Model (5) controls for the additional effect of game theory 
knowledge, as we expect that trained participants will adopt a selfish behavior more often (Marwell 
and Ames, 1981; Frank et al., 1993). 
Our results can be summarized as follows: in the limited Model (1) only the sender's gender 
reveals a positive, significant coefficient. Therefore, controlling for framing and recipient gender, 
we confirm the previously discussed findings where females transfer significantly more than males, 
independent of the experimental manipulations. In Model (2) the sender's gender maintains a 
positive, significant coefficient, while the recipient's gender coefficient also becomes positive and 
significant. This indicates that females receive higher transfers. Framing, in line with Dreber et al. 
(2013), does not affect transfers. However, the interaction of sender and recipient gender reveals a 
significant, negative coefficient. This shows that the recipient's gender negatively affects the 
positive effect of the sender's gender on the amount transferred. Plainly, the fact that females 
transfer generally more is reversed when the recipient is another female. This supports the results 
explained in the previous subsection, where in female-female pairs (and also in male-male pairs) 
transfers are lower than in mixed pairs. In this model, framing interacted with either sender or the 
recipient’s gender does not reveal a change in the first difference. When we control for the triple 
interaction in Model (3), we see a weakly significant indication of how framing affects the interplay 
of sender and recipient genders: the second difference decreases when framing changes from Take 
to Give. Model (4) supports these results and further demonstrates that they are independent of age, 
                                                            
78 The presented results remain valid in an OLS-model (the significance of the triple interaction effect is lower). 
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income, relationship status, and household size79. Model (5) additionally shows that holding 
everything else constant, education in game theory influences transfers negatively. 
To parallel the extensive margin tests, we additionally apply a logistic model with robust 
standard errors80. Explanatory variables included in Models (6)-(10) are equivalent to Models (1)-
(5) and results, i.e., marginal effects, are presented in Table 4. We re-confirm the previous findings: 
in the limited model, the sender's gender weakly influences transfer probabilities, revealing that 
females are more likely to transfer non-zero amounts than males, when not considering the 
experimental manipulations. This persists and is even more pronounced in the later models, where 
we introduce more controls. In Model (7) the coefficient of the recipient's gender increases, 
although it remains insignificant. The interaction of sender and recipient gender is negative and 
significant, allowing us to restate that the second difference affects the initial sender's gender effect. 
Framing and its interactions are insignificant and, at this point, an overall influence of framing can 
be rejected. Finally, the triple interaction effect in Model (8) reveals the influence of framing on the 
second difference of gender pairing. This should be read as follows: higher transfer frequencies 
exist in mixed pairs, but this effect of gender pairing is more pronounced in the take framing. 
Models (9) and (10) strengthen our findings, proving that the effects we claim are mediated by 
education, but hold independent of age, income, relationship status, and household size. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
79 We must specify that most of our participants were single and they are thus driving the results. If we re-run the models in the small 
subsample of individuals in a relationship, the effects we report disappear. This does not mean that there are no effects for committed 
individuals, but only that this subsample is too small to draw any definitive conclusions. Our data suggests that the influence of 
marital status should be analyzed in a larger sample. 
80 According to Hoetker (2007), the interpretation of the strength and direction of the interaction coefficients yielded in a logistic 
regression is, at times, counterintuitive and diverges from the straightforward interpretation in a linear, OLS model, requiring more 
caution. The effect of the interaction depends not only on its coefficient, but also on the individual coefficients and values of the 
included variables, resulting in situations where the sign of the interaction´s coefficient does not indicate the direction of the 
interaction´s effect, and the significance level does not necessarily reflect significant interaction effects for all observations in the 
sample.  To overcome these potential problems, we followed the method recommended by Cornelißen & Sonderhof (2008) and ran 
additional analysis using the “inteff3” program for Stata, where standard errors for the marginal effects are also computed. We then 
uncovered that the sign of the interaction coefficients of interest hold (Gender Sender x Gender Recipient; Gender Sender x Gender 
Recipient x Framing), thus confirming the interpretation we propose, but the significance level of the triple interaction weakens, 
pointing towards trends in our results, as opposed to robust frame and gender-pairing interactions in a non-linear fashion (the analysis  
is attached in the Appendix). 
 132 
 
Table 3: Tobit Regression Results 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
Framing  
(0= Take, 1= Give) 
- 3.085 
(5.858) 
- 11.36  
(10.63) 
- 0.469 
(12.59) 
1.311  
(12.42) 
- 1.906 
(12.36) 
Gender Sender  
(0= Male, 1= Female) 
12.20* 
(5.902) 
21.63*  
(10.58) 
31.60* 
(12.71) 
34.80** 
(12.60) 
23.96+ 
(12.16) 
Gender Recipient  
(0= Male, 1= Female) 
2.485 
 (5.814) 
16.96+  
(9.864) 
26.58* 
(11.57) 
27.60* 
(11.58) 
26.08* 
(11.38) 
Framing x Gender Sender  12.70     (11.41) 
- 7.355 
(17.06) 
- 10.91 
(16.95) 
- 8.808 
(16.22) 
Framing x Gender Recipient  3.662    (11.46) 
- 17.05 
(16.69) 
- 19.23 
(16.47) 
- 17.83 
(16.01) 
Gender Sender x Gender Recipient     - 31.61** (11.47) 
- 51.21** 
(16.73) 
- 54.53** 
(16.76) 
- 49.69** 
(16.08) 
Framing x Gender Sender x Gender 
Recipient 
  39.66
+ 
(22.94) 
44.23+ 
(22.51) 
41.15+ 
(21.56) 
Age    0.690  (1.038) 
0.872  
(0.991) 
Income Category    0.965  (5.511) 
1.063 
 (5.349) 
Relationship Status  
(0= Single, 1= Relationship) 
   5.011  (6.778) 
5.721 
 (6.619) 
Household Size    - 0.0946 (1.446) 
- 0.470 
(1.438) 
Game Theory (0 = No, 1 = Yes)     - 23.35*** (5.842) 
Constant 2.804 (6.340) - 1.136  (8.550) 
- 6.223 
(9.671) 
-27.63 
(28.44) 
- 14.29 
(28.29) 
sigma Constant 37.62*** (2.450) 
36.46*** 
(2.399) 
36.22*** 
(2.368) 
35.76*** 
(2.360) 
33.93*** 
(2.334) 
N 195 195 195 193 193 
Note: Significant results are flagged with (+) for trends where p < .10, with (*) for p < .05, with (**) for p < .01 and with (***) for p < .001.  Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. 
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Table 4: Logistic Regression Results 
 Model (6) Model (7) Model (8) Model (9) Model (10) 
Framing  
(0= Take, 1= Give) 
0.0122 
(0.0723) 
- 0.0785 
(0.127) 
0.0739 
(0.144) 
0.0981 
(0.144) 
0.0707 
(0.155) 
Gender Sender  
(0= Male, 1= Female) 
0.139+ 
(0.0711) 
0.199+ 
(0.119) 
0.347** 
(0.134) 
0.390** 
(0.134) 
0.310* 
(0.152) 
Gender Recipient  
(0= Male, 1= Female) 
0.0690 
(0.0720) 
0.190 
(0.117) 
0.331* 
(0.131) 
0.341* 
(0.133) 
0.348* 
(0.141) 
Framing x Gender Sender  0.149 (0.137) 
- 0.162 
(0.206) 
- 0.221 
(0.206) 
- 0.213 
(0.213) 
Framing x Gender Recipient  0.0270 (0.146) 
- 0.277 
(0.191) 
- 0.308 
(0.189) 
- 0.306 
(0.199) 
Gender Sender x Gender Recipient  - 0.272* (0.135) 
- 0.519*** 
(0.137) 
- 0.553*** 
(0.132) 
- 0.548*** 
(0.142) 
Framing x Gender Sender x Gender 
Recipient 
  0.447*** (0.116) 
0.473*** 
(0.0999) 
0.472*** 
(0.101) 
Age    0.00223 (0.0138) 
0.00446 
(0.0141) 
Income Category    - 0.00852 (0.0709) 
- 0.000264 
(0.0747) 
Relationship Status  
(0= Single, 1= Relationship) 
   0.0862 (0.0878) 
0.108 
(0.0927) 
Household Size    0.00223 (0.0183) 
- 0.00252 
(0.0175 
Game Theory (0 = No, 1 = Yes)     - 0.260*** (0.0781) 
N 195 195 195 193 193 
Note: Significant results are flagged with (+) for trends where p < .10, with (*) for p < .05, with (**) for p < .01 and with (***) for p < .001.  Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. Additional analysis of Model (9) were ran with the  inteff3 program for Stata, as suggested by Cornelißen 
& Sonderhof (2008) and are included in the Appendix. 
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6 Conclusion 
We have shown that, in a non-strategic interaction, gender pairing matters and social context 
enables preferential money transfers towards the opposite sex. Generally, both females and males 
transfer more to the other gender. Yet, common favoritism is statistically significant only when the 
context implies that the endowment, but not the decision, belongs to the recipient. We conclude that 
framing matters for gender-paired dictator games. 
Gender considerations are important in social interactions and social interactions are rarely 
context-free. Thus, the interplay between gender pairing and framing should not be ignored. If we 
overlook this factorial coaction, our data confirms that females generally transfer more than males 
and framing does not matter. But, as pointed out before, we discovered that gender-paired dictator 
game transfers could be context-sensitive. That is, females take significantly more from other 
females than from males when the money belongs to the counterpart, and give less to other females 
than to males when the money is theirs. In a similar fashion, males take significantly more from 
other males than from females when the endowment belongs to their counterpart, and give less to 
other males than to females when the endowment belongs to themselves. 
For now, we can only speculate, but cannot disentangle the motives behind this behavior. 
However, we would like to point at the importance of gender pairing for social games and its 
interaction with framing. Additional insights into the motives behind this context-sensitive 
“befriending” of the opposite sex can be gained in experimental settings disentangling motivation. 
As an example, a setting where, in a treatment, money transfers are publicized, might reveal 
information about reputational concerns. Another setting, where, in a treatment, the marital status of 
the participants is revealed, might give information about reproduction concerns and mate 
competition. Finally, a setting where an experimental treatment consists of allocating endowment 
according to meritorious results in an effort task in both frames might shed light over these selective 
allocations that, in our case, are based on cash windfall. 
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Appendix 
 
Instructions 
In what follows we present the translated instructions of the Give Male to Female treatment. By 
changing the sender or recipient gender all other give treatments were constructed. Please note 
that the translation highlights the gender of both sender and recipient. In German this is not 
required since gender is embedded in the inflection. The original German instructions, except for 
the gender pairing details, were first used by Kettner and Waichman (2014).  
General Information 
Dear (male) participant, 
Thank you for participating in this study on decision-making. In the following you will be informed 
about the rules and procedures. Every (male) participant has received the same printed instructions 
as you did. Please take your time and read the instructions carefully.  
No communication with other (male) participants 
All decisions in this study are private. Please do not communicate with the other (male) 
participants. Otherwise, we are forced to exclude you from the experiment and you will have to 
forgo your payment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The (male or female) 
experimenter will answer your question quietly.  
Anonymous matching 
In this study, you will be randomly matched with another (female) participant from the other room. 
The randomization is carried out according to the number you drew during registration at the 
beginning of this study. The matching will not be made public and no (male) participant can 
reconstruct which other (female) participant he is matched to. 
This experiment is completely anonymous. Your identity will not be made public and you will 
not receive information about the identity of the other (male) participants in this room and 
the other (female) participants in the other room. 
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General information about the decision task 
Both you and the matched (female) participant received 5 € for your participation at the beginning. 
In addition to this, you have another 5 € which is in your personal envelope, on the table in front of 
you. The other matched (female) participant has nothing (0 €). 
You can now leave the amount you just received unchanged or reduce it, and increase the 
amount of the (female) participant you have been matched with. 
How to make your decision 
On the table in front of you, you see two envelopes: one is your personal envelope and the other 
envelope belongs to the other (female) participant. In order to distinguish between the envelopes, 
they are marked: your personal envelope is marked ''YOUR PERSONAL ENVELOPE''; the 
envelope of the other (female) participant is marked ''ENVELOPE OF OTHER (FEMALE) 
PARTICIPANT''.  
Content of the two envelopes 
Your personal envelope contains a total of 20 coins, out of which ten are 50 cents coins (5 €) and 
ten are worthless coins (metal washers). The washers have the purpose of keeping your decision 
completely anonymous with respect to other persons including the (male and female) 
experimenters.  
The envelope of the other (female) participant is empty. 
Please make sure, that your personal envelope contains ten 50 cents coins and ten worthless 
washers by emptying the contents onto the table in front of you.  
Receipt 2: This receipt is only for accounting purposes. After you signed the receipt, we ask you to 
place it in the sealed collection box and continue with your decision. The sealed box is used so that 
the (male and female) experimenters cannot see the name written on the receipt. All (male) 
participants in this room sign the second receipt. The (female) participants in the other room will 
not sign such a receipt.  
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The decision 
After you have emptied the contents of your personal envelope on the table in front of you and 
signed the receipt, please put exactly ten coins/washers back in your personal envelope. Similarly, 
put exactly ten coins/washers into the envelope of the other (female) participant. In the appendix, 
we present all possible decisions (for the appendix see last page of instructions).  
Completing the decision and sealing the envelopes 
As soon as you have made your decision, put your personal envelope into your pocket (coat etc.). 
Please seal the envelope of the other (female) participant (i.e., use the flap-tape to seal the envelope) 
and place it in the box located behind you, on the floor. (Important: Please do not hand the 
envelope to another person or to the (male or female) experimenter, but place it directly in the 
collection box.) 
After all (male) participants in this room have made their decision, a (male or female) experimenter 
will carry the box to the other room in which a second (male or female) experimenter will take over 
the box and distribute the envelopes to the assigned (female) participants. Nobody in the other room 
is informed about your identity.  
Anonymity 
We have planned the experiment in a way that guarantees your anonymity at all times. 
1. Your identity is never revealed to another person.  
2. The (male or female) experimenter who distributes the envelopes to the (female) 
participants in the other room was not present at the time you made your personal decision. 
He or She and the other (female) participants do not know from whom they received the 
envelope.  
3. After the decision we will ask you to fill in an anonymous questionnaire. The questions are 
used for the evaluation of the study and none of your answers can be linked to your identity. 
 
Thank you very much for your support! 
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 [Translated Instructions of the Take Female from Female treatment. By changing the sender or 
recipient gender all other take treatments were constructed.] 
General Information 
Dear (female) participant, 
Thank you for participating in this study on decision-making. In the following you will be informed 
about the rules and procedures. Every (female) participant has received the same printed 
instructions as you did. Please take your time and read the instructions carefully.  
No communication with other (female) participants 
All decisions in this study are private. Please do not communicate with the other (female) 
participants. Otherwise, we are forced to exclude you from the experiment and you will have to 
forgo your payment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand. The (male or female) 
experimenter will answer your question quietly.  
Anonymous matching 
In this study, you will be randomly matched with another (female) participant from the other room. 
The randomization is carried out according to the number you drew during registration at the 
beginning of this study. The matching will not be made public and no (female) participant can 
reconstruct which other (female) participant she is matched to. 
This experiment is completely anonymous. Your identity will not be made public and you will 
not receive information about the identity of the other (female) participants in this room and 
the other (female) participants in the other room. 
General information about the decision task 
Both you and the matched (female) participant received 5 € for your participation at the beginning. 
In addition to this, the other (female) participant you are matched with has another 5 € in the 
envelope labeled envelope other (female) participant. It is found on the table in front of you. You 
have nothing (0 €). 
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You can now leave the amount she just received unchanged or reduce it, and increase  your 
amount. 
How to make your decision 
On the table in front of you, you see two envelopes: one belongs to the other (female) participant 
and the other is your personal envelope. In order to distinguish between the envelopes, they are 
marked: the envelope of the other (female) participant is marked ''ENVELOPE OF OTHER 
(FEMALE) PARTICIPANT''; your personal envelope is marked ''YOUR PERSONAL 
ENVELOPE''. 
Content of the two envelopes 
The envelope the (female) participant contains a total of 20 coins, out of which ten are 50 cents 
coins (5 €) and ten are worthless coins (metal washers). The washers have the purpose of keeping 
your decision completely anonymous with respect to other persons including the (male and female) 
experimenters.  
Your personal envelope is empty. 
Please make sure, that the envelope of the other (female) participant contains ten 50 cents coins and 
10 worthless washers by emptying the contents onto the table in front of you.  
Receipt 2: This receipt is only for accounting purposes. After you signed the receipt, we ask you to 
place it in the sealed collection box and continue with your decision. The sealed box is used so that 
the (male and female) experimenters cannot see the name written on the receipt. All (female) 
participants in this room sign the second receipt. The (female) participants in the other room will 
not sign such a receipt.  
The decision 
After you have emptied the contents of the envelope of the other (female) participant on the table in 
front of you and signed the receipt, please put exactly ten coins/washers back in the envelope of the 
other (female) participant. Similarly, put exactly ten coins/washers into your personal envelope. In 
the appendix, we present all possible decisions (for the appendix see last page of instructions).  
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Completing the decision and sealing the envelopes 
As soon as you have made your decision, put your personal envelope into your pocket (coat etc.). 
Please seal the envelope of the other (female) participant (i.e., use the flap-tape to seal the envelope) 
and place it in the box located behind you, on the floor. (Important: Please do not hand the 
envelope to another person or to the (male or female) experimenter, but place it directly in the 
collection box.) 
After all (female) participants in this room have made their decision, a (male or female) 
experimenter will carry the box to the other room in which a second (male or female) experimenter 
will take over the box and distribute the envelopes to the assigned (female) participants. Nobody in 
the other room is informed about your identity.  
Anonymity 
We have planned the experiment in a way that guarantees your anonymity at all times. 
1. Your identity is never revealed to another person.  
2. The (male or female) experimenter who distributes the envelopes to the (female) participants 
in the other room was not present at the time you made your personal decision. He or She 
and the other (female) participants do not know from whom they received the envelope.  
3. After the decision we will ask you to fill in an anonymous questionnaire. The questions are 
used for the evaluation of the study and none of your answers can be linked to your identity. 
 
Thank you very much for your support! 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 144 
 
Table A1: Last Page of the Instructions- Give Male to Female Treatment 
You Other (female) participant Return to your personal envelope Place in the envelope of other (female) participant 
    
5 € 0 € 10 x 50 cents coins and 0 x washers 0 x 50 cents coins and 10 x washers 
    
4.5 € 0.5 € 9 x 50 cents coins and 1 x washers 1 x 50 cents coins and 9 x washers 
    
4 € 1 € 8 x 50 cents coins and 2 x washers 2 x 50 cents coins and 8 x washers 
    
3.5 € 1.5 € 7 x 50 cents coins and 3 x washers 3 x 50 cents coins and 7 x washers 
    
3 € 2 € 6 x 50 cents coins and 4 x washers 4 x 50 cents coins and 6 x washers 
    
2.5 € 2.5 € 5 x 50 cents coins and 5 x washers 5 x 50 cents coins and 5 x washers 
    
2 € 3 € 4 x 50 cents coins and 6 x washers 6 x 50 cents coins and 4 x washers 
   
1.5 € 3.5 € 3 x 50 cents coins and 7 x washers 7 x 50 cents coins and 3 x washers
    
1 € 4 € 2 x 50 cents coins and 8 x washers 8 x 50 cents coins and 2 x washers 
    
0.5 € 4.5 € 1 x 50 cents coins and 9 x washers 9 x 50 cents coins and 1 x washers 
   
0 € 5 € 0 x 50 cents coins and 10 x washers 10 x 50 cents coins and 0 x washers
 
Table A2: Last Page of the Instructions- Take Female from Female Treatment 
Other (female) participant You Return to the envelope of the other (female) participant Place in your personal envelope  
    
5 € 0 € 10 x 50 cents coins and 0 x washers 0 x 50 cents coins and 10 x washers 
    
4.5 € 0.5 € 9 x 50 cents coins and 1 x washers 1 x 50 cents coins and 9 x washers
    
4 € 1 € 8 x 50 cents coins and 2 x washers 2 x 50 cents coins and 8 x washers 
    
3.5 € 1.5 € 7 x 50 cents coins and 3 x washers 3 x 50 cents coins and 7 x washers 
    
3 € 2 € 6 x 50 cents coins and 4 x washers 4 x 50 cents coins and 6 x washers
    
2.5 € 2.5 € 5 x 50 cents coins and 5 x washers 5 x 50 cents coins and 5 x washers 
    
2 € 3 € 4 x 50 cents coins and 6 x washers 6 x 50 cents coins and 4 x washers 
    
1.5 € 3.5 € 3 x 50 cents coins and 7 x washers 7 x 50 cents coins and 3 x washers
    
1 € 4 € 2 x 50 cents coins and 8 x washers 8 x 50 cents coins and 2 x washers 
    
0.5 € 4.5 € 1 x 50 cents coins and 9 x washers 9 x 50 cents coins and 1 x washers 
    
0 € 5 € 0 x 50 cents coins and 10 x washers 10 x 50 cents coins and 0 x washers
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Table 5: Probit Regression Results 
 Model (9b) Marginal Effects inteff3 at means 
Marginal Effects 
inteff3 average ME 
Framing  
(0= Take, 1= Give) 
0.246 
(0.366) 
0.010 
(0.073) 
0.011 
(0.069) 
Gender Sender  
(0= Male, 1= Female) 
1.030** 
(0.387) 
0.159* 
(0.074) 
0.151* 
(0.070) 
Gender Recipient  
(0= Male, 1= Female) 
0.892* 
(0.368) 
0.059 
(0.074) 
0.065 
(0.069) 
Framing x Gender Sender -0.552 (0.528) 
0.132 
(0.144) 
0.135 
(0.137) 
Framing x Gender Recipient -0.789 (0.523) 
0.042 
(0.146) 
0.036 
(0.137) 
Gender Sender x Gender Recipient -1.601** (0.535) 
-0.274+ 
(0.143) 
-0.272* 
(0.138) 
Framing x Gender Sender x Gender Recipient 1.803* (0.747) 
0.682* 
(0.276) 
0.678 
(1.539) 
Age 0.005 (0.035)   
Income Category -0.025 (0.177)   
Relationship Status  
(0= Single, 1= Relationship) 
0.218 
(0.215)   
Household Size 0.004 (0.044)   
Constant -0.667 (0.957)   
N 195   
Note: Significant results are flagged with (+) for trends where p < .10, with (*) for p < .05, with (**) for p < .01 and with (***) for p < .001.  Robust 
standard errors are reported in parentheses. The first column reports the coefficients for the additional analysis of Model (9) ran with the inteff3 
program for Stata, as suggested by Cornelißen & Sonderhof (2008). The second column includes the marginal effect at means; while the third column 
provides average marginal effects for individuals. 
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Concluding Remarks 
 
 
This dissertation followed to inaugurate experimental research on economic decision-
making under chronic stress. Contributing also to the investigation of reliable biological measures 
for chronic stress and to methodological developments regarding gender-paired sharing, two 
externally valid, relevant types of decisions have been considered: decisions under uncertainty, 
mainly risk-taking, and decisions in social contexts, embedded in social preferences. 
The first study investigated if findings from acute stress research on decision-making under 
risk extended also to chronic stress and chronic cortisol exposure. Namely, the fact that acute stress 
affects risk-taking was extended and tested into an experiment measuring risk-taking through 
several parameters, as well as ambiguity-taking in connection to perceived chronic stress as 
reflected in the Trier Inventory for the Assessment of Chronic Stress, and chronic cortisol exposure 
assessed in human hair. Further, two important findings in the literature could be retested: the 
gender differences in self-reported stress measures and the gender differences in risk attitudes. The 
results unveiled a significant, positive correlation between chronic stress and factual risk-taking for 
both genders, correlation that was robust to multiple demographic and psychometric controls. 
However, this association was stronger for women than for men. Moreover, the gender differences 
maintained, in the direction predicted by the literature, in risk-taking, independent of stress, and, at 
trend level, in self-reported stress and risk-taking measures. In what regards cortisol exposure 
assessed in hair samples, there was no relation between it and risk-taking, or between it and self-
reported chronic stress. Interestingly and worth more detailed investigations, long-term averaged 
cortisol was associated, at trend level, with men’s gambling of owned money.  
In the second study, for reasons detailed below and in the discussion section of the research 
mentioned above, only self-reported chronic stress assessed by the Trier Inventory for the 
Assessment of Chronic Stress was used as a chronic stress proxy. In a basic attempt to analyze the 
effects of chronic stress on social preferences per se, social decision-making was elicited in a 
gender-paired, double-anonymous dictator game with real and hypothetical payoffs. Initial evidence 
from a singular experiment on dictator game giving among males and acute stress advanced the idea 
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that stress increases prosociality. Departing from this, the second study presented in this thesis 
checked experimentally if this conclusion would arise also in relation to chronic stress, and in 
various gender-paired conditions, beyond male-only interactions. Also, the reported higher 
cooperation specific to women was tested, along with the effect that incentives, in interaction with 
stress, might have on behavior. No significant correlation between chronic stress and social 
preferences dependent on incentivized behavior was found for either gender, independent of 
controls. However, the way that decisions are motivated matters, since women’s hypothetical social 
preferences were negatively and significantly correlated to self-reported chronic stress levels: the 
higher their perceived stress, the lower their willingness to share with an anonymous recipient.   
Finally, the third study supplied valuable methodological insights that are not only relevant 
for experimental economics, but also for experiments conducted in psychology and social 
psychology and, especially, in stress research. Because of marked differences in the hormonal 
make-up of men and women81, men-only samples have long been preferred in stress research. 
However, when aiming to control for gender differences, and, most important, when targeting to 
unravel the effects of stress in social contexts or social interactions, both genders have to be 
included and the pairing of genders further supplies information about specific patterns. While 
women have been included in multiple studies on stress, and hormonal interferences have been 
controlled for with variables like the menstrual cycle phase and oral contraceptive treatment, 
gender-pairing in social decision contexts under stress has not been investigated so far. The third 
study showed, in a purely methodological construction and independent of stress measures, that 
gender-pairing matters, especially in interaction with framing, i.e., the way that the decision was 
defined. Namely, both women and men prefer the opposite sex when it comes to money sharing, but 
this is statistically significant only when the amount to be shared is defined as belonging to the 
recipient in the first place. Thus, genders adapt their behavior in function of the gender of their 
counterpart, but also in relation to how decisions are delineated. 
The results and their possible underlying motivations are discussed in detail for both studies 
focusing on chronic stress and economic decision-making in their respective sections. In what 
follows, the overarching aspects worth noting for future research are outlined. Thereupon, possible 
future contributions are suggested, in order to advance stable and reliable methods in stress and 
decision-making research, as well as to produce further replicable knowledge and new insights: a 
                                                            
81 These specific hormones further interact with stress hormones. 
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detailed investigation of what enables gender differences in self-reported stress; an account of 
interindividual variability in stress reactivity, sensitivity, and awareness; an ecological assessments 
for the measurement of perceived stress; an evaluation of personal characteristics as mediators of 
stress reactivity and perception; and, finally, the employment of real-world compatible motivations 
in laboratory tasks.   
The first aspect worth mentioning is that perceived chronic stress is significantly related to 
economic decision-making. With a notable gender emphasis on women´s behavior, chronic stress 
positively relates to risk-taking in the gain domain and negatively relates to hypothetical money 
transfers in the dictator game. However, this relation is correlational and does not allow for causal 
inferences. In what concerns the gender difference, it might be generated by multiple motives, but 
two plausible causes are the increased stress sensitivity of women, and the increased proneness to 
report more symptoms, again, of women. When employing self-reported measures it is important to 
discover if there is a gender specific tendency to purely accuse more symptoms, since this grants 
false comparisons between genders. If, however, the over-reporting is heterogeneous per se, having 
elemental causes like higher self- and bodily-awareness, greater sensitivity, or frequent self-
assessment, research could initiate treating genders as separate, particular cases, where the 
perceived impact of various conditions and states should be differentially evaluated. This is a first 
important avenue of research that could have immediate, valuable consequence on methodology 
and research practices, while motivating some of the reported gender differences in the literature. 
The second relevant aspect is the measurement of chronic stress. The concept of “chronic 
stress” was clearly equated to perceived stress exposure throughout this thesis, but a supplementary, 
biological measure exists and initial expectations were that it would reflect similar, correlated levels 
to the self-reported assessments. As shown in the first study in two different samples, the Trier 
Inventory for the Assessment of Chronic Stress (TICS) or the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS) and 
chronic cortisol exposure seem to diverge, possibly reflecting different aspects of prolonged stress 
exposure. This points somewhat back to the idea itemized before, of heterogeneity in sensitivity or 
awareness to stress, as some individuals might be highly reactive to stressors but less aware, while 
others might have low reactivity but higher awareness, and these differences complicate 
straightforward, correlational analyses between cortisol reactivity, perceived distress and behavior. 
Also, the gap could pertain to the populations targeted in the experiments, as their stress levels 
might be insufficient to elicit a marked cortisol response. Nonetheless, some smaller effect size of a 
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positive association is reasonable to be expected even in this case. Finally, the measures themselves 
might be partisan to retrospective bias, for the self-reports, and to procedural inadvertences, for the 
hair cortisol. While the literature offers the alternative of the cortisol awakening response (CAR) for 
the biological facet of prolonged stress, self-reports could be replaced in a second future research 
avenue: using daily assessments over a longer period to obtain an averaged measure of perceived 
stress. While this might still be subject to heterogeneity in self-reporting and stress reactivity, which 
should be anyway controlled for in any future study, it could provide a more accurate evaluation of 
the experienced stress. Furthermore, besides controlling for the heterogeneity in stress reactivity and 
stress perception, mediated or not by gender, there is a constellation of factors that should also be 
accounted for, since they could enrich the models derived in stress research on economic and non-
economic decision-making: personal characteristics as neuroticism and trait anxiety could further 
mediate stress reactivity and stress perception. 
Lastly, the discussion has to encompass the idea of how elicited behavior is motivated. It 
was clearly shown in the second study that behavior differs between real and hypothetical payments 
and that stress is related only to hypothetical decisions, with incentives washing out any association 
between stress and money transfers. While the hypothetical decisions do indicate the same direction 
and could therefore serve as initial evidence, incentivized behaviors manage to exclude alternative 
motivations like, to name a few, reputational concerns, the wish to impress, over-represented 
positive self-image, or responding to believed experimenter demand. To strengthen the matter, the 
first study has shown that behavior in an incentive-compatible task relates strongly and significantly 
to actual behavior where one´s previously owned money is at risk. It must be that, given these 
observations, incentivized experiments offer better predictions concerning behavior outside the 
laboratory for demeanor that is ultimately financially motivated, while unincentivised experiments 
better predict decisions and behavior that cannot be financially motivated. This should be carefully 
noted for future experimental work on economic decision-making and stress, versus non-economic 
decision-making and stress. 
 
 
 
